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

PRESENTED BY THOMAS WELTON STANFORD.

THE

WAR IN EUROPE

OF

1870-1;

WITH

AN ENQUIRY INTO ITS PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES.

BY T. D. WANLISS.

BALLARAT:

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED AT THE "STAR" OFFICE.

1871.

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THIS LITTLE VOLUME

IS MOST RESPECFULLY DEDICATED

TO

THOMAS CARLYLE,

IN WHOSE EARNEST PAGES THE

DISCRIMINATING READER MIGHT YEARS

AGO HAVE FORESEEN THE IMMINENT ADVENT OF

THE PRESENT GREATNESS OF PRUSSIA; AND IN

WHOSE STIRRING APPEALS IN HIS VARIOUS WORKS TO THE

NOBLEST ELEMENTS OF OUR NATURE THE WRITER

THANKFULLY AND WILLINGLY RECOGNISES

HIS HIGHEST LIVING

TEACHER.

PREFACE.

THE series of papers which compose this little book was begun in the *Ballarat Star* in the month of September last, shortly after the news reached this colony of the declaration of war by France against Prussia, and was continued from time to time, as each monthly mail brought a further instalment of news for narration, for comment, or for speculation. I at first thought that my task would be a very short one, as when I began it, I had no intention of giving a narrative, however brief, of the war. My aim was simply to endeavor, so far as in me lay, to make clear to the readers of the *Ballarat Star*, the position and strength of the belligerent powers; to trace the causes which had brought them into collision, and then generally to point out how the success either of France or of Prussia would affect the general politics of Europe, and more especially the position of Great Britain. In other words, the narrative portion, viz.: the papers from IV. to XIII, are interpolations in my original plan. It is hardly worth while explaining

how the plan was changed—suffice it to say, that it was; that these extra papers were duly published as a portion of the series, and having been so, they are now republished, and in default of a better, may to some readers serve as a brief narrative of one of the most wonderful wars in history.

It will be seen that a portion, of the earlier papers especially, is devoted to an explanation or examination of the telegraphic news forwarded to India after the departure of the mail from England. Those telegrams were always curt and meagre, and often somewhat difficult of explanation. Except a few verbal alterations, I have not altered the text in any way.

The concluding papers or chapters, viz., from XIV. onwards, were not published in the *Star;* they are therefore new to the public. In these it will be seen that I express pretty decided views as to the peaceable intentions of new Germany. That the new empire will altogether avoid war I do not say, or think at all probable; but I believe that the German people, like the British people, have an intense aversion to war for mere war's sake, and that they will not begin one for the sake of glory, or to quiet internal dissension; and certainly that they will not enter upon any war "with a light heart." I believe the German people to be, on the

whole, as peaceably disposed as the British people; and, holding this view, I regard it as neither right nor wise for us to launch accusations of aggressiveness against such neighbors. It is not for us to cast such a stone. Germany has long been the natural ally of Britain, and is now more than ever likely to be valuable to us in that respect, unless we wantonly alienate her sympathies.

T. D. WANLISS.

Star Office,
Ballarat, 10th May, 1871.

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in 1740, Prussia steadily advanced in importance. Her history under this monarch is well known. His seizure of Silesia led to the famous "Seven Years' War," when Prussia, then only with a population of two or three millions of people, and assisted by the British Government, maintained a successful struggle against the combined forces of Austria, France, Russia, and Sweden. This wonderful contest proved to be a turning point in the history of Germany. Thenceforward, the leading minds and spirits of Germany saw that in Prussia the race had secured a worthy leader, and that kingdom consequently became the nucleus of German progress and power, though Austria still loomed the larger on the political horizon. Of the Napoleonic wars in the beginning of this century it is not necessary to say much, further than that the insults and the terrible oppression and exactions of the French from the battle of Jena to that of Leipzic burned deep into the hearts of the German people, and begat, or rather intensified that yearning desire for national union which had for so many centuries been frustrated. The peace of 1815 brought Prussia a great accession of territory, the most valuable portion being what is now termed Rhenish Prussia, a populous province lying on both banks of the Rhine to the south of the Netherlands, and having France for its western boundary. Then for the first time the present belligerents stood face to face as contiguous nations, touching and confronting each other; Prussia with a frontier territory peopled by Germans, France with her frontier territory (Lorraine) peopled by a race which, though not of French origin, yet were then content if not proud to be termed such. At this date

the population of France was about 29 millions, and that of Prussia a little over 10 millions.

If we measure the two kingdoms at this period (1815-16) by their respective populations, we find the superiority of France apparently overwhelming. Twenty-nine millions to ten, and the larger power in possession of the great prestige conferred on it by the dazzling successes of Napoleon, seems a disproportion that makes a comparison almost ridiculous. As now interpreted, however, by the subsequent march of events, the position of Prussia even in 1816 can be shown to have been one that might not unfairly be placed in the lists against that of France. France had then absorbed all the people of her own race and language and something more, with the exception of the Walloon Provinces of Belgium, and a part of Switzerland and Savoy. With these exceptions, therefore, she could only extend her frontiers by annexing territory peopled by another race—a process of aggrandisement, possible enough as she had already proved, by swallowing part of Flanders, Lorraine, and Alsace, but likely to become perilous if Germany became united under a capable leader. Prussia stood in a different position. Though numerically only about a third of her powerful rival, she held the position of leader in Northern Germany, and in Germany the wealth, intelligence, and political power of the race were rapidly centreing themselves in the north. True, there was another great German power, Austria, which had been the leader of Germany for centuries, and still apparently held there the foremost place. Prussia had to supplant her in Germany before she could pretend to

cope with her western rival. The task might well seem a hopeless one, to contend with an internal as well as an external antagonist, each three times numerically more powerful than herself. But Prussia had raised herself to her position of 1816 against infinitely greater odds than these; her people were vigorous and enterprising; her governmental machinery was the most admirably organised in the world; and further, her great deeds in the "Seven Years' War," and her wonderful exertions against Napoleon from 1813 to 1815 had made her the historical centre of Germany. The veterans who had fought against Napoleon, as they sat by the firesides of the Fatherland, and told the stirring stories of the campaigns of '13 and '14, and of the final defeat of their great enemy at Waterloo, could only speak of the Prussian Blucher as *their* national leader and hero. Austria no doubt had helped largely to the overthrow of their enemy, and so had Russia and Britain, but Germany had been led by Prussia, and the influence of such leadership gradually became, year by year, more and more felt. The soul of German life and of German patriotism, so to speak, was thenceforth to be found in Prussia.

In the fifty years that passed away after 1816, both of the rival nations made considerable progress, the larger one, France, apparently maintaining her relative position of superiority. During that time she had rid herself, first of the elder and then of the Orleans branch of the Bourbons, and had established a Republic, which had been succeeded by the second Empire. Under the firm rule of Napoleon the Third, she increased greatly in trade and in wealth, and still more so in *prestige*. The

Crimean war, which humbled Russia, again brought the deeds of French soldiers prominently before Europe, and the campaign in Lombardy in '59, where Austria was defeated in several great battles, once more placed France in the proud position of Dictator to the continent of Europe. "When France is satisfied, Europe is at peace." "Not a cannon shot can be fired in Europe without the consent of France." Such were the utterances of the French Emperor and his prefects in those days, and the other nations of Europe began again to fear that their restless neighbor was about to enter on another era of conquest and of plunder. The territory of the Empire had meanwhile been increased since 1816. Louis Philippe had conquered Algeria, and Savoy had been ceded by the King of Sardinia to Napoleon for his assistance in Lombardy in 1859. An important possession in Cochin China was also seized in 1860. Meanwhile the population of France alone, including Savoy, had increased to upwards of 38 millions. The opening of the year 1866 then saw France confessedly the leading military power in Europe, and with a prestige, second only to that she had acquired under the first Napoleon.

The progress of Prussia during the same period was of a less dazzling character, and at the close of 1865, most observers would have agreed that during the fifty years that had elapsed since 1815, she had in the development of power been greatly distanced by France. In reality it was not so. The progress of Prussia was internal, and had attracted little notice; but it was none the less real, and as it prepared the way for the unification of

Northern Germany, was in reality infinitely more important than the territorial acquisitions or the military menaces of France. The Zollverein, the famous Customs Union of Germany, was the chief instrument by which Prussia developed her power during the period we speak of. Previous to its introduction by Prussia, each kingdom and each petty government in Germany levied its own duties at its frontiers, with a result that may be imagined. Trade was all but paralysed, the growth of population was restricted, and perhaps worse than all as regarded the future development of Germany, there was no free play of national life or of national feeling. Each kingdom and each petty state sought to stand by itself, and thought its chief duty consisted in being jealous of, and in watching its neighbor. Had such a system continued for another hundred years, in all probability Germany would have shared the fate of Poland, and would have been devoured, province by province, and state by state, by France on the one side, and by Russia on the other. From such a calamity not only to herself, but to Europe and the world at large, Germany was saved by the foresight of Prussia. Shortly after the close of the Napoleonic wars, her statesmen endeavored to get the various States of Germany to agree to a common tariff, of which the duties were to be collected at the frontiers of the common territory, and the proceeds divided amongst the various governments according to their respective populations. The scheme at first encountered much opposition from the jealousy and short-sightedness of the various governments, but it gradually made way, till, in 1836, it embraced more than half

of Germany, excluding the German portion of Austria. In 1860, all the other States, with one or two unimportant exceptions, but still excluding Austrian Germany, had joined the Zollverein. The commercial advantages of this union were great. Internal and foreign trade increased greatly; canals and railroads were extended throughout the whole of Germany, and population rapidly advanced. In 1860, that of Prussia was about seventeen millions and a half. But, great as were the commercial advantages of the Zollverein, the political results were infinitely more important. The quickened commercial intercourse resulting from the Zollverein brought the people of the various States together, and the arrangement of its terms and other business connected with its management, naturally led to a corresponding acquaintance of the politicians and statesmen of the various contracting powers.

While the people of Germany were thus being ripened for union, the great events that, in 1860, took place in Italy, and which, through the genius of Cavour and the heroism of Garibaldi, had resulted in Italy becoming once more, with the exception of Venice and Rome, a great and united kingdom, quickened the national desire for the union of Germany. It became more than ever clear that the day of small States had gone by and that the union of Germany must be speedily carried out, otherwise it might be altogether frustrated. What Italy had done surely Germany could also do. At this time Count Bismarck began to appear prominently in the field of Prussian politics. He saw clearly the important crisis in which Germany was placed, and he prepared for it

with a vigor and a resolution that overcame all obstacles. His experience as a diplomatist at Frankfort, St. Petersburg, and Paris, had made him well acquainted with the great difficulties in the way of German unity, and had shown him that though the internal obstacles had been to a great extent removed, the still more dangerous external ones had yet to be encountered. These lay, firstly, in the opposition of Austria; secondly, in that of France. Bismarck endeavored to increase the Prussian army, and to make it more effective than it had previously been. In this he was strongly opposed by the Prussian Parliament on the ground of economy; but supported by the King, he acted with a Cromwellian vigor and ruthlessness of purpose. When he could not get the consent of Parliament he acted without it, telling the members, in one of his famous speeches, that Germany could not be made a united nation by talk, but only "by blood and iron." He carried his point, and when the second Schleswig-Holstein war broke out, in 1864, the Prussian army was in such an admirable state of efficiency that Bismarck's high-handed policy was condoned. The Prussian people began to see that they had at last an able and a resolute leader. Then arose differences with Austria respecting the disposal of the conquered provinces, Schleswig and Holstein. These differences were for a time settled by the Convention of Gastein, but Bismarck, long ere this, seemed to have resolved on a struggle with Austria for the supremacy in Germany, believing that the thorough union of Germany was impracticable till the position of Austria as a German power was destroyed, and she was compelled to

acknowledge the supremacy of Prussia in Germany. In his bold outspoken way, he once bluntly told the astonished Austrian ambassador that Austria was not a German but a Sclavonic power, and that she must seek her centre of gravity at Buda, and not at Vienna. The war of 1866 followed with the result known to all. Austria ceased to be a German power connected with the rest of Germany; and Prussia at last stood forth before the world as the acknowledged leader of Germany, in war, as well as in peace.

II.

The result of the campaign of 1866 startled all Europe, and no nation more than France. It is perhaps not saying too much, that the defeat of Sadowa was as sorely felt in Paris as in Vienna. The latter is a great German capital, deeply imbued with German feeling and impulse, and it was there felt that after all, though Austria had lost, Germany had gained. It can easily be conceived indeed, that some far-seeing Austrian Germans looking at the ultimate results of Sadowa, might regard it with satisfaction; for had not Austria been for centuries tried as a leader of Germany, and almost invariably been found wanting. Austria, though a great power, was not great as a German power, but as a Sclavonic one, and after all, Bismarck's rough words might have been salutary and true. But there was no such consolation left for the French. The full force of the blow to them was not at first felt. The unification of Italy had been followed by

the cession of Savoy, and why should not a similar price follow the unification of Germany? It was known that previous to the campaign of 1866, Bismarck had visited Napoleon at Biarritz, and it was hinted in the Parisian salons that then no doubt the Emperor had stipulated, that if Prussia should be successful and should receive an accession of territory and of power, she should pay to France a price for her acquiescence. But if such an arrangement had been agreed on, it had only been in an informal way, for on the terms of peace being arranged at Prague between the contending powers, it was found that France was to receive no accession of territory. Prussia had left Austria intact; not taking Bohemia, it was understood, as she intended to have done, owing to the threats of France; but annexing Hanover and some of the smaller German powers that had opposed her, and incorporating, though not annexing, the whole of North Germany to the Main in a confederation of which Prussia was to have the leadership in the event of war, and to be the diplomatic representative abroad. When these terms of the treaty became known in France, the most intense dissatisfaction was felt. A demand, it was said, was made by the Emperor to the King of Prussia for the cession of the Rhenish provinces in compensation for the aggrandisement of Prussia, but Bismarck's reply was to the effect that he dared not alienate a foot of German territory, for fear of a revolution in Germany. So ran the story at the time, though on this point we are not aware that the knowledge is precise. But of the deep annoyance felt in France at the result of the war there can be no doubt. The French

saw rising on their eastern frontier, and joining territory with them, a rival more formidable than any other power in Europe was likely to be. Touching their frontier in Alsace and Lorraine, the easy victor in the campaign of '66 which she had organised and managed in a way that compelled the admiration of Europe, and now the exultant leader of Germany, Prussia seemed for the time to overshadow France. Had the French army then been properly armed, in all probability France would at once have joined Austria and have declared war against Prussia. But the dread of the wonderful needle rifle was great, and the French Government unwillingly and sullenly accepted the position, and began at once to improve her weapons of war and to increase her army.

From the feeling then shown by the French people, and the temper displayed by many French statesmen, it became painfully evident that war against Prussia could only be ultimately avoided by the display of great forbearance and great wisdom on the part of the Emperor. The national soreness was excessive, and the antipathy to Prussia became bitter in the extreme, while the name of Bismarck to the popular mind of France became what that of Marlborough was a century and a half ago. France was menaced, it was said, by this new and arrogant neighbor of hers on the east. A thorough re-organisation of the French army took place so as to put its numbers on an equality with those of Northern Germany. Then followed the Luxembourg embroilment in 1867, which, but for the interposition of the British Government would then have resulted in war. That difficulty passed away, but

France went on steadily with her warlike preparations, and it was generally understood that but for the revolution in Spain in 1868, which disarranged the plans of the French Emperor, war against Prussia would then have been begun. Indeed, unless France can clearly show that Prussia meditated an attack on her, it is difficult to account for her preparations, and her doings during the last three or four years, except on the hypothesis that she was steadily preparing for a conflict, which she meant to provoke if it did not otherwise come.

In the meanwhile Prussia was not idle. Having annexed Hanover, Nassau, Frankfort, and other minor powers that had opposed her, and virtually possessed herself of Saxony, she organised a new Government or Parliament for North Germany, on the basis of universal suffrage, and in which each State is represented according to its population. Under the new government the navy and army are both placed under the command of Prussia, which also represents the confederation abroad. An offensive and defensive alliance was also formed with South Germany, thus constituting Germany, exclusive of Austria, one united nation, virtually under the leadership of Prussia. The process of consolidation was still going on, slowly but surely and warily during the present year; the more important laws—what we term imperial acts—were being unified at the last sitting of the North German Parliament, and in other respects, Bismarck was steadily welding the great German people into one powerful nation, when there arose the difficulty that has led to the present war, the question of the Hohenzollern nomination to the Spanish throne.

We have thus briefly summarised the events which have preceded the rise of Prussia to her present powerful position, because unless we did so the general reader would hardly be in a position to appreciate the great strength she can draw upon in the terrible contest she is now engaged in, or be able to judge so clearly which of the combatants is in the right. From our summary, imperfect as it is, it will be gathered that the great development of Prussian power has almost entirely proceeded from German sources. The growth of Prussia, in fact, has been a natural growth, so far as the growth of a nation can be said to be so. It has been the yearning desire of the German people to constitute themselves into a nation, that has aided the growth of Prussia, and has at last placed her where she now is, in the first rank of European powers. Her accretions have all, or nearly all, been German, with the grand exception of Poland, a portion of which she acquired in the great and disgraceful partition of that country in the latter half of last century. This is the great blot, but it is almost the only one, in the history of the formation of the Prussian territory. English readers are accustomed to look on the last Danish war as an unwarrantable one, and as a dreadful spoliation of a small and weak kingdom by two powerful ones, Austria and Prussia, assisted by the rest of Germany. It is not our intention, nor have we space, to enter at length into the merits of this difficult and complicated question, but we may observe that English readers, while admitting that the Germans may have had considerable grounds of complaint against Denmark, decide the question against them at once on what they

deem the sufficient plea, that, whatever may have been the merits of the dispute, it was a clear case of tyranny and of an abuse of power for Austria, Prussia, and the rest of Germany to make a combined attack on a small State with a population of only two millions. To take the side of the weak is doubtless a most estimable quality, but it seems to be forgot that when the German Diet declared war against Denmark there is no reason to assume that it was entered upon because Denmark was weak. On the contrary, the probability at the time was, that Denmark would prove, with her allies, to be the more powerful of the two belligerents. For it must be remembered that France and Britain were both pledged to defend Denmark in this unhappy Holstein business, and therefore Germany had every reason to suppose that she would not only have Denmark, but France and Britain to contend with. The charge of an abuse of power is therefore hardly tenable, and, as regards the other points in dispute, it must be remembered that Holstein is German and long had been a member of the German Diet, and that the citizens of Holstein had complained for years as bitterly of Danish tyranny as the Danes since their defeat have complained of German arrogance and oppression.

We have alluded thus pointedly to this Holstein affair, because with British readers generally it is assumed as a matter of course that Germany was then wholly in the wrong, and on this conception or misconception of the facts, they in many cases base a strong antipathy to Prussia in the present contest with France. Probably three out of four Englishmen who are disposed to sympathise with France against

Prussia, do so, on the assumption that in the Schleswig-Holstein war Germany was all in the wrong, and Denmark was all in the right. We think we have said enough at all events to show that the case is not quite so clear as is generally supposed, and again proceed to deal with our general subject.

The feelings of soreness and of jealousy entertained by France against Prussia, owing to the great military prestige the latter power had acquired in the war of 1866 and her subsequent success in consolidating under her leadership the remainder of ex-Austrian Germany, culminated in a fierce explosion of bitterness in the first week of July last, when it became known that General Prim, the Prime Minister of Spain, had announced to the Cortes that he had offered the crown of Spain to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and that the Prince had accepted the offer. The feeling displayed was suspiciously startling, inasmuch as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs openly assumed that the nomination, if not withdrawn, would be regarded as a justification of war—not against Spain, but against Prussia. This extremely undiplomatic and excited statement was naturally regarded with the greatest anxiety by the rest of Europe, as it was naturally inferred that if the French Government, or rather the French Emperor, had not made up his mind for war with Prussia, he would not have permitted his Foreign Minister to speak of this Spanish question so uncompromisingly, until the merits of it had been carefully examined, and the share of Prussia in it ascertained. Old politicians argued that the Emperor was either determined on forcing Prussia into a war, or exacting from her such

a submission or retraction as would humble her in the eyes of Europe, and proclaim that she was afraid of encountering France in the field. It is difficult indeed to come to any other conclusion. Prince Leopold, it appears, is more nearly allied to the Bonaparte family than to the reigning House of Hohenzollern. His nomination to the Spanish throne had, it is true, been submitted to the King of Prussia, and had received his sanction, but it had never been submitted to the Prussian Ministry, and had simply been looked on as a family affair—not a State question. These explanations were made to the French Government, and the further step was taken of having the nomination withdrawn, by getting the father of the Prince to refuse his consent. When this was done, the public opinion of Europe felt satisfied that the difficulty was at an end, and that there would be no war. This would doubtless have been a correct view to take if the French Government had been acting in good faith. With the withdrawal of Prince Leopold as a candidate, any design of Prussia, if she ever had any, was removed. But the Emperor was not satisfied. He ordered his ambassador at the Prussian Court, M. Benedetti, to demand an assurance from the King that he would not give his consent to any future candidature of Prince Leopold. The King refused to do so, and then, after a few more angry flourishes on the part of the French Government, war was declared against Prussia on the 15th of July.

It is hardly possible for any unprejudiced reader, or for any reader but one very deeply prejudiced to come to any other conclusion than that France, or rather the French Emperor

and his Ministry are guilty of this war with all its cost—all its inevitable and terrible bloodshed, and all its unforeseen consequences. Whatever may have been the reasons that have urged him to such a step—whether the fear that his popularity was waning—that his dynasty was in danger—and that nothing but the *eclat* of a successful war would save it; or whether he has really resorted to war solely in the interest, or so called interest, of France, firmly believing that Prussia was getting too powerful and required to be checked, it is painfully clear that there is no sufficient ground patent to the world to justify him in the remotest degree in *forcing on* such a dreadful calamity to civilisation. By this terrible step he has outraged the public opinion of the civilised world, and should a great catastrophe in consequence fall on his throne, and a great calamity fall on the nation he leads, he cannot expect to receive the sympathy that in common fairness will be extended to his opponents should the fortune of war be against them.

III.

The part of the subject with which we now propose to deal is the respective strength of the belligerents in the various forms of national power that are likely to have effect in the contest. This is a more complex question than at first sight it would appear to be, for in a great war it is not simply the numbers that may be enrolled on either side that must be looked to, but the spirit which animates the respective combatants, their resources in

money, their training, their quality as soldiers, their equipment, and above all, and beyond all, the question of leadership. The power of intellect is evident in every department of human enterprise, but perhaps in none more so than in war. Wellington is reported on good authority to have said that under ordinary circumstances the presence of Napoleon in the field was equivalent to a reinforcement to his troops of 40,000 men, and as armies in those days generally numbered from 80,000 to 130,000 men, it follows that in Wellington's estimation the military genius of his great rival added from 30 to 50 per cent. to the strength of a French army. But military skill, however great, must in the first place have an instrument to work with, or it is as useless as a lever without a fulcrum. A large population then, from which soldiers may be drawn, and great material prosperity with which to equip and sustain them in the field, are the first necessaries of a great military power. In these respects the present belligerents are almost equally matched. Seldom, indeed, in these essentials have two more closely matched combatants taken the field. We shall take our statistics chiefly from the *Statesman's Year Book for* 1870, which is generally regarded as a good authority. From this we learn that by the census of 1866 the population of France consisted in round numbers of 38,191,000, or say 38 millions, while for 1867 the revenue was £69,215,000, and the expenditure £76,218,000; at the same time the debt amounted to £540,805,000. The army, when on a war footing, consists of 516,000 infantry, 100,000 cavalry, 66,000 artillery, 15,000 engineers, and 59,000 other troops—we

leave out the smaller figures in all these details—making a total of 757,000 men. With these, there is a reserve of 198,000, thus giving a total for effective service of 955,000 men. Then there is the National Garde Mobile, numbering 381,000 men, which "is destined as an auxiliary to the active army in the defence of the fortresses, coasts, and frontiers of the empire, and in the maintenance of order in the interior." The navy in 1869 consisted of 62 ironclads with 672 guns, 264 unarmoured screw steamers, 62 paddle steamers, and 113 sailing vessels with 2373 guns. The crews consisted of 2218 officers and 39,000 men; but on a war footing it is said the total strength of the navy, including engineers, dockyard laborers, &c., can be raised to 170,000 men. Besides these there are 28,000 marines and colonial troops. If, then, we estimate the active force of the navy at 70,000 men, we have a total fighting force, exclusive of the Garde Mobile, of 1,053,000 men.

The population and resources of Prussia by herself are considerably less than that of her rival, her population being about 24 millions; but to these have to be added the other States and free cities of North Germany, the forces of which are all under the control of, and at the disposal of Prussia during war. Including these other States, Prussia commands a population of a little over 29½ millions, all under her immediate command for war, and actually represented abroad by her Government. The South German Confederation is not so closely identified with her, having separate governments independent of the North German Parliament. But for war purposes they are virtually one, the wary Bismarck shortly after

the close of the Sadowa campaign, having secured an offensive and defensive alliance between the northern and southern confederation. The latter, which includes Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg, and two smaller States, has a population of nearly 9 millions. Prussia, therefore, leads a German population, numbering in all 38½ millions, against the 38 millions of France. On this head, therefore, the two sides are almost on an equality. It is impossible for us to give the total revenue and expenditure of Germany in the same way as that of France, as the general budget of the confederation only refers to expenditure for general purposes, nearly all of which is for the army. The total amount of the confederate expenditure for North Germany in 1869 was £11,393,000, of which nearly ten millions were for military purposes, and the greater portion of the remainder for the navy. It may be desirable, perhaps, to give the amounts of the revenue and expenditure of Prussia proper, so that our readers may so far have some standard of comparison with that of France. The Prussian revenue, then, for 1869 was £25,130,000, and the expenditure the same; the debt at the same time was £56,426,000. These figures, whether as regards revenue, expenditure, or debt, bear no comparison with those of France. On the whole, there seems to be no doubt that as regards wealth, France has a considerable superiority over Prussia, and that should the war be lasting, as it is almost certain to be, she would have in this respect an advantage. The smallness of the Prussian national debt, and the admirable economy practised by the government will, however, go far to neutralise the advantage of

France in this respect. On a peace footing the army of Prussia proper consists of about 300,000 men, viz.:—Infantry, 201,000; cavalry, 53,000; artillery, 32,000; engineers, 6000; and 8000 of the military train, &c. On a war footing, on which the army can be placed in a fortnight, the number is increased to about 700,000 men. These when increased by the contingent of the other States of North Germany, form a total strength of 977,000 men available during war, and all at the disposal and under the sole command of Prussia. Besides this array, the forces belonging to Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, forming the South German Contingent, are also in time of war placed under the command of Prussia. By the latest accounts in our possession, the total number of these when on a war footing was 135,000 men, but as the reorganisation on the Prussian basis was still going on last year in some of these States, it is probable that this number will by this time have been increased to at least 160,000 men, which would still be little more than half the proportion of men under arms in Northern Germany. The total array of German soldiers under the command of Prussia would thus amount to 1,137,000 men, against the 955,000 of French troops, while the Land Sturm, or final levy of reserve, comprising all men capable of bearing arms under 50, and which is liable to be called out when Germany is invaded, may be certainly regarded as more than equivalent to the French Garde Mobile. On the whole, then, as regards numbers, the German military force seems to decidedly outnumber the French. In naval strength, though Germany has a numerous mercantile marine, and her seamen are of

great excellence, she cannot bear a comparison with France. Great efforts have lately been made by North Germany to form a navy, but the time has been too short to permit of its being in any way formidable. There are 6 iron-clads carrying 70 guns, 9 steam frigates, 23 gunboats, and 6 other steam vessels of war carrying 271 guns. There are also 3 sailing frigates, and a few other sailing vessels of war of a smaller class. The total number of men in the navy is little over 2500. It may be assumed, therefore, that, at sea, Germany cannot pretend to cope with France, and her warships will therefore probably be employed in predatory warfare and in destroying French commerce.

In equipment and training both sides are, we think, likely to be pretty equal. The army is the one department of government on which the French people have, since the time of the first Napoleon, grudged no outlay, whether of men or money. Led by him to believe that they were the finest soldiers in the world, and the first nation in Europe, they have since chafed under any Government which did not minister to such an ambition. The present Emperor, who knows his subjects well, has taken special care to humor this Gallic foible, and since his accession to the throne the army has been placed on a footing which it had not enjoyed since the days of the first Empire. Its equipment also, in arms and in every other department, has been most carefully attended to, many of the improvements, it is said, being at the suggestion of the Emperor himself. The French army, then, is undoubtedly a most formidable machine, both as regards training and equipment. That of Prussia, if we may

judge by its performances in the campaign of 1866, is in no way inferior. The present King is a most devoted soldier. If we remember rightly, he served, when Prince of Prussia, with the British army in India during one of the Sikh campaigns, and since he succeeded to the throne, he has devoted great attention to the army, and, in conjunction with Bismarck, has rendered it equal to, if not more effective than, the French. The introduction of the needle-gun is said to be due to his sagacity, and there can be no doubt whatever, we think, that in every department, the Prussian army is in equipment and training equal if not superior to that of France. The new French gun, the *mitrailleuse*, which was invented two years ago, is popularly supposed to be peculiar to the French army, but we think this assumption will be found to be incorrect. The Prussian War Department had ample notice of the invention of that weapon, and it is not likely that its introduction into the Prussian service has been overlooked. Where we think there may be found a deficiency in training and equipment on the Prussian side is in the contingents belonging to the other States, and especially in those of South Germany. When the troops of these States encountered the Prussian army in '66, their imperfect equipment and training was painfully apparent. Those of the North German States, being under the sole direction of Prussia since '66, are likely to be now well organised, but the arrangement with South Germany, owing to political misunderstandings, did not operate so quickly, and the South German contingent, therefore, is almost certain to be found wanting in both equipment and

training. The men, however, are of good fighting stuff, and no doubt every deficiency will be remedied as quickly as possible. On the whole, then, we think that in training and equipment, though not quite so in numbers, it is fair to assume that the two forces are as nearly as possible on an equality.

We have now to consider the spirit which animates the soldiery on either side, their quality as fighting material, and lastly—the most important consideration of all—the question of generalship. In all these, certainly we think in two of them, the superiority is with the Prussians, though probably we shall be looked upon as military heretics for thinking so. However, as we are prepared with our reasons, our readers may judge for themselves as to their value, and whether we are right or wrong the quick march of events will soon dedecide the question in the most unerring manner possible.

The French soldiers are undoubtedly of most excellent quality. They are full of courage and intelligence, and excel all the other troops of Europe in dash, or *élan* as they term it; but, on the other hand, they are deficient in pluck and in staying qualities. It is said by French military writers, and with truth, that their soldiery have a natural aptitude for military affairs—that when in the field they instinctively criticise the movements, and inwardly pronounce them right or wrong. But this spirit of military intelligence, admirable as it naturally is, under certain circumstances becomes a fertile source of weakness. When his general has a genius for war, as had Turenne or Napoleon, this intelligence of the French soldier is a most

admirable quality, for it enables him quickly to see that his efforts are being properly directed, and he consequently rapidly acquires a spirit of confidence and of audacity which render him one of the most formidable of opponents. Hence it is, that when led by great generals such as those we have already named, the French armies defeated those of every nation they encountered—except our own, we with modest pride may add. But this brilliant side of the medal has its reverse. This very spirit of intelligence, so creditable to the French soldier, and sometimes of such rare value, becomes dangerous when he is badly led. He loses his *élan*, his best and most striking quality; he becomes discontented, first loses confidence in his general, and subsequently in himself, and if exposed to a series of repulses or a great defeat, he rapidly becomes demoralised, and is then generally beaten by really good troops. A striking instance of this rapid deterioration in the quality of French soldiers occurred when Napoleon went to Egypt. After his departure, the French army, which had previously been invariably victorious, was invariably beaten; they lost all their conquests in Italy and on the Rhine, and when Napoleon returned the Austrians were within the old frontiers of France. Under Napoleon these reverses were quickly retrieved, and victory after victory quickly restored to the French soldiery that confidence which had been so rudely shaken during Napoleon's absence. In the Peninsula again, after the first victory or two was obtained by the British troops, it was observed that they had acquired a moral superiority over their opponents which was retained to the end, and which helped largely to the successful result of the war.

During the first years of the French Revolution, the republican and patriotic fervor which inspired the French soldiers made them more tenacious and more dogged than is ordinarily their nature. They felt that their country was in danger, and they burned with ardor to save it. But this feeling has long been absent from the French army. The spirit which animates the French soldiery now, is not a revolutionary one. It is one of pride in the national prowess—a patriotic desire to sustain the national honor. It is a most admirable spirit this feeling of national pride. It is a spirit born of great victories, that have either been gained against great odds, or have resulted in the independence of a people, and until a race feels such a spirit stirring its blood in times of danger, it cannot be said to have made itself a nation. Marathon, Thermopylæ, Agincourt, Bannockburn, Cressy, Rossbach, Leipzig, Austerlitz, and Waterloo—these are victories that are as priceless treasures to the nations who won them, for they inspire their sons from generation to generation, so long as the life of the nation endures. Victories such as these, like historical jewels, adorn the brows of the races who gained them, and blaze and sparkle in their honor through the dulness of the centuries. Of this spirit, the French have a heritage equal to that of any other country in Europe, but powerful as is the working of such a spirit, there is a feeling before which even it fails, other things being equal. We allude to the feeling which inspires a great or a resolute race when it is making itself a nation, or when it is forcing itself into what it feels to be its rightful place among the foremost nations of the world. It is this feeling

which for some years has permeated the whole of Germany, and which has been fanned into a fierce flame by the breezes of French jealousy and of French rancour that have been steadily blowing on it since Sadowa. What the state of German feeling has been since France declared war, we can only conjecture; but there can be little doubt, we think, that the coming mail will show us that the whole of Germany is in a state of wild and enthusiastic fervor, such as Europe has not seen since 1813-14. Against such enthusiasm the war feeling in France will, we think, prove to be weak in comparison, and, as Carlyle has it in contrasting these two peoples, will seem as the fleeting flame of burning straw to the deep, fierce steady glow of the consuming anthracite.

Nor will this popular fervor be misdirected, and be allowed to run to waste, from the want of a clear head and of a strong organisation, as is but too often the case in the wild revolutionary outburst of a people. The Prussian Government, with the cool resolute Bismarck at its head, has shown itself to be a master in the art of administration, and there can be no doubt that the national fervor and fury of Germany will be directed with the most consummate art against the vital points of the common enemy.

The spirit which will animate the German soldiery in the contest, is therefore, in our opinion, for the reasons we have given, likely to be superior to that of their opponents, and we have now to treat of the normal quality of German troops as compared with that of the French. In this respect, again, we give the Teutons the palm. We are aware that many facts are apparently against

us, and also many arguments. We know that Jena, Auerstadt, Bautzen, Lutzen, and Ligny will be pointed to, and will be held to be conclusive as against our view. We do not think so. At all these battles, except the second, Napoleon commanded in person. We have already pointed out the wonderful influence exerted over French troops by such a general as Napoleon. But generals like Napoleon only appear once or twice in a thousand years, and we may point out that, in two great battles—Dennewitz and the Katzbach—which the Prussians fought against the French in 1813, and where the commanders of the latter were Marshals Ney and Macdonald, the Prussians defeated the invaders with great slaughter. Rossbach as a decisive victory may be set against Jena, and for valor, endurance, and unflinching ardor the campaigns of the Prussians during the "Seven Years' War" will bear a favorable comparison with anything in French history. The great cause of failure in the military history of Germany, has, in our opinion, been owing to the fact that but too many German battles have been between Germans, in which the higher feelings of the soldier could not be expected to appear, and also to the consequent want of a national centre or head, from which the people could receive their inspiration. As a soldier, the German is brave, patient under fire, capable of great endurance, and tenacious of his purpose; but he is naturally slow of movement, and not ready to take the initiative. In intelligence and quickness of movement he is naturally much inferior to the French soldier, but he is superior to him in pluck and bottom. The Germans, when their blood is up, like the

British, will take a great deal of beating, and are not very quick-witted in discovering that they have been beaten. In a long war, therefore, or in a war like the present, where the high stake of national unity and national life are being fought for, German tenacity is likely to be fully a match for French impetuosity.

There is another important consideration which it is necessary to bear in mind in estimating the quality of the soldiers on either side. This is, that the natural slowness of the German race has not been apparent since Bismarck appeared at the head of affairs. Whether this curious and startling fact is due to the high education now common in North Germany, and to the consequent diffusion of intelligence throughout the ranks of the army and of the people, or whether it is that the statesmanlike sagacity of Bismarck has taken care that his countrymen should be reformed and made strong in their weak point, we know not, but at all events he who now sarcastically refers to German promptitude makes a pointless joke. Previous to the declaration of war by the German Diet against Denmark, in 1864, the *Times* had a characteristic sneer at German slowness. It remarked that though there was a great deal of anxiety being felt lest there should be war declared by Germany against Denmark, the present generation at all events need not be under any anxiety regarding it, as the latest news was to the effect that the German Diet had only begun to consider the question, and all the world knew what *that* meant. As the *Times* is only insolent to the weak, the sneer well represents the degradation into which the disunion of the country had then brought

the National Council of Germany. From that to the vigor of Bismarck the change is startling, and when our readers contrast the slowness of the old Diet with the unparalleled promptitude displayed in the Sadowa campaign, they can readily understand the enthusiasm with which such a change in the government of Germany must be welcomed by the German people.

In the spirit, then, which will animate the soldiery on either side, and in the qualities of race which go to form the raw material of an army, we think that in this war the Germans will have the advantage of their opponents. But then comes the question of leadership. In considering this question, we do not intend to enter into the respective administrations of the two forces as regards the providing them with food, munitions of war, and suitable reserves. These, doubtless, are important elements in the success of armies, and are therefore properly a branch of what we have termed leadership. Of this department Bismarck has shown himself a master, but as the corresponding department in the French service has also a very high reputation for efficiency, it will, perhaps, be well to treat both sides as equal in this respect, and simply deal with the question of leadership in the field, or generalship.

France, though a warlike nation, and apt to claim for itself the title of the greatest military power in the world, has, strange to say, never been fertile in great generals. Of commanders of the second-class and generals of division she has been prolific, but this is almost a necessary consequence of prolonged military operations. Her roll of great generals

is not to be compared with those of our own country, or of Germany, for we do not look upon Napoleon as a Frenchman. He was undoubtedly of Italian birth, and most probably of Greek descent. Turenne was probably the greatest of the purely French generals, and when we have named him, we have perhaps named the only Frenchman who can pretend to be placed in the first rank of commanders, and there he by no means occupies a high place. There seems no reason to believe that the present generation of Frenchmen are likely to remedy this defect of their race, and place another of their brethren in the roll of great commanders. In the Crimean and Italian wars, French generalship was mediocre in the extreme, and the best that can be said of it is, that it was not much, if any, worse than that of the other nations engaged in these wars. It would be foolish, of course, to assume that this defect will assuredly be continued in the present war, for no one can say when a great leader in war may appear, either in the French or any other army. But this much we may venture to premise, that none of the present generals of France are one whit above the barest mediocrity. General MacMahon is supposed to be the most capable, and so far as he has yet shown his powers, he is merely a good general of division, certainly inferior to several of the generals in the Federal and Confederate services in the late American war, and probably not equal to two or three of the Prussian generals to whom he will be opposed. Of the other French generals none have as yet attained a great reputation, but, as we have already stated, a short campaign may quickly bring one to the front,

and if so, in all probability, if he is a great master of war, he will, with the immense resources he will have at his command, probably give to his country the advantage in the present struggle. Of course the chance of such a leader appearing in a war such as the present, which will probably end in three or four campaigns, is but small, and the probability is rendered less from the circumstance that under the present government of France the rise of a great military leader would be a danger to the dynasty. The Emperor, it is understood, is well aware of this, and he is therefore likely to be as watchful in preventing the rise of a *too* great general in his own service, as he will be anxious to defeat the enemy in the field. In all probability, then, the result will be that the French army will be only moderately well led, that the secondary commanders or generals of division will exhibit excellent ability, and that the army on the whole will fight most gallantly all through the war, if they are successful; if otherwise, for the first campaign only. These deductions are, we think, fairly to be drawn from what we know of the previous performances of the French armies.

The Prussian army, from its having so recently been in a great war, will so far have an advantage of its rival, and this circumstance at the same time enables the public to form a better judgment as to the capability of its leaders. It is well understood that the strategist of the Prussian War Department is General Moltke, and on him therefore will have devolved the planning of the campaign. This duty will consist in the selection of the country in which the armies will operate, the mode in

which they will support each other, their final point of concentration, and also, should it be necessary, the lines of retreat, and the positions where they will then concentrate for a line of defence. As in the war of 1866, General Moltke, so far as we gather by the fragmentary telegrams received by the last mail, has decided on assuming the offensive, and endeavoring to penetrate the French frontier between Metz and Sarrebourg, leaving Strasbourg on his left flank. As a strategist, General Moltke has a great reputation in Germany, and probably he deserves it, but the military critics have been pretty unanimous in pronouncing the plan of his campaign in entering Bohemia in 1866 as hazardous in the extreme, and contrary to the canons of war. The fate of the day at Sadowa seemed at one time to hang on a thread, and had the Crown Prince been two hours later in coming up—a delay which a heavy thunder-storm might probably have caused—Prince Frederick, there is every reason to believe, would have been overpowered, and Moltke would now, probably, have had the evil reputation of poor Benedek. It is, of course, ill arguing against success, especially in war; and probably Moltke deserves the high name the Prussians give him, for *he* may have thoroughly known the state of unpreparedness of the Austrians, and the consequent timidity of Benedek, and laid his plans accordingly. If so, he is a true master in the art of war, and the ablest strategist in Europe. But in the present state of our knowledge of him, we think we do him justice when we say that he is undoubtedly an able strategist, superior to any of his known opponents, but liable to err on the side of rashness. It will

be a matter of great interest to watch the development of his plans in this campaign, and to see whether he comes up to the high reputation his countrymen have given him. If he is successful in this war he will take a high rank indeed among generals.

The commanders of the Prussian armies in the field are the Crown Prince, eldest son of the King, and husband of the Princess Royal of England, and Prince Frederick, a nephew of the present King. Both are yet comparatively young in years, the Crown Prince being 39, and his cousin 42. These princes are undoubtedly soldiers of considerable ability, and are, we think, quite able to cope with Marshal MacMahon, or any of the other French generals that have as yet come to the front, as regards a knowledge of war; but we are by no means disposed to place either of them, as yet at least, on a pedestal. In the Sadowa campaign, both, it is understood, were under the supervision of Moltke, who indeed was present at head-quarters of Prince Frederick's army on the day of Sadowa, and probably during the other portions of the campaign, and who would therefore be responsible for the various movements. There can be no doubt, however, that in these two princes the Prussian armies have two very capable leaders, who are at least entitled to be highly respected for their military ability. Of the other Prussian generals, two of the most distinguished are Bittenfeld and Falkenstein. The former, if he is still alive, must be upwards of 70, and as he is therefore beyond the age of active service, it is unnecessary to say more of him, than that he led the third army in Bohemia, and acquitted himself well. General

Falkenstein commanded the Prussian army that operated on the banks of the Main, where, with only 50,000 men, he first captured the Hanoverian army, and then out-manœuvred, and finally completely defeated the Bavarian and other anti-Prussian contingents that were endeavoring to concentrate in Franconia. General Falkenstein seems in that campaign to have displayed great ability, and as his command was an independent one, far distant from the main Prussian armies in Bohemia, he must have been compelled to act mainly on his own judgment. From these circumstances, we are of the opinion that General Falkenstein*—unless he also is of an extreme age—will be heard of in the present war, in which he will probably take a leading part.

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* Since writing, we have ascertained that General Falkenstein is 73 years of age and therefore unfit for very active service. He has been appointed to the command of the army that is to defend the Baltic coast of Prussia. From Mr. Brahe, Consul for the North-German Confederation in this colony, we have received the following information relating to this general:—"General Vogel von Falkenstein, now commanding the first Prussian Army Corps (infantry), was born in 1797, and entered the army by joining as a volunteer a regiment of sharpshooters, in 1813. He distinguished himslef in the very first skirmish at Bischofswerda, after the passage over the Katzbach was effected, and was in consequence promoted to a cornetcy, and in December of the same year received his brevet as lieutenant. I have come across an anecdote regarding the young soldier, which characterises him. When the sixteen years old soldier was mounting guard near Caub, on the Rhine,, it being extremely cold at the time, Field-Marshal Blucher, upon going his round, came upon him, and said 'You must feel very cold, poor boy' Falkenstein retorted, 'Boy; I am a Prussian officer, General, and you must retract the boy,' which Blucher did willingly."

IV.

Since writing our previous papers the positions of the two mighty belligerents have been changed as if by enchantment. Then our information being only to the 5th of August, when the storming of Weissenbourg by the Prussians was looked upon as a fair counterstroke for the taking of Saarbruck by the French, the latter power was still thought by many to have the better chance of victory. But since then what a change! Defeat after defeat of the French, the surrender of the Emperor, the capture of an army of 90,000 men at Sedan, and the advance of a Prussian army to Chalons, within 90 miles of Paris, all seem to betoken that the power of France is broken, and her military glory in the dust. In discussing, therefore, as we have now to do, the probable issue of the war, we have a task before us which now, at all events, seems comparatively easy to solve in favor of Prussia.

But is there, then, no hope for France? Can she not now repeat the wondrous deeds of 1792 and '93? At that time she had nearly all the nations of Europe against her, and their troops then also bivouacked in Champagne; but after all they were driven back, and Paris and France were saved. Why may not this be done again? doubtless every patriotic Frenchman has been repeating during the last six weeks. There is only one nation against us now, and the same nation, with half-a-dozen others, was against us then. Now we are 38 millions, then only 25. We are well armed,

well trained, and have abundant means, and we are surely not less brave than our fathers. Why, then, despair of France. Such, probably, have been the thoughts and the words of millions of the French people since the middle of August. They seem reasonable hopes, and not unworthy aspirations. Let us see whether they are likely to be fulfilled.

Though the war was begun by the French Government, and it is therefore reasonable to suppose that it did not enter upon such a serious enterprise till ample preparations had been made, it is now evident that the Government was not fully prepared; that it had neither a sufficient number of troops ready, nor the requisite provisions and munitions of war; and worse than all, that it had no definite plan of operations, or a general capable of conceiving one and carrying it out. On the 6th of August, when the first decisive blow was struck at Woerth by the Crown Prince, and fully three weeks after the announcement of war in the French Chambers, there seem to have been only about 300,000 or 350,000 French soldiers on the eastern frontiers. Of these, about 70,000 or 90,000 seem to have been under MacMahon on the right at and behind Weissenbourg, and nearly 250,000 under the Emperor at or in front of Metz. The Emperor and his Government seem to have been under the delusion that the military power of France was so great, that the enemy dared not assume the initiative, and that he would regard the French soil as sacred, and only prepare to defend his own. This seems also to have been an opinion held by the majority of the French people. Their victories over the Russians and the Austrians in the Crimea

and in Italy, seem to have led them to believe that the old days of the First Empire had returned, and that as against any *one* nation in Europe, at all events, France had nothing to fear. She might, perhaps, have to exert her strength on this occasion more than in the two previous wars, but of the result there could be only one opinion. Peace would be dictated to Prussia at Berlin, and the frontier of the Rhine would be secured at last. Such seems to have been the view of the situation entertained by the great majority of the French people, and such a contingency as an advance of the Prussians to Paris, or even towards it, seems never to have been even thought of by them. Holding with his people this view of the probable course of events, and evidently assuming that the initiative would be left to the French armies, the Emperor seems to have been fatuously remiss in his preparations. In the beginning of August before the storm burst on him, little more than three-fourths of the army when on a peace footing seems to have been concentrated on the frontiers; there also seems to have been a great deficiency of provisions; and the munitions of war, though the stores in France must have been immense, do not seem to have been concentrated in requisite quantities at the proper points. When we consider that the Emperor, according to his late confidential Minister, M. Rouher, had been preparing for this war since the day of Sadowa, that all his other frontiers were safe from attack, and that he had chosen his own time for declaring war, this incompleteness of preparation at the vital points, betrays most gross incapacity on the part of himself and his government, especially when

they had the significant warning of the Sadowa campaign and the fate of Austria before their eyes.

On the Prussian side the preparations seem to have been most complete and thorough. Within twenty-four hours from the declaration of war, every Prussian citizen on the active reserve of the army had been summoned to his post, and had begun to move to the French frontiers. At the end of a fortnight, 400,000 men fully equipped were on the banks of the Rhine, and within another week these were massed on the French frontier, and another 200,000 were coming up behind them to form the reserve. All these vast preparations had been completed with the greatest secrecy possible under the circumstances. The Press preserved a discreet silence, and the vast host poured to the Rhine borders with an activity as unceasing, and a silence nearly as complete as if it had been the inroad of an army of ants. The strictest discipline was maintained, a discipline which not only pervaded the army, but the whole nation. Throughout Germany, though all was movement, all was orderly and silent—the nation bracing up its strength as it were for a bold, resolute, and resistless leap into what it deemed to be its legitimate place as one of the leading powers of the world.

It is not our intention in these papers to give a minutely detailed account of the movements of either side. Our aim is more to lay bare the spirit which animates the combatants, and to explain the causes of failure or success so far as they are known to us. Our summary of the movements of the belligerents will therefore be as brief as is consistent with the task which we have laid down for ourselves.

On the 4th of August the first serious movement in advance took place, the Crown Prince storming Weissenbourg, and sharply defeating the enemy; and on the 6th the thunder-cloud at last burst with full force on the French frontier. General Moltke, or rather the King, who is the nominal Commander-in-Chief, had placed the right army under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, the centre under General Steinmetz, and the left under the Crown Prince. Each wing consisted apparently of about 120,000, and the centre of probably 150,000 men. While Prince Frederick advanced against Sierck and Thionville in his front, meeting with no great resistance, Steinmetz advanced, attacked General Frossard at Forbach, defeated him with great slaughter, and pushed forward towards Metz, about 35 miles in his front. On the left, the Crown Prince, following up his victory at Weissenbourg, and pressing on in the direction of Hagenau and Strasbourg, found Marshal MacMahon blocking his path at Woerth. A great battle took place, in which the Prince gained a decisive victory, and then pursued his shattered and retreating enemy across the Vosges mountains towards Nancy, lying 30 miles to the south of Metz. This success of the Crown Prince was a most important one, as it bared the flank of the French at Metz, and enabled the Prince to sweep round and threaten their communications with Paris. Had the French now possessed a capable general, his first step after these defeats would doubtless have been to have retreated from Metz and left it to its fate, to have concentrated his forces at some point nearer Paris, and then to have watched for an opportunity, and have

thrown himself headlong upon one or other of the advancing armies, before they had had time to combine. This was the method of the first Napoleon when, with only about one-third of the forces recently at the command of his nephew, he held at bay the allies, at the head of armies equal in number to those of the present invaders. But France seems now to have no head either in politics or in war. MacMahon's defeat at Woerth was so severe that his army does not seem to have rallied till it had reached Chalons, 150 miles from the scene of its defeat, and 80 miles inwards from Metz. Here it probably was reinforced by fresh troops from Paris and the south, and under MacMahon again prepared to advance to the support of Marshal Bazaine, who had succeeded the Emperor in command at Metz. But the delay in leaving Metz had been fatal. Apparently that important fortress had been intended as the base of operations against Prussia, and an immense store of munitions of war had been accumulated within its defences. It is not the first time that such a prize as this has been the utter ruin of a weak general. The French commander seems to have been unable to make up his mind to leave Metz with all its treasures of war to its fate, and appears to have lingered till the victorious Prussian centre had come up, surrounded him, and thrown themselves across his line of retreat to Paris. Then, seeing his danger, he attempted, from the 14th to the 16th of August, to break through, but after some doubtful small successes against the army under Steinmetz, he was finally driven back into Metz by the combined forces of that general and of a part of those of Prince Frederick, who had come to the aid of the

to break through from Metz, and join MacMahon, but was at last driven back with great loss, and was then finally cooped up in Metz, where he still remained beleaguered at the latest dates.

Probably there has never been in so short a time so startling a record of war and of victory. In less than four short weeks from the 6th of August, the military power of France has been prostrated, her Emperor and an army of 90,000 men taken prisoners of war, and another great army of 200,000 men cooped up in her principal fortress; while these unparalleled results had been preceded by victory after victory being obtained over her previously exultant troops, by an enemy which the nation had been taught by its leaders to disregard, if not despise. The first Napoleon in his proudest campaigns never achieved such results as these, and the name of Moltke must henceforth take its place in history with those of the great masters of the art of war.

Overmatched in generalship, in organisation, and in the spirit of the soldiery, France, evidently from what we now see, has had no chance of victory from the beginning. Possessed of admirable troops, of immense resources, and of a strong position, she has neither had a general capable, even in a small degree, of leading her armies, nor a statesman possessed of the capacity to make proper use of her unbounded resources. The Emperor and his Ministers seem to have been living in a kind of fool's paradise, deluding themselves and the nation with the foolish idea that Prussia would be only too glad to avoid war on almost any terms, if France would only allow her to do so. Hence the want at the

last moment of any definite plan of operations, the incompleteness of the commissariat arrangements, the defective condition of the armaments of the fortresses, and the fatal want of concentration of the troops to meet the first shock of the enemy. France had a proud name and a high position as a military power—as the first of military powers, indeed; but high names and great reputations, though they impose on the multitude—even on the world as a whole, often for generations—are after all mere bubbles, which sooner or later will be pricked, if the true power which has made them be withdrawn. The power which made France the great dominant military power of the world was the genius of the first Napoleon. When the Bourbons returned, France fell to her proper position among European powers, and her vain, though brave people, could not endure the downfall. They got rid, first of the elder, then of the younger Bourbons, and then tried another Napoleon. The name begat the old military aspirations. France yearned once more to give law to Europe. Her ruler humored her, was successful in the Crimea against Russia, then in Italy against Austria, and the excitable Gauls thought that they at last had got a ruler of men, and that they were again to be the ruler of nations, because victory had once more alighted on their standards. The world which on the whole is credulous, and only too ready to acknowledge success, accepted the French estimate of the new ruler, and at the same time the French estimate of their own military prowess and position. Probably the delusion would have continued, and the third

Napoleon would have made his exit from this world, leaving behind him, for a time at least, a great reputation, had not the political genius of Bismarck, and the military genius of Moltke raised in Prussia a real military power of the first rank—a power based not on a name, or on the memory of former deeds, but on the terrible strength of a great and powerful race, who at last feel that they are a united people. The spirit as we have already pointed out, that inspires a high-spirited race under such circumstances, is perhaps the most powerful of all national feelings. It is like the fury of a wild animal when she is defending her cubs—her strength seems redoubled, and nothing but death restrains her efforts. When France attacked the new-born German unity, she evoked a similar spirit, and the result is that she has now a million of armed Germans bursting and raging through her frontiers, and determined only to make peace at the gates of Paris.

V.

We dealt in our last paper with the causes that have led generally to the great collapse of the French military power, and before proceeding further with our main subject, we propose to discuss the probable causes of that startling and, to France, fatal episode of the war, the surrender of an army of 90,000 men at Sedan. Such an event is well worthy of consideration, for it is almost, if not quite, unparalleled in the annals of war. One of the greatest strokes of the first Napoleon was the capture of Mack and his army at Ulm, in the opening of the Austerlitz campaign; but there the number

that surrendered was only from 20,000 to 30,000 men, a mere wing of an army; but this surrender at Sedan is that of a great army, apparently complete in all its parts, and no doubt composed to a large extent of some of the finest soldiers of France. That such a force should be surrendered as prisoners of war, within a month of the opening of the campaign, when—unlike the surrender of General Lee and his army—the resources of the country to carry on the war may be said to be unexhausted, indeed, hardly yet drawn upon, may seem to many of our readers inexplicable; but of the fact there can be no doubt.

When Marshal MacMahon left Rheims on the 24th of August for Rethel and Vouziers, with the intention of relieving the French army in Metz, he probably had under his command from 120,000 to 130,000 men. The precise number does not seem to be given in any of the telegrams that have reached these colonies, but we know that after his retreat from Woerth, he rallied his broken army at Chalons, and the number that would join him there would probably be at least 50,000. Then, all the available troops in Paris would of course be hurried at once to the front, and before he left Chalons, these would probably not be less than 50,000 men. One of the latest telegrams states that the thirteenth army corps (French), 50,000 strong, was also being despatched from Paris to his support, but this seems to have been near the end of August, when MacMahon had left Chalons, and had either left, or was about to leave Rheims. It is hardly probable, therefore, that the whole of this reinforcement would be able to join him in time for his

intended movement, and though it may be said, that if he knew such a reinforcement was coming up, he is not likely to have moved till it had joined him, it must be remembered that the occasion was most urgent—one of those momentous crises in war, in fact, when the saving of a few hours is of more importance than the addition of as many thousands of men. If we assume, therefore, that about one-half of this reinforcement reached MacMahon in time to join him in his proposed movement to relieve Marshal Bazaine, we shall have under his command an army of about 125,000 men, probably more than less.

Marshal MacMahon's intention seems to have been to have crossed the country from Rheims by Rethel and Vouziers to the valley of the Meuse between Stenay and Verdun, distant about 60 miles in a straight line from Rheims; then to have forced his way up that valley, towards Metz, while his brother marshal was making a desperate attempt to break through and join him in the vicinity of Verdun. Had this movement been successful the French armies combined would have formed a formidable body of 350,000 men; with which, under an able general, and the almost untouched resources of France still at his back, great deeds might have been possible. But the great strategist who directs the movements of the German host quickly saw the aim of his adversaries, and at once altered his plans to meet it. The telegrams state that "The Prussian royal head-quarters advanced on the 26th of August to Bar-le-Duc: a portion of the army was stationed to watch Marshal Bazaine; the remainder resolutely began its march on Paris. Detachments advanced

on Varennes. The 27th found the Prussian scouts within 10 miles of Rheims. The Crown Prince was steadily pushing towards Paris. A new army was covering his flank. On the 27th the Prussian vanguard was between Chalons and Epernay." The latter town is about 70 miles from Paris, and up to this date, the Crown Prince seemed to be marching straight for the capital as his goal. The next day all was changed. The telegrams continue thus:—"The German troops arrived before Rheims on the 28th. The Prussian advance in the department of the Aube *seemed to be arrested*, and the troops fell back on St. Dizier. Next news states that the Prussian force in this region was ordered northwards in the direction of Rethel and Vouziers. It was supposed the march to Paris would not be continued till the pending battle with MacMahon was decided." If our readers will bear in mind the movement of General MacMahon from Vouziers towards the valley of the Meuse, to which we have already alluded, they will at once, by looking at the map, understand this check in the advance of the Prussian troops. When the Prussian scouts by their advance to Rheims found that MacMahon had left that city, and had doubled back towards the Meuse Valley, the news when communicated to head-quarters, made Moltke aware that a bold but hazarduous stroke was about to be struck by MacMahon, viz., to relieve and unite with Bazaine. The cool and clear-headed German saw his opportunity and at once prepared his fatal counter-stroke. He instantly stopped the advance of the Crown Prince towards Paris, directed him to follow closely on the heels of MacMahon, and moved

all the other available troops to his support. The two armies under Prince Frederick and General Steinmetz were, no doubt, also warned to prepare to repel any attempt of Bazaine to break through, which, as we know, they successfully carried out. On the 28th of August, then, the position of the belligerents seems to have been thus:—Marshal Bazaine in Metz, with an army of probably 220,000 men surrounded by Prince Frederick and General Steinmetz with forces numbering from 350,000 to 400,000 men. About 70 miles on the north-west, at Vouziers, Marshal MacMahon at the head of about 130,000, making a bold march towards the Meuse Valley for the purpose of relieving Bazaine from the pressure of one of the investing armies, and thus enabling him to break through the toils, while close on MacMahon's heels was the Crown Prince at the head of 150,000 men. It will be seen from this glance at the position of the various armies that MacMahon had placed himself in a most critical position. An army more powerful than his own, flushed with victory, was close behind him, while direct in his front, and between him and his goal, were the still more powerful armies of Prince Frederick and General Steinmetz. Unless, therefore, he had been able to deceive the Crown Prince, and thus shake him off, and gain a couple of days' march on him, so as to give time for Bazaine and himself to fight, and, if possible, overpower the other two German armies before the Crown Prince could come up, the pressure of the latter on his rear would overwhelm him. The necessary 48, or even 24, hours were denied him. Moltke, with the prescience of genius, seems at

once to have divined the object of the backward march of MacMahon, and, as we have seen, arrested the advance of the troops towards Paris, and sent them driving northwards in hot pursuit of MacMahon and his gallant but devoted army.

Then followed six terrible and fatal days for France. We need not tell our readers on which side our sympathy has been since the first announcement of this bloody and needless struggle. We look on the war to have been primarily due to the selfish ambition of the Emperor of the French and his advisers, and next, though in a less degree, as an immediate cause, at least, to the restless vanity of the French people. But in contemplating the terrible disasters that befel the French army under MacMahon between the 29th of August and its final surrender on the 2nd of September, we feel all these considerations melt away from before us, and arising in their place a deep feeling of pity and of sadness at the awful fate that befel these brave and devoted men.

On the 29th, the avenging Germans were on MacMahon's heels, pressing him fiercely and apparently in overwhelming numbers. So closely was he pursued, that he seems never to have had a chance of striking for Metz. At Buzancy, and at Beaumont, two small towns to the west of the Meuse, he was overtaken on the 29th, and driven with great loss across the river to Mouzon. At five o'clock next morning the battle again began, poor MacMahon now giving up all thought of reaching Metz, and retreating in the opposite direction, first to the Belgian frontier, which of course he dared not cross, and then towards Sedan, on the north. "The carnage," says the telegram,

"was terrible." On the 31st the vicinity of Sedan was reached, but this was no haven of rest. His pursuers gave him not an hour's respite. On that and the following day the fighting was continued, in front of Sedan, "with fearful slaughter," say the telegrams. The devoted French seem to have been completely overpowered. On the Prussian side, the Royal Guard, the pick of the German troops, had come up, and besides these, there were five army corps engaged. Moltke having got MacMahon into a corner, had apparently sent every available Prussian division against him, and the position of the French therefore became utterly helpless and hopeless. After the fighting on the 1st of September, they were "almost all driven inside the fortress," which is only of the third-class; their leader was wounded, they were cut off from their base, and surrounded by double their number of victorious troops. The Belgian frontier was behind them, which they dared not cross, and thus cooped up in a corner, like rats in a pit, and probably short of provisions, and almost certainly of ammunition, broken, dispirited, and surrounded, this devoted army, after five days of most gallant efforts and of most desperate fighting, that would have done honor to the reputation of any people, at last, on the 2nd of September, surrendered themselves prisoners of war, with their Emperor at their head. France probably never sustained a greater blow; but the blow has cast no slur on the gallantry of her soldiers. These seem to have nobly sustained the reputation of the nation in the field. But with this surrender of Sedan, Imperialism in France has now, and we think for ever,

received its death blow, and that Napoleonic worship, which since the days of the first Empire has, canker-like, been spreading over France, will now we trust finally disappear and give place for the future to healthier aspirations, and to nobler principles of national life.

It is not difficult, we think, to show that the fatal movement which terminated in the catastrophe at Sedan is entirely due to that want of strategic ability in the French military leaders which has been so conspicuous since the war began. When the Crown Prince was advancing towards Paris, Marshal MacMahon was collecting an army in his front, to retard his march, and when a favorable opportunity offered, to give him battle. Had the battle been fought in front of Paris and proved unfavorable to the French, as it probably would have done, the loss would have been considerable no doubt, but it would not have been irremediable. There was the capital behind with its fortifications on which the defeated army could have fallen back, and it is certain that all the troops then at the command of the Crown Prince would have been unable to invest Paris with its extensive fortifications, and its numerous and warlike population. This difficulty would have given MacMahon a breathing space, and this obtained, it should have been his object, we think, to have left the capital to its fortifications and its fate, and have moved his army to the south, to the line of the Loire. There he would have had nearly two-thirds of France behind him, with untouched resources. The armies assembling at Lyons and behind the Loire would have gathered to and supported him; other armies would quickly have sprung from the warlike

soil of France, and he would thus have probably found himself in a month or two at the head of nearly half a million of men. True, he might have been at once pursued by the Crown Prince, but if so, then Paris would have been saved for the time, and this would have been a great gain. And, if pursued, he would have been retiring on his resources and on his reserves, while every march of the Prussians would be drawing them away from theirs. Time would thus have been gained, and in war time is all important. Germany cannot keep up a long war at such a terrible high pressure as that with which she has opened the campaign, and she would therefore have been disposed to have given France comparatively favorable terms of peace rather than continue a tedious and protracted war of subjugation. But all this chance seems to have been thrown away by that fatal strategic blunder of Marshal MacMahon's army being thrown to the north of the march of the Crown Prince, instead of to the south. On the north the marshal had but a narrow field on which to operate, and want of success was almost certain to be fatal. To the north within a week's march lay the sea; on the north-east was the Belgian frontier, across which he dared not march a soldier, on pain of bringing the British power against his already overmatched country; on the south and south-east were the Prussian armies in overwhelming numbers, which would also soon advance, and by holding the line of the Seine effectually prevent him from getting to the south-east of Paris. He thus, by going to the north, placed himself and his army in a corner of France in which the keen and pitiless Moltke quickly enclosed him, and then dealing

him blow after blow for five successive days left his brave but unfortunate army no other resource but surrender at discretion.

It is true that had MacMahon placed himself and his army to the south of the march of the Crown Prince towards Paris, he would not have been in so favorable a position for relieving Bazaine, and probably would have been compelled to give up all thought of relieving him. But, after all, the great point to be thought of—greater even than the relief of Bazaine—was to keep an army in the field, in a position where its retreat was open, and where it could receive the reinforcements that the spirit of the French people would quickly have provided. By thus retreating to the southwards Marshal Bazaine's army might have been left cooped up in Metz, but even if so, the fortifications are said to be some of the strongest in Europe, and the supply of provisions and ammunition must be ample for a siege of many months at least, or the Imperial Government must have been composed of madmen. At the worst then, Bazaine could surely have held out for a few months, while all Southern France was rising to relieve him. And while he was there holding out, a much more than equal number of the enemy would have been required to keep him within his lines. From all the more important points of view then, it is clear, we think, that the strategic reasons which induced or compelled MacMahon to concentrate at Rheims, with the intention of marching to the Meuse Valley for the purpose of relieving Bazaine, were wrong, and utterly indefensible. They led him into a position in which failure would be utter ruin

if the enemy were vigilant; and what the enemy is, had before this, become apparent to all Europe. It was but too evident before this movement began, that he who was pitted against Moltke had better look well to his guards, otherwise he would quickly receive a home-thrust, which would place him *hors de combat.* It is somewhat strange that of all people in Europe the French Emperor and his marshals should have been so slow in perceiving a fact of this nature—a knowledge of which to them, beyond all others, was of so momentous importance.

VI.

The surrender at Sedan will, we think, decide the result of the war. The material loss to France by such a disaster is great, and still greater will be the moral effect that such a terrible calamity will have on the nation. The people will feel that they are thoroughly overmatched in organisation and in generalship, and if the terms offered to them by the enemy are not too hard, will feel disposed, we think, to terminate the war, and so get rid of the presence of the invaders. The war having been begun hastily and hurriedly, they will console themselves with the reflection that it was the work of the Emperor and his advisers, and not of themselves, and while ridding themselves of every remaining shred of the Imperial regime, will probably conclude that the authors of the war having been thus summarily disposed of, the war itself had better be concluded, if it can be, on terms that are not too hard or too humiliating.

Such, we think, if the Prussian successes are continued, will be the feeling of a very large and powerful party in France. We are aware that this view is not the general one, which is, that the contest will be, on the part of the French people, one similar to that waged against Napoleon in Spain—"war to the knife." There is no doubt much to support such a view of the question. There is the example of 1792, when France was invaded and repelled the invaders. Then the nation is singularly brave and high-spirited, and her resources are hardly yet drawn upon, except in one important branch, to be hereafter alluded to. Her Foreign Minister on the 24th of August declared "he would not listen to a proffer of mediation while a single Prussian remained in France," and the latest telegrams to the 5th of September, briefly announce that the Emperor had been deposed, a Republic proclaimed, a Provisional Government formed, and that the Republic was to repel invasion as in 1792." To carry out this programme, a new army was forming under the walls of Paris, another behind the Loire, an additional one composed of old soldiers at Lyons, and without doubt in the other unoccupied provinces of the empire, armies more or less effective would be organised as rapidly as possible. All these preparations seem formidable, and look as if the nation had determined to make no terms with the invaders, and was prepared to spend "its last shilling and its last man" in repelling them from the soil of France.

But while we admit that the successful carrying out of such a programme is still possible, it is perhaps as much as can be said of it. The chances are against even the head of a

strong resistance being now shown to the invaders, and infinitely so against them being driven triumphantly from the soil of France. The Germans, we are satisfied, are not waging a war of subjugation, and if they take Paris—which we think is all but certain—will offer terms which the more sensible and peaceable portion of the nation will, we think, feel inclined to accept. At all events, it will be made clear that they do not intend to subjugate or even to dismember France, unless it be of her German provinces, and though the latter condition will be a bitter one for even the most easy-going Frenchman to accept, yet it will probably come to be looked upon as inevitable, and as the unfortunate result of their Emperor's folly, and shortsightedness, in waging war against Germany before his preparations were complete, and before he had made himself aware of the terrible power of his adversary.

But it is said, a republic having been established, the old revolutionary spirit will be appealed to, the people will arm as one man, and then despite the immense strength of the German armies, they will, as in 1792, '93 be overpowered, and be compelled to leave the soil of France. We do not share in this opinion. The armies that invaded France in the first Revolution were little better than a disciplined mob, led in many cases by incapable voluptuaries, or by old generals long past active service. There was no cordial union among the leaders, each invading nation was jealous of the other, and, more important still, the common soldiers had little sympathy with the invasion, which was looked upon, not as a national, but as a royalist movement. Many of

the leading spirits not only in Germany, but in the other countries of Europe, were then more inclined to support France than to fight against her, and the bold stand which she made against the invaders had the strong sympathy of nearly all advanced thinkers throughout Europe. France on the present occasion cannot claim such support. She has long been basking in Imperialism, and that of a most degraded kind. She is the aggressor; and she became the aggressor because the German people were endeavoring to secure for themselves that which France had long ago attained—national unity. There is doubtless something in a name, and the proclamation of the Republic, will certainly evoke a higher and a stronger national feeling than would have been displayed in support of Imperialism; but if the flame of republicanism does not extend to other countries, such as Italy and Spain, and in this way lead to a general disturbance in Europe—which we admit is at least possible—we do not see that France unassisted, is likely under any conceivable circumstances, to recover from her late disasters, and drive the Germans triumphantly from her soil.

Since the days of the first French Revolution the world has been prone to attach too much importance to the power of revolutionary feelings and revolutionary movements, especially of those that occur in France. But the truth is, that revolutionary feeling is not of itself national strength, but only a single element of it; and when devoid of a thorough organisation, of trained and experienced troops, and above all of a great leader, or leaders, to direct it and cause it to expend its force effectively, it almost invariably fails to obtain success,

unless the power to which it is opposed has the same defects. In the present instance, we see nothing in the present position of the belligerents to warrant us in assuming that the calling up of the revolutionary feeling in France will have any important effect on the campaign. In the first place, it will be opposed by a feeling on the part of the invaders of a kindred character, but fresher and more instinct with life than the somewhat worn-out revolutionary spirit of France; secondly, the Germans have an organisation superior to that of any other country in the world, led by one of the greatest administrators that Europe has produced; and lastly, the German military power, while led by generals who seem to be most able tacticians, is directed as a whole by General Moltke, who seems to be a consummate genius in war, and who seems to us to have effected something equivalent to a revolution in the military art. Thus it is clear that the power which France has to contend with is one of the most formidable kind—a power, clearly, which would have tried severely all the resources of the nation, even when ably directed, and with every possible advantage of position and of prestige.

There is still no doubt a formidable military force in France which will be brought forward in defence of the country, and which, if ably directed, might suffice ultimately to save it, if the invaders were not so numerous, so well organised, and so admirably led. But as it is, we confess that in our opinion the position of France is desperate—hopeless, indeed, as regards her immediate position. Her choicest soldiers are either captured, destroyed, or cooped up in Metz, and the remainder of her

regular troops must be fearfully demoralised by the disasters they have experienced since the war began. A great victory might to a large extent restore their *morale*, but this seems hardly probable. Their generals seem unusually incapable. MacMahon, who seems to have been one of the best, and who as a tactician, must have displayed considerable ability, is reported to be grievously wounded, and if there is another competent leader, he has yet to make himself known. The blighting effects of Imperialism in refusing to give high military command to any but those who were subservient to that cause, is now fatally felt by France, in the want of good military leaders, and so rapid is the action of the enemy, and so terrible are his blows, that there is no time to remedy the defect. The nation must now meet the most formidable military force it has ever encountered, with the remains of a broken army, with perhaps a vigorous, but certainly new and disorganised Government, and with no great military or political leader, around whom the soldiery or the nation can rally. Under such circumstances, we see no probability that the armies now being got ready in the south and in other parts of France will be able to make any successful resistance. They must be composed either of raw and inexperienced troops, or, at the best, of old troops that have not been in the habit of acting together, and that are new to each other, and to their officers; and thus they cannot have that spirit of confidence in themselves which is so great an element of success. The first defeat of one of these new armies will utterly demoralise the others, and then the nation will be more helpless, and

more at the mercy of her enemy than before. She will then become utterly powerless, and will have to accept any terms, however humiliating, as Prussia had to do after Jena. True, the fleet is intact, and is powerful, but what avails that? It may harass German commerce—may even bombard some German seaports, but that is of little consequence, when a German army in overwhelming force is at the walls of, if not inside Paris. Prussia has now, as it were, her hand on the throat of prostrate France, and all the damage done to her seaports by the French fleet will simply be added to the bill of war costs, of which she will demand payment, before she will let go her hold.

So far then as we understand the position of affairs as revealed by the telegrams down to the 5th of September, we see no probability of France being able to make a successful stand in defence of her capital. The surrender at Sedan, left the Crown Prince free to march on Paris, which he would probably reach a few days before the middle of the month. The French army there would in all probability retire within the circle of the forts which surround the city, and, supported by them, would there endeavor to make a successful stand. The forts, though not likely to prove formidable, when regularly besieged, are strong enough to give great support to a French army encamped under their guns. There may thus be some delay till the Prussian reserves come up, when we think Paris is certain to fall. To supply provisions merely to a vast population of nearly two millions is impossible, unless one or two railroads or a navigable river is kept open for traffic, and to secure this the French

armies must be able successfully to keep the field. But we know that they are now unable to do so. Consequently, when the German armies advance they will be able to seize all the railways running into the city, will at once destroy those they are unable to hold, and will also place a force in such a position as will stop the navigation of the Seine. This being done, unless the invaders are defeated in the field, Paris must of necessity fall sooner or later without the necessity of firing a shot, as no supplies of provisions could then reach the inhabitants except in mere driblets.

But if the battle which we think is likely to be fought under the walls of Paris is a defeat to the French, we hardly think that any protracted or desperate defence of the city will be attempted. The probabilities are against such a course being adopted. Great capitals, as a rule, are difficult, if not impossible, to defend when the defenders are unable to keep the field. Thus, in the wars of the first Napoleon, every important capital on the European Continent was occupied by his troops without any defence being attempted except in the field. It is true none of them were strongly fortified, but during those protracted wars there was plenty of time to fortify some of them, if it had been found desirable to do so. The true reason seems to be that in modern wars, which as a rule are not wars of subjugation, and which, now especially, are of very short duration, the fortification of cities containing over half a million of inhabitants, as most large European capitals do, is likely to prove an injury rather than a benefit. If a city is fortified and is defended, it becomes as a matter of course subject to the usages of war. It is certain to be

attacked by heavy artillery, is also liable to bombardment, and, if resistance is carried out to the utmost, and it is taken by storm, it is subject to sack. What this is we need hardly tell any one who has read history. It is a calamity so awful that there is no regular government in Europe, we think, which, rather than risk it, would not surrender its capital to the occupation of an enemy. The Provisional Republican Government just established in France, is likely from its very constitution to resort to more extreme measures than old established, and especially monarchical governments; but we are of opinion that while it may perhaps for a short time endeavor to defend Paris, it will only be in the hope either that foreign aid may somehow or other bring a diversion in its favor, or that the armies being collected in the southern half of France may be able to advance and relieve the city. When it becomes apparent that neither of these resources is likely to be available, then Paris—if not previously captured—will, we think, be surrendered, for fear of a worse fate.

A full and careful consideration of all these circumstances, then, leads us to the conclusion that the war will not be nearly so long as we at first anticipated, and that if peace is not already made, there is every probability that it soon will be. When the German armies get to Paris, the other great Powers of Europe will almost certainly press upon the two belligerents the desirability of putting an end to hostilities. Probably, in the first place, an armistice will be declared, as at Nikolsburg in the war of 1866, and then will come up the terms of peace. If these are unreasonable and humiliating to France, the Republican

Government will, in all probability, refuse to agree, and will prefer to continue the war and take its chance of what may turn up. It therefore becomes important to enquire what terms the Germans will be likely to demand. Of course in such a matter all is mere conjecture, and perhaps some of our readers may think that it is wholly premature of us to discuss such a matter, if not idle to enter upon it at all at this stage of the contest. We venture to do so, however, in the first place, because we think that the final result of the contest is already assured, and in the second, because we believe that there are certain obvious bases of a peace which the Germans are almost certain to insist upon as a *sine quâ non.* If these preliminary conditions are granted us, we think it follows, from the importance of the contest, and the extraordinary interest it has excited throughout the world, that the consideration by us now of the probable terms of peace is neither idle nor premature.

The question of supremacy on the European Continent, which no doubt was one of the main predisposing causes that led France to declare war, is already substantially and emphatically decided in favor of Germany, and the only point that now remains to be discussed is the price that Germany will demand as the conqueror. In determining a question of this sort with only the probabilities of the case to guide us, we may, of course, conjecture extremely wide of the ultimate facts. There are, however, certain considerations, which if we take as our guide, will, we think, land us pretty close to the truth. The first and most important of these is, that Prussia is now the recognised

leader of, and the champion of the unity of Germany, and being successful in so deadly a struggle as that which she is now engaged in, she is by all the rules, not only of war, but of fair-play, entitled to expect something more than the *status quo ante bellum.* Had the war been a drawn game, as it were, Prussia would still have been the winner in a sense, as she would then have successfully asserted the right of Germany to unify herself without the interference of France; and would of course have also been able to prevent that country from taking possession of any portion of the German territory. But such a merely negative position is of course not enough for Prussia triumphant, and France prostrate. Had the case been reversed, France would to a certainty have demanded the Rhine as her frontier to the borders of Belgium, and in all probability would also have annexed the latter kingdom. If there is then a corresponding demand that Prussia can make of France, she has an equal right to make it, and further to assert it, by her right of conquest.

There *is* such a demand that Prussia is likely to make, and which all Germany with one united voice will urge her to demand as a *sine quâ non* of peace—the cession namely by France of Alsace and Lorraine. These are two of the fairest and most fertile provinces inhabited by the German race, and though they have long been in the possession of France, the public sentiment of Germany has never acquiesced in their separation, especially of Alsace, from the Fatherland—a separation only due, they assert, to the disunion of Germany being taken advantage of by the rapacity of France. It is certain then, we think,

that these two provinces will be wrested from France and restored to Germany—Lorraine, with a population of 1,600,000, being given to Prussia; and Alsace, with 1,100,000, most probably to Baden and Bavaria. Luxembourg will probably also be ceded by Holland to Prussia, the latter power paying for it the sum agreed to be given in 1867 to the King of Holland by the Emperor of the French. These are likely to be the only territorial changes, if we except perhaps some unimportant internal re-arrangement of German territory, and the union of all Germany, both north and south (Austrian Germany excepted), in one powerful empire, with Prussia as its head, and the King of Prussia as Emperor. Besides the cession of these two provinces, there will also be the bill of costs which will be presented to France, and which she will doubtless have to pay. In the Sadowa campaign Austria lost no territory, owing to the interference of France, it is said, but she had to pay Prussia about six millions sterling. There will be no big neutral standing alongside after this fight is over that will be likely to interfere and protest against the amount of the bill, and Prussia is therefore not likely to be so moderate in her demands as she was with Austria. Probably the contribution she will exact from France will be about thirty millions sterling, to be divided among the various German States in proportion to their share in the war. Such, we think, will mainly be the terms of peace that Prussia will offer France. They may seem hard, but on the whole they are not unreasonable, and, if offered—unless some unexpected ally should interfere in favor of France—will, we think, be accepted, notwithstanding the

declaration of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that "he would not listen to a proffer of mediation while a single Prussian remained in France."

VII.

France is now laboring heavily among the breakers. Her terrible reverses in the field have been followed or preceded by serious rebuffs or disappointments from the Cabinets of the neutral Powers. The somewhat piteous appeal which, after the defeats of Woerth and Forbach, the *Journal Officiel* made to the nations of Europe, and which probably was an echo of the diplomatic appeals that were at the same time being made by the French Cabinet, seems to have produced no favorable response, and alone and unaided, France must now combat with that terrible adversary whom she has provoked to a death-grapple. Time is absolutely necessary for her to call out and arm her reserves, and this is what the Prussian leaders seem determined not to give her. Never in the history of war have such enormous armies been pressed so heavily and so swiftly against those of an enemy. Contemplate, for instance, the terrible exertions involved in that wonderful circular march of the army of the Crown Prince from Weissenbourg to Sedan. From point to point, by way of Hagenau, Nancy, and Chalons, is upwards of 250 miles, and yet this distance was got over, although in an enemy's country, in less than a month. During that time, several severe engagements and four battles—two of them great ones—were fought

and won; the passes of a formidable mountain range defended by many fortresses were forced; several forts and many large towns were taken and occupied; and when the wonderful doings of the month were brought to a close by the capture of MacMahon's second army, and the surrender of the Emperor, the victors only rested on their arms for *one* day, and then resumed their march for Paris as if they had merely fought an ordinary battle with a comparatively insignificant enemy. Such is the enemy France has now to meet! Can it be wondered at, then, that her expected allies should hold aloof? The King of Italy importunes his Cabinet to move an army across the Alps to meet the French legions in the south of Germany; and while his Ministers urge delay and are pointing out the dangers of interference, the wires flash the intelligence that the French armies instead of advancing into Germany, are hurled back in total rout; that Metz is surrounded, and Prussian horsemen are within two days' ride of Paris. The Emperor, then in his extremity, appeals to Russia, points out *her* danger if France is overpowered and Prussia is greatly aggrandised—probably to tempt her throws aside one of the most cherished schemes of French foreign policy, and offers to give way to Russia in the East. The Russian Cabinet listens, discusses, and, if we may draw a conclusion from some of the items of the month's news, seems inclined to yield to the temptation, and interpose in favor of France. When, lo! before the terms of intervention—if intervention is intended—can be settled, or even seriously discussed, the Emperor and his greatest army are prisoners of war, and the victorious Prussians

are swiftly and triumphantly marching on the French capital, where a Republican Government has already been established. The Muscovite Cabinet might well then stand aghast, and if it had moved, withdraw from, and endeavor to hide its proposed intervention. It would have been hazardous even at the best to have interfered in favor of the French Emperor against a united Germany; but to do so in favor of a Republican Government that might be the mere creation of a Parisian mob, and might soon be the victim of another, must have seemed to the wary statesmen of St. Petersburg to be a veritable piece of madness. That France, then, will have to reckon with her enemy alone and unaided—for a time at least—seems to us to be pretty clearly the tenor of the news for the month of September. Her last hope of foreign aid, for the present, seems to have disappeared with the downfall of the Emperor, for no foreign Government will run the risk of encountering Germany, however strongly tempted by France, so long as the Government of that country is merely a provisional one.

That thus unaided France will be successful there seems to be no reasonable expectation. Her soldiers have all along fought most gallantly, in this respect well sustaining the character of the nation, but the management of the war, whether in the field or in the Cabinet, seems to have been woefully defective. Nor do we yet see any signs of statesmanship or of great military ability. The loudly-expressed determination to defend Paris "from street to street, and from house to house," seems to us to betray weakness and not strength, and goes to show that the new Government is composed of

desperate men, who wish to excite the sympathy of Europe by subjecting Paris to all the horrors of a siege and of a bombardment. Such a course of action is feminine in its character, and will probably excite much feminine sympathy in Europe and elsewhere, but that it will have the slightest effect on the statesmen who control the destinies of the European kingdoms is more than unlikely. They will reply if appealed to, to prevent the destruction of Paris, that Paris in ashes is doubtless a dreadful spectacle, but then if France makes war, and has her capital besieged, her capital must surrender, or take the consequences. The law of modern warfare is well defined, and must be the same to France as to Spain, or to any other country. When the French overran the Peninsula, Madrid surrendered on their approach, but Saragossa stood three desperate sieges and suffered dreadfully in consequence. If the governor of Paris wishes to emulate the fame of Palafox, we may admire his spirit, but cannot say much for his wisdom, and if the Parisians pray in their extremity that they may be delivered from their enemies, it is to be hoped they will have the discernment to include among the first of them, the men who are mad enough to think of defending as a fortified city, a huge capital with about thirty square miles of dwelling houses, and having within its lines, subject to all the horrors of a bombardment, about two millions of human beings. It may properly be said of the defence of such a place, as was said of the Balaclava charge, that it may be very grand, but it is not war. We may go further and say, that when there seems to be no hope whatever of defeating the invaders

in the field, if an army should run within the walls of such a city as Paris, and there take shelter and defy the enemy to proceed to all the extremities of a siege, it is guilty not merely of an act of folly, but of what seems to us to partake of cowardice. It is like the act of a poltroon, who first insults his adversary, and then, when threatened with chastisement, instead of showing fight or making an apology, runs and seizes a lady by the skirts and shelters himself behind her person. It is to be hoped, for the credit of a gallant people, whose armies have hitherto behaved so bravely, that they will not subject themselves to an imputation of this kind. They are, no doubt, justified in defending the forts outside the city, because there the besiegers can confine their fire to the forts, and can leave untouched the vast multitude huddled within the walls of the city. But when the forts and other outer defences fall, it seems clear to us that, should the French military authorities attempt to defend the city proper, and thus expose two millions of people to all the dreadful horrors of a siege, and of a bombardment, they will commit a crime of the first magnitude, and one which even success will not excuse. Such a defence undertaken by the citizens, alone and unassisted, would be an act of great devotion, and of great bravery, though still of great folly; but to be undertaken by a French army would be simply a compound of cruelty and of poltroonery, and would show that the military authorities who would resort to such a step are utterly unworthy of their position, and are only fitted to command the troops of some second-rate South American Republic, where

citizens are looked on as mere material for plunder, and their lives of as little consequence as those of the mules of a baggage train.

But cruel as may seem the defence of a city of two millions of inhabitants, there seems to be no doubt whatever that it has, for the present at least, been determined on by the Provisional Government of France. The *Bois de Boulogne* has been cut down, and as this is within the circle of the forts, and just outside the walls of the city, it is evident that even if the forts are broken through, it is still intended to defend the city—so far, at least, as present resolutions go. If this is carried out, and big deeds follow the big words, the siege of Paris will eclipse in horrors that of any city since the Turks took Constantinople. So long as the forts hold out, there will be comparatively little harm done to the city, as even on the south side, where they come closest to the walls, there is fully a mile between, and thus the fire of the besiegers will fall only, or at least mainly, on the forts. These, however, cannot hold out long. They are isolated works, capable of withstanding a *coup-de-main*, but not of a regular siege. As compared with the defences of Strasbourg, they are insignificant; and Strasbourg, though regarded as one of the strongest fortresses of France, only held out seven weeks. It is true that the fortress of Mont Valerien on the west is very strong, but then between it and the next fort to the north-east there is a gap of seven miles, and to the south, one of four miles quite unprotected except by the river, and by temporary works erected within the last few weeks. It is, however, probable that the besiegers will concentrate their attacks on one or two of the forts on the south, and these taken,

and the line of defence thus broken through, the city itself cannot hold out long. If the French armies do not relieve it, it is highly improbable that it will be defended longer than Strasbourg, even should the military authorities be desperate enough to attempt to hold out at all, after the line of forts is broken through.

The other notable events of the month of September after the surrender of Sedan, are the withdrawal of the French fleet from the North Sea and the raising of the blockade there, the continued investment of Metz by Prince Frederick's army, the surrender of the garrison of Strasbourg as prisoners of war on the 27th, the advance of General Falckenstein at the head of an army towards Lyons, and the occupation of the whole of the valley of the Seine by the invaders, up to and round Paris, and their advance south to the Loire at Orleans. The French armies have thus been unable to meet their foe in the field, and have virtually surrendered without striking a blow the whole northern centre of France, Paris excepted. As this is the very heart of the nation, the part from which it derives its most warlike population—the extreme north excepted, which, however, may also be said to be held down—it is certain that France now continues the war under a terrible disadvantage. She has as it were had her right arm disabled, and thus crippled must meet the swelling hosts of the Germans. It were well—not alone for her own sake, but for the sake of humanity—that she had now a statesman wise enough to see that there are in the history of nations, supreme moments, when defeat must be accepted, and its consequences boldly faced, however bitter it may be to do so. Let her but look at the

recent history of her great rival. After Jena, Prussia was prostrate, her capital was occupied by the French, and her statesmen were compelled to accept terms of peace infinitely harder than those that are likely now to be offered to France. But under the wise leadership of Stein, she set her house in order, improved her land-tenure, gave her subjects greater freedom and greater privileges, re-organised her administration and her army, and thus stimulated by the bitterness of defeat, developed her power and her resources in so admirable a manner as to double her strength in less than fifty years. That France can do the same if she sets vigorously and wisely about it, there is no reason whatever to doubt, but it is certain that if she wishes to do so, her first step must be to place herself under different leadership to that which she has been under for the last generation. France no doubt has statesmen in her bosom, if she would only use them, and these she must find, and place in her front. It is to her statesmen, and not to her marshals that France must look to for her regeneration; to men like Colbert and Turgot, and not to vapourers like Thiers that she must trust to for her future guidance. If their present reverses will thoroughly impress this truth on the French people, and induce them to recognise it, and act on it, they will "out of the nettle danger, have plucked the flower safety." When they have placed a wise statesman at their head, there will be found when the nation needs it a great general not far behind. Genius seldom buds alone, and the same stem that bears a Bismarck or a Pitt, produces at the same time as their complement for the national need, a Moltke, or a Nelson.

VIII.

The wonderful and terrible events of the war have almost entirely withdrawn public attention from the diplomacy of the two belligerents, but if we are not much mistaken, it will be found by-and-by when the veil has been lifted, and the secret diplomatic negotiations of the last few months have been made public, that a drama of surpassing interest has been going on behind the scenes—the players being not generals, marshals, or warlike princes, but astute diplomatists and sagacious and far-seeing ministers or statesmen. To a consideration of this subject, slightly dealt with in our last, we propose to devote this paper.

It is now certain that the late Emperor, in his forecast of the war, placed great dependence on his alliances, and on the fears entertained by other European Powers of the rising strength of Prussia. As to the feeling of the South German States, he had evidently been grossly misled by his agents, but his reliance upon Italy seems to have been based on not unsubstantial reasons, the King, it is understood, being strongly inclined to move with France. Austria was less to be depended on, as the powerful German element there would be disinclined to draw the sword against the Fatherland. Russia was rather antagonistic, but her antagonism mainly lay against a powerful and dominating France, and not against a weak one. For France powerful, meant this: that her policy in the East would be opposed to that of Russia, while France, weak, and likely to be overpowered by

Germany, would be willing enough to purchase the assistance of Russia, by giving way to, if not supporting Russian policy in the East.

Of course, in dealing with these questions of the diplomacy of the war, we do not write, or affect to write, from any exact knowledge of the facts. These are as yet hidden from the public eye, and are likely to be so, to a large extent at least, for some time to come. But though diplomatists work in the dark, in these days they cannot altogether shroud their movements, and it seems to have been known in Europe that the Emperor had been making great efforts to secure the assistance of the principal continental Powers. This much being granted, we must beg our readers to bear in mind that in the remarks we are about to make on the diplomacy of the war, we only write hypothetically, and simply state what is likely to have taken place, and not what has actually happened. More, we need hardly say, we cannot do, and our reason for dealing with such hypothetical matters at all is, that unless we do so our readers will have but a very imperfect view of the situation. While these mighty armies have been struggling for the mastery on the frontiers of France, diplomatic movements have been going on, silent almost as the workings of the brain, which might have—which indeed may yet have—the most momentous consequences on the issue of the war. To allow such movements to pass altogether unnoticed, simply because we are unable thoroughly to trace and fathom them, is unnecessary if not unwise. All that is fairly required of us is to take care that we do not state as facts what are simply probabilities; but with this proviso to endeavor to give our

readers as complete an exposition as we can of the probable diplomatic situation, and of the effect it is now likely to have on the final issue.

We have already stated what was the position of France towards the three chief neutral Powers on the Continent when the war began. Before she sustained her first great reverses, the Imperial representatives would naturally take a high position, and thus, though Italy—or rather her king—from previous alliances felt inclined to support Napoleon, Austria was quiescent, and Russia seemed to think that an alliance with Prussia which had no antagonistic interest in the East, was largely to be preferred to one with France, which had. Now mark the singular diplomatic ill-fortune of France. For the first six weeks of the war she was under the control of the Emperor. During that time he and his followers by the most consummate military incapacity managed to bring her to the verge of ruin. But before the final and culminating disaster occurred at Sedan, the Emperor saw well that he was completely overmatched, and that unless he could purchase the assistance of some powerful ally, he would be overwhelmed, and his dynasty destroyed. The Government of Italy could not or would not move alone, the people in the main being adverse. Austria was also fettered by the strong patriotism of her German population. But Russia was unmoved by any such popular impulse, and her Cabinet had openly announced that she would be guided in her course of action by her interests—in other words, that if she moved in favor of either belligerent, it would be in favor of the one

that would give the highest price for her support. Russia, besides, is the only one of these three continental Powers that is strong enough to be independent of United Germany, and that could venture to act in concert with France in face of the wonderful successes of the German arms. But for such co-operation there are two points on which the Russian Cabinet would take care to be thoroughly satisfied before she would reverse her policy, throw off the alliance of Prussia, and cast in her lot with weakened and overpowered France. These are—in the first place, a price sufficient in the eyes of the Russian Cabinet to compensate for the risk to be run in encountering the hostility of Germany, and, in the second, some degree of certainty that any arrangement entered into by the French Government would be honestly and fairly carried out. As regards the first, there is one prize which the Russian Government has been persistently striving for since the time of Peter the Great, and that is Constantinople and the territory adjacent. For that prize, Russia would sacrifice any ally whatever. It is to her more than Rome is to Italy, or than the frontier of the Rhine is to France. The secret of her long continued alliance with Prussia is mainly owing to this, that Prussia has no Eastern interests, and has no powerful reason, or hitherto has had none, for interfering with Russian aggression on Turkey; while Austria, France, and Britain have. France, when in the height of her ambition, aims in the first place to have the Rhine as her frontier, from behind which she can safely threaten all central Europe; and, in the second, to have the Mediterranean under her control — a French lake is the Gallic

expression — so that by threatening the British line of communication with India by way of Egypt, she could thus have a terrible hold upon the otherwise inaccessible and insolent islanders. These are the fondly cherished aims of the French military party, by whom France has been more or less led since the time of the first Napoleon. But France with her frontiers pierced and her capital threatened by victorious German armies, naturally takes another view of the importance of the Eastern question. Then she was ready to oppose Russian aggression on Turkey, because that would interfere with her own game in that quarter. Now she thinks Russia may well have her own way there, if she will only prevent Prussia from having *her* way on the Rhine. Is there not a cry—loud and fierce—rising in Germany for the dismemberment of Alsace? Is not even the cession of Lorraine being clamored for by the German Press? If such a result should come, then the German frontier will be less than 150 miles from Paris, with no strong defensible country between. Compared with such a calamity to France, what matters who holds Constantinople or Egypt. Russia and Britain may fight that quarrel out, and we will ally ourselves with the Power that now assists us to keep the victorious Prussians from our capital, and prevents our dismemberment. Such, we think, is a probable view of the deliberations of the Emperor and his Cabinet in the second and third weeks of August. In such a view he would be supported by the public opinion of France. But to him the matter was even more vital, for unless the progress of Prussia was arrested, his dynasty, and the career of all

the Imperial followers, would be destroyed. There can be little doubt then, we think, that diplomatic overtures of the most important character were at that time made to arrest the progress of Prussia. The British Government, as being the least selfish and the most powerful, would naturally be the first that would be appealed to; but we know that such an interference could not for a moment be entertained by any British Ministry. Of the other three European Powers, Russia, Austria, and Italy, the first, for several reasons, was the one that could give the most effectual aid, if not the only one that could give aid at all. If Italy alone intervened, Prussia could check her by appealing to the Republican party, and giving them money and means. If Austria alone intervened, she might be checked, either by promising Italy the Southern Tyrol with Trieste and the Adriatic provinces, or by appealing to the patriotism of the German population; and, again, if Austria and Italy moved in concert in aid of France, or even if one of them moved, and could not be checked by the means already stated, then Russia would interfere in favor of Prussia, if the latter Power were willing to pay the price demanded, which, of course, in such an extremity she would willingly do, Prussia's objections to Russian aggrandisement in Turkey being less strong than those of any other of the great European Powers.

From this summary of the position of the various continental States it will be seen that Russia held the key of the situation during the month of August. If Prussia were overmatched in her struggle with France, through Italy and Austria, one or both, joining the

Emperor, Russia could turn the scale, or at least make the contest an equal one, by coming to the aid of Prussia, the latter of course paying the price that Russia might demand for such assistance. If on the other hand, as proved to be the case, Prussia overpowered France, and Austria and Italy were indisposed or afraid to move in her favor, France could secure Russian assistance by making a higher bid for it than victorious Prussia would be disposed to make. Such an alliance would, of course, completely change the aspect of affairs, for though Prussia would be a dangerous enemy to Russia alone, the position of danger would be more than reversed if France became an ally of Russia, and thus placed Prussia between two fires.

Keeping this view of the relative attitudes of the continental Powers in mind, our readers will, we think, agree with us in supposing it more than probable that the Emperor in, say, the second or third week of August made offers to Russia of the most unqualified character if she would only move her armies against Prussia, and thus relieve France of the terrible pressure upon her. What the overtures would be we know not, but in all probability they were the establishment of an offensive and defensive alliance between the two Powers till Russia had secured Constantinople and the major portion of Turkey, and France the Rhenish provinces of Prussia. The question of Belgium would be left to a future time for fear of the interference of Great Britain. Such an offer as this the Emperor was more than likely to make, and Russia more than likely to entertain. But such an important negotiation as this could not be decided upon off-hand, and

herein is to be noted the remarkable good fortune of Prussia, and the equally remarkable fatality that seems for the present to have fallen upon France. The Emperor, by his incapacity, had brought on her nearly all the evil it was possible for him to do, but he had ruled France for nearly twenty years, had established a firm government, and his regime had just been confirmed by a plebiscite giving him an overwhelming majority of many millions of votes. He therefore represented, or seemed to represent, a stable government—a government with which any Power in Europe apparently might safely treat, confidently relying on its stability. This condition was the only other one that Russia required, the price to be paid for her alliance being satisfactory; for to make a treaty with an unstable government, and incur the deadly enmity of the dreaded Bismarck, for a price that the overthrow of such a government might prevent being paid, was a risk that the astute statesmen of St. Petersburg were not likely to run. Thus the Emperor, according to this view of the matter, was about to repair by his diplomacy what he had lost by his military blunders; the only penalty being the abnegation of French policy in the East in favor of that of Russia. But while the preliminaries are being arranged by the diplomatists—and it is important to remember that in the latter part of August, Russia was reported to be massing her troops in strategical positions on her western frontier, and Turkey to be calling out her reserves —Moltke and his legions scattered the Franco-Muscovite negotiations to the winds. The surrender of MacMahon's army and the

capture of the Emperor, destroyed the Second Empire at a blow, and the St. Petersburg Cabinet suddenly found themselves negotiating with an envoy who, though yesterday representing the French Empire and possessing full power to act for it, could now no more commit France to the Russian policy in the East than if he had been a simple valet-de-chambre.

We of course, as we have already stated, put forward these views of the diplomatic situation in August as a mere hypothesis, only committing ourselves to the extent of saying that they are a probable explanation of the Imperial policy at the time. Assuming this view to be correct, it will be seen in the first place, that the surrender of Sedan prevented the immediate breaking out of a great European war; for, if Russia had allied herself with France on the basis of France aiding her designs on Turkey, Great Britain must necessarily have interfered, and thus the whole of Europe would sooner or later have been involved; and, in the second, that, just as the Emperor's position as the head of a stable and permanent government was likely to be of immense service to France, fate so willed it that he should be hurled from his post, amid the applause and the raptures of the people on whom he had certainly brought a great calamity, but whom he now might have saved from further disaster had he continued to rule. Should such a reading of the diplomatic position of affairs prove by-and-by to be a correct one, this terrible stroke of evil fortune that has befallen France cannot but be regarded as one of the most curious and most disastrous freaks of fate of which history can furnish an example.

IX.

Prussia at the present time is receiving magnificent service from her sons. From the noble old king to the humblest private soldier, all are eagerly doing their best for their country, and the most enthusiastic patriotism seems to animate every fibre of the nation. In this respect, however, Prussia is not singular, even in these latter days. The devotion of a whole people to the cause of their country was perhaps as marked in the case of the late secession war in the United States as in the present Franco-Prussian war. On the part of the people of the Southern States, undoubtedly more so; because the contest on their part was so much more unequal, and they had consequently sacrifices to make of a character so extreme and so desperate, as to leave all other patriotic struggles of modern days completely in the shade. But in the service of that form of ability which directs a nation in its life and death struggle—in the genius which in such a crisis keeps it in the right path, which prevents its strength from being misdirected, and its resources from being wasted unavailingly—Prussia at the present time is more highly favored than any other country has been during the present century. Other nations may have had a general equal to Moltke, or perhaps a statesman that can be compared with Bismarck; but no people has had, during the present century at least, at one and the same time, a statesman and a soldier that can each be classed as the equal of these two distinguished servants of the Prussian nation. The Confederate States were

nobly served by General Lee, undoubtedly the ablest soldier of the old school of war now living, but even he must yield the palm to Moltke; and President Davis, though a man of great energy and tenacity of character, is greatly deficient in breadth of view, and cannot certainly be compared with Bismarck. The services of Cavour and of Garibaldi to Italy probably come nearer in character to those rendered to Prussia by Bismarck and Moltke; but even those two great Italians, in intellectual force and in far-reaching views, fall short of their northern prototypes. The highly trained intelligence, and the enthusistic patriotism of the Prussian people have of course placed at the disposal of Bismarck and of Moltke a national weapon unequalled in power at the present time in Europe, but that weapon owes much of its weight and largely of its edge to the profound statesmanship of Bismarck, and its terrible destructiveness is clearly greatly owing to the wonderful skill with which it has been directed in war by the genius of Moltke.

The sagacity with which the foreign and internal policy of Prussia has been conducted during the last ten years has made the name of Bismarck famous throughout the civilised world, but that of his great military coadjutor Moltke, until the present war began, was comparatively unknown, except to his more intelligent countrymen and to the military circles of Europe. The success of the Sadowa campaign was popularly attributed to the power of the needle-gun as against the old-fashioned muzzle-loader, and when such an obviously common-place reason as this was presented to the public mind, it was not likely to look for a second one, and ascribe to strategical skill

developed in a novel and remarkable form, a victory which could otherwise be so easily explained. One new idea at a time seems to be quite as much as the ordinary public mind can fairly receive, and so Moltke's claim to fame was quietly shelved for the time; or if acknowledged at all, acknowledged only by his admiring countrymen, and by discerning military critics, whose superior knowledge enabled them to appreciate his remarkable strategical combinations in the campaign of 1866.

The almost unparalleled success of the Prussian strategy in the present war is such that "he who runs may read," and General Moltke's reputation as a strategist is not likely now to be left in the shade. To explain that strategy, or at least to endeavor, so far as our limited knowledge of military matters will permit, to show in what respect the strategy of Moltke differs from and is an advance upon that of bygone masters of the art of war, shall be the object of our present paper. Unless we are much mistaken, General Moltke has revolutionised the art of war. With that depth of insight which belongs to genius alone, he has clearly seen that in these days of railroads and of electric telegraphs, war can be carried on with a rapidity of action and a precision in execution which were utterly impossible in the days of Wellington and of Napoleon. He has also perceived, and in the most startling manner demonstrated, the practicability of one general moving, feeding, and directing with unerring precision, three or four armies, each as numerous and as powerful as the largest which under the old system of war could with safety be directly

commanded by one man. To have effected a revolution far less important than this in the art of war, has made the fame of several of those who figure as the great commanders of history. Yet it seems to us that such a revolution in the military art has been effected by this Prussian officer, who, even when at the ripe age of three-score years, was utterly unknown beyond his own military circle, and who, now that he has reached the limit of the Psalmist's span of life, is beginning to fill the world with his fame. How so grand a result has been achieved we shall now try to explain.

The most wonderful successes in war have been generally owing to the invention of a new and more effective weapon, to the introduction of some new system of training or of tactics, or to the application of a comprehensive and novel system of strategy by which the old-established principles of warfare have been completely overthrown. The introduction of firearms and of artillery, though one of the most radical changes in the weapons of war ever made, is not reported as having led to any great success on the part of those who introduced them; but this is easily explained by the great imperfections of these weapons when first introduced, and to the very slow and gradual use that was made of them for the first century or so. They, however, changed the system of war, and led nations to rely chiefly upon unarmored but trained infantry, instead of heavily mailed men-at-arms. But the introduction of breech-loaders by the Prussian Government gave their troops a decided superiority in the Sadowa campaign, and the use of rifled artillery by the French in the campaign in

Lombardy in 1859, had also an important effect on the result of the war. These are instances of the importance of new weapons in recent times. Even smaller matters often vitally affect the fighting powers of an army. Thus Carlyle points out that apart from the superiority in drill and training of the troops of Frederick the Great over their opponents, they also in the first years of the "Seven Years War" had another incontestable point of superiority in the use of iron ramrods instead of wooden ones; and this apparently trifling alteration he shows to have been of very great importance. The question of changes in training, tactics, and strategy, is a more difficult one for a civilian to deal with, and in alluding to it at all we wish it to be understood that we write for the non-professional public, and not for the military reader. We only venture to glance briefly—and no doubt imperfectly—at this branch of the military art at all, because otherwise we shall be unable to make our readers understand, what we wish to bring before them as clearly as we can, the important development, amounting to a revolution, of the military art that has been effected in these two last Prussian wars by General Moltke.

In the rude days of war in the middle ages, personal prowess was an important element of success alike in the general and the common soldier, and battles were either a series of isolated struggles between bands of men on either side acting very loosely together, or else a contest between two stiff unwieldy armed masses for a position. Strategy, except in the rudest and most obvious form, was then almost unknown, and even tactics as a branch of the

military art were very imperfectly understood. With the progress of the arts which improved arms offensive and defensive, and with the accumulation of wealth which enabled sovereigns and wealthy cities to maintain under arms men who made war a business, the knowledge of military affairs increased, till, in the sixteenth century, the gold obtained from the New World enabled the sovereigns of Spain to train a body of infantry which became famous throughout Europe. In the next century, the wars of Louis XIV. and the ability of his generals secured for the French armies a great name; but the badness of communication, even in the most populous parts of Europe, rendered the feeding of large armies, and consequently their movements, a most difficult matter. War was then mainly an affair of sieges, and the reduction or the relief of a fortress was often the work of an entire campaign. A war in consequence was a protracted affair, continued from year to year, till the belligerents were utterly exhausted, and, as in the "Thirty Years War," whole countries were rendered desolate, and extensive provinces all but depopulated. Frederick the Great was the first who effected a great change in this respect, and made war shorter in its operation by making it more decisive in its results. Left by his father in possession of a highly trained army, he seems to have made it still more formidable. He improved the arms of his infantry; trained his cavalry till they were more effective against an enemy, it is said, than that arm has ever been since; organised his commissariat, so that he could make a series of long marches, and strike his enemy while quite unprepared; and, perhaps more than all, he trained his troops to

manœuvre in small bodies, and with such precision as completely to revolutionise the tactics of war. An army trained and commanded by him was flexible to his orders, and yet firm and unyielding to the enemy, and thus when opposed to an army organised on the old principle, he was enabled by the flexibility of his own troops to manœuvre them with ease and confidence, and to throw them in great force on the weak point of his adversary, who was thus often destroyed before he could change his order of battle.

The next great change in the art of war was effected by Napoleon. The science of strategy, hitherto imperfectly studied, he brought to a pitch of excellence as high, perhaps, as could then be reached. With armies which, in the early part of his career at least, were invariably much inferior in numbers to those the enemy had in the field, he generally contrived to bring a superiority of force to the vital point of attack. After he became Emperor, when he had immense armies at his command, his strategic powers were displayed in another fashion. By concentric movements, executed with the utmost precision, as in the campaign of 1805, he would bring large bodies of troops by different routes to a certain point or points at a fixed time, and thus surround and capture the enemy, or overwhelm him by the unexpected potency of his attack. These movements were all conceived and arranged in detail by Napoleon himself, and, generally speaking, were most admirably planned and ably carried out. They were, however, liable to this great drawback—inseparable from the nature of communication in those days, when railroads and telegraphs were not—that the orders once

issued from head-quarters, Napoleon had no means of knowing whether or not they were being properly carried out. The value of the movement might be destroyed by some corps engaged in it failing to reach its position in time, either by some unavoidable accident, or by the incapacity of its general; and Napoleon probably had no means of remedying the blunder till too late. Mounted scouts were, of course, generally freely used to convey to him intelligence of the progress of the various movements; but these were liable to capture and other accidents, and could only at the best give him but imperfect and, more or less, stale information. The consequence was that in those days, if the troops on each side were very numerous, and formed more than one army, as in the campaign of 1813, there was no perfect unity of command possible to either side. Napoleon undoubtedly was capable of directing, with the most consummate ability, the operations of half a million, or probably even a million of men at one time, had he possessed, what the telegraph system has since rendered practicable, the means of knowing from day to day, or from hour to hour, the position and movements of every corps of the whole array. But at that time such information was not obtainable, and he had therefore to confine his own immediate command to the army which he led in person, and allow his marshals, under certain general instructions, to act on their own responsibility; or he issued definite orders to them to act in a certain precise manner, and probably afterwards learned that the varying chances of war had rendered the course of action he had ordered, unwise and disastrous. Both methods seem to have been

tried by Napoleon, with not very dissimilar results. Every movement in war is so much a matter of circumstances, that a third-rate general who has the facts of the day or of the hour before him, and acts accordingly to the best of his ability, is likely to beat an enemy who is guided by precise instructions given some days before on the presumption of what seemed likely to happen, even by such a great master of war as the first Napoleon.

It will thus be seen that in the Napoleonic wars strategy could only be very imperfectly carried out by the ablest generals, unless the operations were confined to those of a single army under the immediate direction of the Commander-in-Chief; and even then, as the necessities of a campaign often involved the sending of divisions, more or less powerful, from the main army to seize and hold certain positions, or to perform certain movements as diversions, the strategy of the ablest generals was still extremely liable to fail from unexpected obstacles, or from the carelessness of subordinates in executing important movements entrusted to them. Thus the failure of the Spaniards to hold the fords of the Tormes, above Salamanca, enabled Marmont to cross that river unopposed, and get between Wellington and his base. The latter was thus placed in a most critical position by the able strategy of his opponent, and was only relieved from it by the victory of Salamanca, in which, again, Wellington by his genius as a tactician won a great victory, executing, it is said, in forty minutes the brilliant manœuvre which defeated the French army, and sent it flying broken and dispirited to a considerable distance beyond Madrid.

by French peasants; and, again, the fact that in 1866 the army was in continual connection with one of the principal lines of railway, so that it became merely a matter of attaching the field telegraph to the regular line, and messages could be "wired" almost momentarily. But in this war it has been found quite impossible to attain the same success, and even now there is a temporary "block" again, owing to the wires being cut close to the head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles. The nearest stationary line from here is Saarbruck, so that you may conceive that, notwithstanding the innumerable patrols, it is a somewhat difficult matter to protect it, to say nothing of the laying it. The telegraph system attached to our army is composed in the following way. To understand it completely it must be recollected, however, that an army is composed of various *corps d'armée*, and each corps of two divisions; therefore the telegraph is divided into three sections,—1, the station at the Commander-in-Chief's; 2, the station at each corps; 3, the station at each division. Sending a message from a division of this army, to London we will say, it first goes to the station of the corps to which the division belongs; thence to the head-quarters of the army to which the corps belongs, and then to the nearest main line. Each section has one inspector and five secretaries, or what we should call clerks, four carriages, two smaller ones, and six waggons. The first-named contain the cable, the second the apparatus and batteries, and the last-named the posts upon which the wires are fixed. They carry 20 English miles of cable, and the average time it takes to lay it is three hours to every four miles. The process of laying is naturally the most scientific part of the arrangement, and is conducted in the following manner:—An intelligent officer from the army, with some assistant under him, is entrusted with the general supervision of the telegraph of each army, and to him is entrusted the task of directing where the main line shall run. He rides on ahead of the waggons, which proceed at a footpace, the cable being passed out over a wheel, and indicates to the drivers by means of a piece of paper stuck on a stick or a blazed tree the direction they shall follow. In the meantime, the foot soldiers attached to the telegraph, who are selected from the regiments for superior intelligence, and wear a different uniform, with a large

T on the shoulder-strap, are divided into what is called troops, or, in navvy language, "gangs," of three men each. The first take the wire, as it is payed out, lay it on the ground, and on it a post every 100 yards; the second coming after them, twist the cable round the insulator, which is made of gutta percha, not glass, as we are in the habit of using, and erect the posts in the ground. This is a matter of great ease, they being about 12 feet high, and about the thickness of the butt-end of a salmon rod, slightly tapering towards the top. The third troop strain the wire, and ascertain that it is clear of all wood, &c., and, in short, "runs clear." I should mention that whenever it is possible the trees are used as telegraph posts, and, by means of a light ladder, are easily ascended to the requisite height. It is altogether as perfect an arrangement as can be found. They all, however, complain that this war has tried them terribly, as, from the utter break up of the railways by the retreating army, enormous distances have to be traversed before they can touch a main line. I forgot to mention that if necessary, and, in fact, always when on the field of battle, the telegraph is worked by a machine fixed inside one of the carriages. When, however, a house is obtainable, a room is instantly turned into an office.

By means of this field telegraph system, the great Prussian strategist is placed in possession of the position and movement of every division even of the immense host under his control, unless when the wires are cut by the activity of the enemy. Sitting at his desk at head-quarters, with his maps and plans, and attended by able assistants, he is enabled to combine the movements of his various armies, so that they shall act together almost, if not altogether, with certainty. Should one be attacked by the union of two or more forces of the enemy in front, he knows which part of his own strength is most available for assistance, and he can at once give it orders to move. Or, knowing that to make such an attack the

enemy must have weakened one of his vital points, he immediately makes a combined and powerful advance against it, which is more than likely to be successful, as he can, by the use of his telegraph, depend on the movements of his troops being made simultaneously and in support of each other. But perhaps the new system is more important for attack than for defence. At all events, in the hands of Moltke, it has been entirely used for that purpose, he never yet having waged a defensive war. For attack, one of Moltke's most effective adjuncts to the field telegraph is the great use he makes of light cavalry—those Uhlans we hear so much of in the present war. These are employed in great numbers to scour the country in front of each main army, as well as between them, to prevent the enemy obtaining any information of the movements or position of the Prussian forces, and equally, if not more important, to learn as much as possible of those of the enemy. For this purpose these Uhlans seem admirably trained. They advance with the utmost audacity through the enemy's lines, ascertain his strength, position, and movements, which they at once convey to their own army. They are often attacked by superior numbers, and often captured, but as they generally go in small bands of from ten to fifteen in each, there is almost invariably one or two of the number who escape and carry to their own army the intelligence that is wanted. They form, as it were, the *antennæ* of the Prussian military organism. All news thus obtained is conveyed at once to the telegraph station of the nearest division, and then transmitted to head-quarters. If of importance, as showing that an important strategic

point—such as a pass, a bridge, or a commanding hill or wood—has been neglected or abandoned by the enemy, Moltke can at once, without any delay, order it to be seized by the nearest corps; and thus, probably before the abandonment of the point is known at the enemy's head-quarters, or even by the nearest general of division, it is in the occupation of the Prussians.

In the more important movements of an advance in force, the advantages of the field telegraph in the hands of such a man as Moltke is even of greater consequence than in these minor matters. It enables him—so far as it is possible in war—to carry out his great movements with comparative, though not with absolute, certainty. And to the consummate general, who has a well-matured scheme before him, providing for every reasonable contingency, the certainty or comparative certainty that his plans will be under his own control, under his own eye as it were, from hour to hour, by means of the field telegraph, is perhaps the greatest improvement we have yet had in war. It confers on brain—on genius, as we term the highest development of brain—a new power, because it to a large extent prevents a master in war from being deprived of the reward of his combinations—victory—by the errors of some of his subordinates. It enables him to see that his plans are being carried out, that the vital point which he wishes to strike, is being struck at; and should any unforeseen contingency arise, that under the management of an inferior mind might be likely to overthrow the whole combination, the field telegraph by bringing the difficulty at once under the supervision of the master mind, reduces

its difficulties to the lowest quantity, and enables him to remove or remedy them. A great general under the new system has his pieces as it were all in their place on the chess-board, or in his hand when he is about to play them, instead of as under the old system finding some of them altogether off the board—having them in the air, to use the military expression—when they were perhaps required to give checkmate. Thus, through one of those mischances inseparable from the old system of war, D'Erlon's corps of 20,000 men was entirely lost both to Napoleon and to Ney when the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras were being fought. It was marched and countermarched from one battle-field to the other, never taking part in either, thus probably totally altering the immediate issue of the campaign. In possession of a field telegraph, the first Napoleon, it need hardly be said, would not have left 20,000 men "in the air" while two great battles were being fought within two hours' march of them.

We do not know to whom is due the credit of originating or of carrying out in all its details this system of a military field telegraph. Probably, in some degree at least, to General Von Roon, the Prussian Minister for War, who has a high reputation as a military organiser. But there seems to be no doubt that it is to the genius of Moltke, using this new instrument and the railway system, that the Prussians are indebted for their almost unparalleled successes in the present war.

The first occasion, so far as we know, in which the great merits of the new system were made apparent, was in the campaign of 1866. Then Moltke, instead of following one of the

principal armies into the field as chief of the staff, remained at Berlin for the first week or ten days, as being a point from which he could with greater precision watch and direct the movements of the numerous Prussian armies that were then advancing through the passes of the Bohemian mountains against Austria, and that were operating in the west against Hanover, Bavaria, and the other opposing states of the German Bund. As it was well understood at the time that Moltke was the strategist of the campaign, and was directing from the capital the movements of the Prussian armies, great was the astonishment expressed in certain European military circles at such an apparent absurdity. French military critics in particular were highly amused at the idea of great armies being guided in their movements by an old officer sitting at his desk hundreds of miles off; and the jeer went round that the leader of the Prussian troops in Bohemia and Western Germany was an old man in spectacles—a mere German professor —who sat at his desk in the Berlin War Office while the armies he guided were in the field. That was not war, said the lively Frenchmen, and was even worse than the guidance of the Aulic Council, which in so many wars had been the ruin of the Austrian armies. How *could* war be carried on in that absurd and pedantic fashion? It might do for German armies to be directed in that way, but should they ever be encountered by French armies, then they would, as often before, find to their cost what the consequence would be. The "old man in spectacles," however, seemed well to know what he was about. When the Hanoverian army had been captured and matters approached a crisis

in Bohemia, he left Berlin for a more central post there, and was with Prince Frederick's army when it attacked Benedek at Sadowa. When the present war began, Moltke made Mainz, the great German fortress on the Rhine, his head-quarters, and he remained there with Bismarck till, we think, the beginning of August. Then, as his armies became concentrated he advanced to Kaiserslautern, west of Mainz and near the French frontier, where he remained till the great operations connected with the attacks on MacMahon and Frossard were carried out, and the advance made into the French territory. From that time he seems to have remained at head-quarters with the King, accompanying him in pursuit of MacMahon to Sedan. Moltke's post, in fact, seems to be as near the centre of the armies as possible; at the central head-quarters in fact, where all the lines of field telegraph converge, and where every movement of the huge organism under his direction is as it were felt, and its import at once more or less understood. The tent, or hut, or chamber at head-quarters where sit General Moltke and his able aids is, as it were, the brain of the Prussian armies, to which is conveyed by a series of nervous cords all that the armies feel or suffer, and from which are flashed again orders that move those terrible columns as if they were weapons merely in the hands of an armed man.

General Moltke's method of conducting war seems to be based on the separation of tactics from strategy. So far as we can see, he entrusts the execution of the former entirely to lieutenants, while the planning of the movements of the various armies and of their respective corps he takes upon himself. The

principle of a division of labor has thus been carried one step further in war. The necessity of the case naturally led to this, as when war came to be conducted on so huge a scale it necessarily required several generals to command the various armies in the field, and this naturally led to the setting apart of one in whom the strategical power predominated, to plan and superintend all the movements of the campaign. This seems to be what is done under the present organisation of the Prussian War Department, and that it is a wise one we think there can be no doubt whatever.

To sum up, then, the railway and field telegraph systems, as adapted to military purposes by General Moltke and the Prussian War Department, have effected a thorough change in the art of war; indeed, in our humble opinion, have revolutionised it to as great an extent as has any previous improvement in so short a space of time. The nature of these changes may thus be summarised.

1. (RAILWAYS)—Enabling a government to concentrate immense masses of troops with the requisite food and munitions of war at any point in a short time; *e.g.*, the concentration of the Prussian forces in the opening of the present campaign.

2. Enabling these immense masses of troops in advancing rapidly through an enemy's country, to do so safely, by seizing and protecting the lines of railway, and thus allowing reinforcements and supplies to be forwarded surely and speedily; *e.g.*, the Sadowa and present campaigns.

3. (FIELD TELEGRAPH)—Placing it in the power of the Commander-in-Chief to direct the

daily or even hourly movements of an unlimited number of troops with precision, thus indefinitely extending the limits of personal command as regards strategy, and rendering wars of short duration by making them more quickly decisive in their results; *e.g.*, the Sadowa campaign.

4. Giving greater range also, and infinitely greater precision, to the tactical powers of a commander-in-chief, and thus rendering battles more disastrous to the less skilful combatant; *e.g.*, Sadowa and Sedan.

5. Generally placing the operations of war on a more scientific basis, and consequently increasing the power of a skilful commander, and lessening the chances of success of an inexperienced or incapable one.

These are some of the more important consequences which seem to us to result from the improvements in the art of war that have been made by General Moltke and his military coadjutors. If we are correct in our analysis of them, they are of the highest importance, not only from a military, but from a political point of view. They will vitally affect the future action of all civilised States, and will thus react on the world at large. In the future it will be found, we think, that war will be much compressed in its area and limited in its duration, and, though terrible while it lasts, there will on the whole be a great saving to civilisation of money and of life, and a great lessening of human misery. That there will be much greater suffering while war rages is but too evident, from what we now witness; but where formerly we had ten years of war, there will in future, we think, be only one—war, in fact,

instead of being, as it has hitherto been, a more or less chronic, will in future become an acute disease of civilisation, and corresponding changes will have to be made by all the principal States of the civilised world to meet this altered condition of affairs. The governments of these States will in future find it one of their first duties to provide a highly-trained military staff, having behind it a small perhaps, but certainly highly efficient regular army, and a people more or less trained to arms, as in Prussia or Switzerland. But the necessary reform cannot rest here. Government itself, as the art of administering the affairs of a nation, will have to be improved, and conducted in future on more scientific principles. In the terrible catastrophe which has just befallen France, the shortcomings of the Government have been even more fatal than those of the army, and have been mainly the cause of the terrible collapse of that army before the enemy. In looking, then, to the improvement of a military system, and to the great results arising from the able leadership of an army, let it not be forgot that above and beyond all military systems and all armies are the nations from whom they spring, and surely if the importance of leadership is to be recognised at all, it should begin *there*.

X.

Another month's news shows the position of France to be now almost hopeless. The life is being slowly but surely beaten out of her by the overpowering strength and skill of her enemy. There are now no fierce, desperate battles to record—no wild, terrible wrestlings between two mighty armies like those around Metz or before Sedan. Such struggles as those, however disastrously they resulted for her, at least implied on her part the possession of considerable strength. They showed that, though her footing was unstable, she was at least still free and erect, and able to deal some kind of return blow to her antagonist. But there seems to be little of that left now for poor France. Like some wild animal that has been disabled and brought to bay by the hunter, she still continues to struggle and to resist, but her power for real offence is destroyed, and her resistance, if unaided, must evidently soon come to an end.

All the other events of the month of October sink into insignificance beside the surrender of Metz. That of Sedan was previously unparalleled in the history of European war, but even that disaster is eclipsed by the surrender of Bazaine's army. The world is so easily dazzled by titles and great names that probably the fall of Sedan will be more famous in history than that of Metz, merely because at the head of the force captured there was an Emperor and a Napoleon; but as regards the material loss to France, Metz is as to Sedan as two—probably as three—are to one. The army that

surrendered at Sedan was largely composed of inexperienced and disheartened troops, and probably two-thirds of its number were the second levies that were hastily forwarded from Paris to support and strengthen the broken and demoralised remnants that retreated from Woerth; but under the command of Bazaine were the choicest troops of France, including the celebrated Imperial Guard. When the proud army of the Rhine fell back before the fierce attacks of the Prussians on the 6th of August, the whole of it, with the exception of MacMahon's divisions, made Metz the rallying point. In Metz, therefore, or rather within the protection of its surrounding forts, has been since the 16th of August, when the Prussians arrested its retreat, *the* army of France—that famous army which during the last sixteen years has caused so much anxiety, and so grievous an outlay to the other nations of Europe. Every one can now see the woeful blunder that was committed when this great army clung to Metz, instead of falling back on Paris. Its number in the middle of August must have been about 220,000 men—probably more than less—all highly trained troops, capable of absorbing, without detracting greatly from their efficiency, an equal number of the rawer and more inexperienced levies that were then gathering in Paris from all parts of France. Had a garrison of 30,000 or 35,000 men been left in Metz, and the rest of the army fallen back slowly on the capital to receive its reserves; and then leaving a powerful garrison there to form with the Garde Mobile and the National Guard, a force sufficient to hold Paris and the forts around, had the main army retreated to

the line of the Loire, the difficulties of the Prussian armies would have been increased threefold. There would then have been—the want of which is now so fatally felt in France—a powerful and efficient French army in the field. It would also have occupied a highly favorable position, for it would have been retreating on its resources, and, consequently augmenting its own strength and diminishing that of the Prussians by every day's march to the South. It might not, perhaps, have had a general capable of giving it decisive victories, but still time would have been gained, and every week would, with the fierce light that was then being brought to bear on the army, have disclosed the shortcomings of the incapable generals and the merits of the efficient ones. In a few weeks the wonderful quickness of the French people in military affairs would have enabled them to remedy at least the more remediable of the defects that have been so fatal to their armies. Probably by the time the army, or armies, had fallen back to the line of the Loire they would have been, doubtless, considerably disheartened; but for every real purpose more effective against the enemy than when they were in cantonments on the frontier, and ready to spring forward into Germany.

Then how changed would have been the position of affairs at Metz in favor of France. That fortress is one of the strongest in Europe —so strong that a siege in the usual way has not been even attempted by the Prussians, on the ground that it would have taken so much time and have cost so many lives. The process of reduction has been by a close investment, resulting in the beleaguered army being brought

to such straits for want of food and other accessories as to be compelled to surrender after holding out for two months and a half. But if an army of say, 200,000 men could hold out against starvation for two months and a half from the stores and supplies left in Metz before the advance of the Prussians, the ordinary garrison must have been able to hold out, so far, at least, as food is concerned, a very much longer time. Probably 30,000 men, certainly 40,000, would have been sufficient to have strongly garrisoned the place with all its surrounding forts, and it is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the supply of food for such a number would have lasted at least a year. The Prussians then would have been compelled to besiege it in form, and endure the loss of time and of men that such a great siege would have entailed; or they would have been compelled to leave a considerable force, probably 50,000 or 60,000 men to mask it, and prevent the garrison from interfering with their line of communication. In either case the gain to France would have been great, and should the Prussians, as the war went on, have been completely successful in other parts of France, and even have captured Paris, Metz, if still unsubdued, would have enabled better terms to have been got from them when peace came to be made. That Bazaine then should have remained at Metz till he was surrounded by the Prussians and unable to get away, must be looked on as one of the great blunders of the war; a blunder even exceeding in the fatal importance of its results, MacMahon's forward movement from Rheims ending in the surrender of Sedan, or the almost inexplicable want of concentration of the French corps on the frontier in the first week of August.

The magnitude of the capture is, we think, unparalleled in the history of European warfare. That of Ulm will for the future sink into insignificance. The surrender of an army of 173,000 men, including the Imperial Guard, three marshals of France, 66 generals, 6000 officers, 3000 guns, and nearly two millions sterling of treasure, seems to be the very acme of military disaster. Yet who can venture to say so after the experience of the last three months. Woerth and Forbach were thought to be terrible disasters—so terrible, that many looked for a defeat of the Prussians as being certain to come soon after, to restore the balance of fortune. Then came Sedan, still more fatal and more startling. The public mind has hardly had time to realise the situation, or fully to comprehend the magnitude of that event, before another disaster, not so startling certainly, because not so novel or so unexpected, but at least double in magnitude, falls upon the unfortunate French people; and still, when the last news left, there seemed to be looming in the winter days that were then beginning to creep over France, a calamity greater in material loss than even these, and surpassing them also in interest—the probable surrender of the famous capital, the proud city of Paris.

So accustomed has the world become to Prussian success, that the capture of Metz, wonderful and important as it is, is looked upon as a matter of course, and but little attention seems to be paid to the remarkable skill that must have been displayed in the investment of the place. It will be found, we think, by-and-bye, when the operations of the campaign begin to be closely examined by

military critics, that the plan of the investment of Metz is a master-piece, and that its execution has been of the most able and thorough character. It is impossible, indeed, that it can be otherwise. The investing force does not seem to have much exceeded—if at all—200,000 men. Some of the English newspapers, even so late as October, estimate it at 120,000 men. Probably the correct number will be about 200,000. The task this army had was to keep close prisoners in Metz, or round it, an army nearly as numerous, for there must have been nearly 150,000 of Bazaine's army capable of bearing arms. This army, be it remembered, the choicest troops of France, having every inducement and motive that soldiers could have to break through the besiegers. Then the circle of investment must have been an extensive one, and the point at which the besieged might select to break through, or the night or the hour they might choose for that purpose, would of course be quite unknown. False sorties might be attempted night after night, at various parts of the circle of investment, and all would require to be prepared for and met as if they were genuine. Yet notwithstanding the almost insuperable difficulties that must have attended the holding closely and firmly within their lines, so great an army as that under Marshal Bazaine, they seem to have been thoroughly overcome. The Prussian plans seem to have been as perfect, whether as regards their thoroughness in the way of strength, or their completeness as to minute details, as the mechanism of a ponderous steam-hammer, which is said to be able, either to crack a nut without injuring the kernel, or

to crush a solid mass of iron, as if it were moist clay. Single spies, however skilfully disguised, were latterly unable to pass the Prussian lines, and the desperate outbursts of an army of 100,000 men struggling for all that is dear to a soldier, though repeated again and again, were equally fruitless. In half an hour, it is said, 50,000 of the Prussians, and in an hour 100,000, could be concentrated at any point of their works against which an attack might be made, and those works were so skilfully designed and so strong that the usual guard could hold them for that time against almost any sortie of the besieged. When it is considered that the line which the Prussians had to defend was the outer, and consequently the more extensive one, that it was liable to be attacked at any hour, and at any point of the circumference— not merely by a garrison, but by an army nearly as numerous as the besiegers themselves, it will we think be generally conceded that the greatest credit is due to the Prussians for bringing the investment to a successful close. We are inclined, indeed, to regard the investment of Metz and the capture of Bazaine's army as one of the masterpieces of the war.

The six weeks intervening between the middle of September, when Paris was invested, and the 1st of November when the bombardment was to begin, seem to have been occupied by the Prussians in making the most thorough preparations for the siege. At first the difficulties were great. The heaviest siege guns that could be obtained were absolutely necessary, and these could only readily be conveyed from the frontier by means of a canal or railway. The French had destroyed the locks of

the Rhine and Marne Canal, so that it could not at first be used, and the fortress of Toul blocked the only line of railway running through the country held by the Prussians. Thus the forwarding of heavy siege guns was necessarily delayed, and though some were sent along the ordinary roads drawn by traction engines, the number thus brought to Paris could not have been large. Neither of these obstacles, of course, interfered with the mere investment of the city, as troops easily marched round Toul, and ammunition, food, and other necessaries of war that were not ponderous and unmanageable, were conveyed past the break it caused in the line of railway by means of carts and waggons. The capitulation of Toul on the 22nd of September, opened the railway throughout, and the surrender of Strasbourg on the 27th, set free for the siege of Paris the heavy guns that had been used for the bombardment there. Some time in October also the damaged canal was repaired, and by means of it the heaviest artillery, we believe, that has ever been used in war were forwarded to the beleaguered capital. Some of these guns are described as being capable of throwing shells holding 150lb of powder, and curious to relate, it is also stated, that the monster cannon exhibited in the Paris Exhibition of 1867 by Krupp, of Essen, in Rhenish Prussia, has been sent to Paris again, but this time *not* on a mission of peace. This great gun is said to be the most powerful piece of artillery ever made, capable, we think we have seen it somewhere stated, of throwing a projectile of upwards of 1200 lbs weight to a distance of 6 or 7 miles. Be this as it may, there can be no doubt that artillery of the most formidable

kind ever used in war was being diligently forwarded during the month of October to Paris, and that during the same time every preparation was made by the Prussians to strengthen their entrenchments against sorties of the besieged, and to render the investment as complete as that of Metz. What that was we have already alluded to, and though the immense extent of the circle to be invested—about 32 miles being the line of the outer forts—increases the difficulty of doing so properly, almost in a geometrical ratio, yet so perfect and so complete have been the Prussian plans hitherto, that he must be a bold man who will predict their failure now.

The bombardment began on the 1st of November, so runs our latest telegram received by last mail, and then, so far as we are concerned, the curtain fell for another month. What is to be the issue of the terrible drama then begun? All military authorities say that modern improvements in war have made every siege merely a question of time, if the besiegers have the requisite means and force, and know how and are prepared to use them. Have the Prussians, then, the power required to besiege such a city as Paris? The besieged, and their countrymen generally, seem to be strongly of opinion that they have not; but this opinion is not generally shared by the rest of the world. It seems to us pretty clear that unless the Prussian power suddenly breaks down—of which we see no symptom whatever—Paris cannot, at the outside, withstand an attack more than three months from the commencement of the bombardment, and that one month or six weeks is the more probable limit of the defence. All war is a matter of uncertainty,

but perhaps there is no matter connected with it more uncertain than the duration of a siege, if the garrison has plenty of food and munitions of war, and the besiegers are not reckless of their own lives; and this uncertainty is increased when there is a large civil population inside the besieged city. The temper of the inhabitants becomes then a matter of vital importance in estimating the probable duration of the siege, and whether it may last two or three weeks or as many months. That temper may be like that of the citizens of Paris in 1815, when the city was at once surrendered to Blucher; or it may be like that of the defenders of Leyden or Saragossa. If the Parisians on the present occasion are determined to emulate the defence made by these cities, there can be little doubt that the Prussians have before them a most difficult task, but still one for which they are quite able. By concentrating their fire on two or three of the outside forts, they will render them quite untenable by even a small detachment of troops—and the outer line of defence thus broken—which will probably be on the southern side—they will then be able not only to batter the walls, but to pour into the city a terrific storm of shot and shell. There can be no doubt that the apparent inactivity of the latter part of September and of October was to thoroughly prepare for the bombardment—to have ready, such a command of the heaviest artillery, and such a store of shot and shell, as to be able to overpower the fire of the defence, and to make the bombardment so heavy and so continuous, that to repair the damages done to the walls, or to extinguish the conflagrations within, would be all but impossible on the part of the citizens.

Will the Parisians resolutely hold out against such terrible punishment? We think not. It will be too dreadful for such a vast and mixed population to bear long. It is a trying position for even an old and hardened pugilist to have his head "in chancery," and held with an unrelaxing grip by a powerful opponent who can give a severe punishment at his leisure. But when such is the position of a West End "dandy," it is more than likely that the sponge will quickly be thrown up. Paris is not a fortress like Metz, or Gibraltar—grim war-seamed strongholds, where the interests of the citizens are as nothing, compared with the importance of defending them to the last extremity. It is a huge capital, a city of gaiety and of pleasure, fortified after a fashion it is true, but only intended to withstand the dash of an invading army, and not to endure a siege. The wisdom of attempting to defend it under any circumstances is doubtful, but to defend it and subject it to a bombardment, when its relief by an outside army is hopeless, seems to us to be a national blunder, the enormity of which will quickly become more apparent when the city has begun to experience the horrors of a bombardment such as the world has never before seen.

There seems to have been no check in October to the onward movements of the Prussians in the other parts of France, and as the surrender of Metz, on the 27th of that month, would free a considerable force for further operations in the South and North, there is every probability that a few weeks would place one-half of France in the occupation of the Prussians. The strategical position thus gained

by occupying the northern centre of the kingdom virtually places it, when we look at the overpowering force at their command, at the mercy of the invaders. Dijon, the ancient capital of Burgundy, was occupied a day or two before the end of October, and, probably, before the middle of November a Prussian army would be before Lyons, the second city of France. There does not seem to be the head of a resistance shown anywhere. A great deal is said about a formidable army having been formed on the southern bank of the Loire, but the Prussians are reported to have crossed it at several points with little or no opposition. The French troops, in fact, seem to be everywhere demoralised, and there seems to be little probability of their now encountering the enemy in the field in great force. The nation seems to have concentrated its hopes on the defence of Paris, and when it falls, in all probability all serious resistance will cease.

The proclamation of the Republic at Paris seems to have awakened in favor of France the lively sympathy of many of the working-men in England and on the Continent, and at the same time of the people of the United States. Garibaldi seems also to have cast in his lot with the new-born Republic, and to be fighting in its defence. These facts are significant, and are well worthy of the attention of statesmen. But while they show how strong is the undercurrent of republican feeling in Europe, they do not speak much for republican intelligence. So far as French Republics have yet gone, each has simply proved to be the chrysalis of an Imperial despotism, and it is more than questionable whether the latest will have a more

XI.

With the capture of Metz, Prussia seems to have relaxed her exertions. Compared with her efforts in August, September, and October, those she made in November seem to have been comparatively tame. She seems now to regard the result as certain, and as a consequence to be disposed to take matters easy. Such seems to us to be the main feature of the news for the month of November. The Prussian armies, it is true, are more or less active in various parts of France, but they evidently move with leisure, and not as if they had still to contend with time as well as with the enemy. They seem to feel that no effort that France can now make can shake off their hold of her; that she has no chance of an ally coming to her assistance, and, therefore, that a leisurely prosecution of the campaign is now as likely to be successful as a more vigorous one. Holding in overwhelming force the northern centre of France from Amiens to Orleans, and from Rouen and Le Mans to the frontier of Lorraine and Alsace, they almost cut the kingdom in two, and can at pleasure operate in force against the fresh levies either in the north or in the south. Their communication with their own country is uninterrupted, and seems likely to be so. With their lines of communication safe, and in possession of a commanding central position, the leaders of the Prussian armies probably feel that if France will not agree to their terms, there is nothing more likely to cause her to do so, than to continue the hostile occupation of her territory, to seize

the more important cities and strategic positions that are readily accessible, and while doing so to live upon the country. Such an occupation must be most burdensome and most exhausting to France. The trade of the occupied districts must of course be entirely destroyed, while that of the rest of the country will be paralysed, and in the meantime, the Prussians eat up the resources of the districts they occupy, and when these are exhausted move on to a fresh one, there again to go through the same exhausting process. If then, the French do not succeed in raising armies strong enough to defeat the invaders in the field, it is clear that a continuance of the occupation will be ruin to the country. Its resources will be eaten up and wasted by the enemy, and years of future industry will be required to restore it to even a moderate share of its former prosperity. If it means to revenge itself for its present humiliation, it is postponing its ability to do so by every month that it now keeps the enemy on its soil. All this is so obvious that the French people, by continuing the contest, must either display much more tenacity of character in their resistance to an invader than they are supposed to possess as soldiers on a field of battle; or they and their leaders must take a much more hopeful view of their position than the rest of the world generally does.

Our own opinion is, as we have more than once stated, that France unaided has no hope of making a successful resistance; but while holding this view of the matter, we must own that the obstinacy with which the nation continues the contest shows how certain elements of national character, not in themselves very elevating or very conducive to national

strength, sometimes go far to give an air of strength, and even of tenacity, to the character of a people. One of the weak points of the French national character is generally supposed to be their want of tenacity, of continuity of character so to speak, and the resolution they are now displaying in opposing the invaders under national disasters unparalleled in their extent and fatality, would at first sight seem to show that in this respect they are not altogether so lacking as has been generally supposed; that when the area of a contest is widened from a field of battle to a country, they display an indisposition to acknowledge defeat, as great, if not greater, than those Teutonic races which are generally supposed to be so superior in this characteristic. Take, for instance, the conduct of the Prussians after Jena and Auerstadt. These battles were great national disasters doubtless, but though greater than Woerth and Forbach, they were not to be compared to Sedan, and are not to be mentioned with Metz. Yet after Jena, Napoleon went through Prussia at a canter. Even some of the strongest fortresses surrendered without firing a shot. It is true that Prussia was then small, that her population was only about ten millions to about forty millions controlled by Napoleon, and that a large number of the people of Prussia, besides being uneducated, were then in a state of semi-serfdom. But in a great national crisis, the characteristics of race are supposed to rise above such conditions, and to show themselves, to some extent at least, against any odds. Yet Prussia, with its supposed dogged Teutonic population, succumbed to Napoleon at a blow, while France with its

lively, impulsive, and changeable Celts boldly resists Moltke, not only after Sedan, but grander still, after Metz.

Here, then, is a subject for enquiry, more important and more interesting than one as to the cause of the loss of any of the battles of the campaign. These may have been decided by accident, or by causes that may be avoided or may not exist in the future; but those national characteristics to which we have drawn attention spring from deeper sources and have a wider base of action, and are therefore of a much more enduring nature. Is, then, the popular notion wrong, and are the French as a race as tenacious—as dogged as the Germans or the British? We think not, and that the resolution with which the French are still carrying on the war, despite their unparalleled disasters, is traceable to the effect of other causes operating on the national character. One of these is the political one, that there is no regular government now in France—no body of politicians or of statesmen, who have the capacity to see the full extent of the abyss into which France has fallen, and the spirit to sacrifice themselves to secure a peace. All the politicians see that any possible peace must be more or less humiliating to France, and that the Ministers who make it, though utterly irresponsible for the calamities which have rendered it necessary, will, by-and-bye, probably be made the victims of the rage of the nation at its humiliation. This is one potent cause why the members of the Provisional Government are unwilling to listen to any terms involving the surrender of French territory. But this alone does not account for the popular desire to continue the contest,

even after such terrible disasters. To explain this we must remember that the French are a lively, impulsive people, prone to see things as they wish to see them, and indisposed to recognise facts that are repulsive to their self-love or self-esteem. The national vanity has long held as the cardinal point of the French creed, that they are the leading nation, not only of Europe, but of the world—*la grande nation*—in fact; able to hold its own against any other nation, or even a combination of nations, especially in a defensive war. The destruction of such a faith as this, which lies deep in the heart of the French people, will be no easy task; yet till it is destroyed they will not listen to any terms of peace which would involve the surrendering of territory belonging to France. All the disasters they have as yet met with in the war, are popularly attributed, either to the incapacity of the Emperor, or to the treason of his generals, and any peace now made surrendering Alsace and part of Lorraine, would almost to a certainty be regarded as an additional act of treason on the part of the Government that signed it. The people of France, in fact, do not yet comprehend their position. Unlike their more solid-brained neighbors of Germany and Britain, they have not the faculty of looking facts in the face, and owning their existence. They do not yet fairly know as a nation that they have been completely overpowered by the superior strength and skill of their adversary, and certainly so long as Paris holds out, are not likely to acquire that knowledge.

Nearly all the accounts that come from the English correspondents living among the French people dwell strongly on this curious feature

of national character. The most obvious facts are either denied or falsified, if they are antagonistic to the supposed invincibility of France and of Frenchmen, and then, when such resources fail, treason is alleged to be the cause of the disaster. This great national peculiarity—a peculiarity which, in the outset of the war, there can be little doubt brought on the nation many of its disasters—is at this stage of the contest, strange to say, telling in its favor, so far at least as regards a resolution to continue the war. The French people, in our opinion, now fight, not because they see clearly that if they continue to do so they are sure of success, but because as a nation they cannot and will not see their helplessness. Depression no doubt exists in various parts, and as is usual with such idiosyncracies, whether national or individual, depression of an extreme kind; but that feeling is still exceptional, while confidence is general. We can readily understand how this attitude of the people may lead to an erroneous conception of their strength and of their chances of success, not only to themselves but to others. But when a disinterested observer begins to carefully examine the reports received from various parts of France, he finds that the real elements of success are sadly wanting. Paris is relying on the efforts of the provinces, and the provinces seem to be of opinion that Paris is invincible, and that the German hosts will melt away during the winter months before its impregnable walls and forts. Behind and beneath all this vainglorious illusion, there however remains a considerable stratum of men of resolute and persistent patriotism, who see clearly

XII.

The most wonderful campaign in history has had a fitting climax in the fall of Paris, which, after a respectable defence, capitulated on the 28th of January to the German forces under King, or rather Kaiser William. The event, though a painful one to the pride of the French, is one for which even their warmest supporters must be thankful. The key of the protracted and bloody, but all but useless resistance of the French levies, lay in the defence of Paris, and now that it has surrendered it is not likely that fighting, unless of a comparatively insignificant character, will much longer continue. The fall of the capital is an event which must strike even the most vainglorious Frenchmen, and compel them to admit that the invaders have at last thoroughly obtained the mastery. The cause of the French advocates of peace will thus be strengthened, if not by the accession, at least by the silencing of their opponents.

The interval between the fall of Metz and the fall of Paris has been a most eventful one, and as after the former event we expressed somewhat decidedly our opinion that the cause of the French was "all but hopeless," it is only fair that we should not overlook the gallant efforts since made by the French to reverse the terrible strokes of ill fortune that had fallen upon them. Those efforts reflect the highest credit on the gallantry and patriotism of the French people; but that they should have been made at all is a proof that for the time France has been utterly destitute

of true leadership. The three months winter campaign, ending with the surrender of Paris, may be described as a magnificent paroxysm of gallantry on the part of the French people, such as would have sufficed to give it a character for bravery and patriotic devotion had such been wanting. But such was not wanting. The defeats of Woerth and Forbach, and the disasters of Sedan and Metz, could not destroy, or even much affect, the well established reputation of the nation for bravery, though they made it abundantly clear that in the important point of leadership, whether military or political, it had fallen terribly low. One of the chief results, then, of this dreadful winter campaign, which has brought on France such terrible, and, as we think, such useless and unnecessary misery and bloodshed, has been to make clear to the world what was previously clear enough, that the French nation is one of the most gallant in the world, and at the same time to bring out in dark relief the fact that, of all the great powers of Europe, it is the one which is now the most destitute of true leadership. Surely this is not a result worth buying at such a terrible cost.

The position of France after the surrender of Metz may be described as that of an all but utter collapse. Her system of government for many years previous had been a false and degraded one. The true pivot on which everything turned, was not the welfare of the French people, but the interest of the Imperial dynasty. A necessary result of such a policy was the growth of an Imperial clique, who feeling, or professing to feel, the utmost devotion to the dynasty, took care to use it as a stepping stone to their own aggrandisement.

In the earlier years of the Emperor's reign this clique was chiefly composed of able but bold and unscrupulous men, who at least knew how, in their own way, to govern. These were the men of the *coup d'état*, who having sacrificed many lives, and risked their own to establish the Imperial regime, looked upon it as being mainly of their own creation. So long as these men lived, which may be roundly described as being in the first ten years of the Imperial power, when the Emperor himself was active and vigorous, the Empire was strong and able to withstand all attacks from within and without. Such may be described as the muscular period of the Empire. But during the second decade a deteriorating process began. The Emperor had lost many of his chief instruments of the *coup d'état* by death, and others became broken down in health and spirit. He himself found the cares of government too much; and whether from indolence or inability, or from uxorious influence, he seems during this latter period to have delegated his power to incapable hands, to men of the courtier or toadying class, who surround all centres of profit and power. Instead of having a soldier like St. Arnaud as one of the heads of his war department—a man who would sacrifice life ruthlessly, but who could also keep the springs of government strong—he had in these latter years Le Bœuf, whose chief idea of government seems to have been to make things pleasant to his chief—one of the true courtier type, if we may judge from the tales told since this war began. The Empire in fact had lost its strength—success had been fatal to it—from the muscular it had passed to the flabby

condition, and when it was pitted by the folly of its leaders against the firm, vigorous, and high-strung organisation of new Germany, it broke down hopelessly and helplessly at the first round. It is not, we need hardly say, by the toadying class that great empires can be administered and upheld when comes the shock of battle.

But concurrent with this fatal weakness in the directing power of the Imperial Government, there were also significant elements of decay in the material sources of its strength, the army. During the first Imperial decade, the army seems to have been not only well affected, but also well governed. Its discipline seems to have been good; its self-esteem was flattered by two great and successful wars: its chiefs were men who had fought their way to eminence, and in many ways the Emperor showed that his policy was dictated from a desire to gratify his soldiery. But it is no easy matter to gratify a Pretorian soldiery, and at the same time preserve its excellence as a weapon of offence. The difficult task was probably pretty well done, when the Emperor was guided in his patronage by the rough and unscrupulous military chiefs who had helped to lift him to power. These men knew French soldiers thoroughly—knew how to humor them, and, more difficult still, how to govern them. But after the campaign in Lombardy in '59, when the Emperor seemed to be the Dictator of Europe, the fatal weakness of the Bonaparte character showed itself. That family seems to be unable to withstand the results of success. Success seems to act on its members like a kind of moral intoxication, and to lead them to act

as if the ordinary laws which govern humanity were not applicable to them. This was strikingly exemplified in the first of the family, and may, we think, be distinctly traced in the career of his nephew. He had gained his position by means of the army, and when he had reached the pinnacle of power he seems to have neglected the proper administration of it. The influence of courtierism, what in common life we call toadyism, to which he seems to have surrendered himself, descended from the court to the army, and withered it. Promotion fell not to the men of the camp, but on the creatures of the court; on voluptuaries like De Failly, or masters of ceremony like Le Bœuf, who knew how to make themselves pleasant to the dispensers of patronage at the Tuileries. As such men acquired power, they again bestowed it on their creatures, and so the circle of weakness widened and descended, till it struck even at regimental efficiency. When this point was reached—and the disclosures that have been made since the present war began show that it must have been—the efficiency of the French army became destroyed. In that army since '89, republican sentiments have run side by side with the military feeling so prevalent in France. The first Napoleon perceived this, and adroitly took advantage of it, once proclaiming in that epigrammatic way so taking with Frenchmen, that every French soldier carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack; and in his military patronage he acted on this principle. His military administration was based on what may be termed Imperial Republicanism—an autocrat dispensing patronage on republican principles. The soldiery may have no choice in the

selection of their superiors, but then the selection must proceed from the possession of qualities that find favor in the camp, not those that commend themselves to the court. Since '89 it is only on this principle that in France it has been found possible to preserve at one and the same time the discipline and the goodwill of the French soldiers. During the latter decade of the late Emperor he seems to have acted on a different principle, and the result was dissatisfaction and indiscipline in the army, and weakness and inefficiency in its administration. These evils had only to reach a certain point to render the Imperial power an insecure edifice, liable to be overthrown at the first rude shock.

These remarks may seem a digression, but without them we could not properly make clear to our readers the nature of the struggle which the French have been making during the three months of November, December, and January. It has been a subject of remark that the comparatively indisciplined levies that have carried on the contest since the fall of Metz have shown more soldierly qualities than the far-famed regular army of France. We believe this to be due to the circumstances we have explained, and to the fact that the administration of the army by the government of the defence is based on the principle that had been abandoned under the Imperial regime—that promotion and rewards shall be given to the possessors of military qualities. After the fall of the Imperial regime the whole system in fact was changed as if by magic. Gambetta by his republican enthusiasm and wonderful energy breathed new life into the army and the people who had been stunned by the calamities

that had so rapidly befallen them. That such efforts were too late to be of service to France we have repeatedly maintained, and, being so, that they have inflicted incalculable injury on the country, we think must now be apparent to everyone. But there is one advantage derivable from these efforts, though purchased at such a terrible cost to France, and that is they have made plain to the world the immense resisting power possessed by a nation in arms. Had the resistance that the French have lately been offering to the Prussians, been headed by only half the regular army, fairly led, there is a strong probability that the invasion would have been stayed. A knowledge of this fact, is likely to render wars less frequent, and invasions all but impossible.

The efforts of Gambetta to raise the provinces and to bring their levies to the assistance of the beleaguered capital, began immediately on his arrival at Tours in the beginning of October. Assuming at once to himself the powers of a military dictator, which it is fair to say was almost universally granted to him, he called forth all the resources of the country. He proclaimed aloud, alike to the youth, and to the old soldiers of France, that to those who did service to the country, promotion would be awarded. His own energy was wonderful, and early in November he was rewarded by one of his new generals, D'Aurelle des Paladine, attacking Von der Tann, at the head of a Bavarian corps, and driving him back from Orleans to within two days' march of the German lines round Paris. This was the first gleam of success that the French had yet obtained. At the same time, the levies of Brittany in the west, and those of the northern provinces,

assumed a threatening attitude; and there can be no doubt that at this time some anxiety was felt in the German head-quarters at Versailles. This appearance of new armies on all sides must have taken the German leaders by surprise, as after the fall of Metz they had sent a corps of the second reserve back to Germany, thus showing that they looked upon all serious resistance as over after the surrender of Bazaine. But the successful attack on Von der Tann, the recapture of Orleans, and the success at Coulmiers showed clearly to the German leaders that new and unexpected elements of resistance were being developed, and this once clearly seen, the best chance of the French was lost. Their only hope lay in surprising the Germans before they had become fully aware of the dangerous character of the resistance that the energy of Gambetta was organising. For the German leaders, once aware that the war was about to assume this new and desperate character, prepared to meet it on the same terms. France was not more determined to resist than Germany was to conquer, and this fact seems to have been generally overlooked by many of the British journals in dealing with the probabilities of French success. If Germany was determined to strain her strength as well as France, it is clear that with the immense advantages she had over her enemy in her magnificent organisation, her unrivalled generalship, and the advantages of her position, she could with almost perfect certainty look for victory.

So it proved. The recapture of Orleans and the defeat of Von der Tann, at Coulmiers, on the 10th of November, were the only sparkles of success obtained by the French. General

Paladine, in order to overpower Von der Tann before the advancing troops of Prince Frederick Charles came to his assistance, had moved before his army was thoroughly concentrated or even organised. After overpowering Tann he paused in his advance. The Duke of Mecklenburgh left Paris with reinforcements, and in a few days after, Prince Frederick, at the head of the Metz army, arrived and assumed the chief command against Paladine. Meanwhile the French general received immense reinforcements, and on the 27th November ventured to attack the left of the Germans at Beaune la Rolande. This was the first step of a preconcerted advance in force to co-operate with a great sortie to be made from Paris by Ducrot on the 29th; which if successful at both extremities, was to end in the junction of Paladine's army with Ducrot's near Fontainebleau, whence they were to precipitate themselves on the German line of communications with the frontier, and so compel the raising of the siege of Paris. The plan was not without merit, but it utterly failed at both ends. The sortie made in great force on the 30th, resulted in the capture of three villages, Champigny, Brie, and Villers, outside Paris, but when Ducrot's troops got beyond the fire of their own guns, and came under that of the Germans, they could make no further progress, and in a few days, they were all withdrawn and encamped again under the forts, outside the city. The attack at Beaune la Rolande, by Paladine, was also repulsed. On the 2nd of December, the Germans who had advanced, gained a victory at Artenay, and on the 4th Orleans was retaken. Gambetta then, after the revolutionary fashion, dismissed Paladine,

and gave his command to Generals Chanzy and Bourbaki, but these generals found themselves unable to arrest the progress of the victorious Germans. They, however, made a most gallant fight of it. Their army, which probably numbered in all between 250,000 and 300,000 men, as opposed to about 150,000 to 170,000 Germans, was divided, Bourbaki with one wing, retreating south, towards Bourges, and Chanzy with the other, along the right bank of the Loire, towards the southwest. Prince Frederick followed Bourbaki, but the opposition on this line was not great. Chanzy, however, who was followed by the Grand Duke of Mecklenburgh, made a most desperate resistance to the German advance. In the first nine days of December, not less than seven battles were fought—some of them of a severe and bloody character. The weather was cold and bitter, and the whole country side for several days' march along the banks of the once pleasant Loire, was strewn with wounded and dead or dying men, to whom little attention could be paid by either side, so desperate was the contest. The continued fighting was too much for the comparatively raw troops of the French, and they almost constantly gave ground. The result was the capture of Beaugency by the Grand Duke, and the temporary occupation of Vierzon and of Tours by Prince Frederick, from which latter city the French Government had previously retreated to Bordeaux. Still further pursued, Chanzy continued to fight hard, in his passage through the Forest of Marchenoir having engagements daily from the 10th to the 14th of December. Attempting to make a resolute stand in some

difficult country in front of Vendome, he found his right flank threatened by a detachment from the army of Prince Frederick, who, meeting with little resistance from Bourbaki, had thus been able to assist the Grand Duke. Chanzy, who seems to be the best general the Germans have had to encounter during the war, still tenaciously held his ground to the west of Vendome, and between that and Le Mans, and there is good reason to believe that had he been only opposed by the Grand Duke, he would have completely held his own. But that fatal want of strategical ability at the French head-quarters which has been so conspicuous since the war began, again proved disastrous to the most gallant of all their armies. Bourbaki had retreated, as we have said, with his army towards Bourges and Nevers, pursued by Prince Frederick. His obvious policy was to oppose the Prince at every point where a stand could be made, and to advance again if the Prince drew back. In this way, the Duke of Mecklenburgh alone and unassisted, would be compelled to deal with Chanzy; and as we have seen, alone, he was not much more than a match for the gallant Frenchman, for in the latter half of December these two armies faced each other without either gaining much ground. But while this was the position in the west, a change fatal to French hopes was taking place to the south-east towards which Bourbaki had retreated. There, acting probably under orders from head-quarters, Bourbaki marched with nearly all his army, numbering perhaps about 130,000 men, towards Dijon and Dole in the east. The plan seems to have been to attack General Werder, the German commander in that quarter, in

overwhelming force, raise the siege of Belfort, and then march north on the German communications. The movement proved to be as ill-conceived, and as ill-timed, as that fatal one that ended at Sedan. When Prince Frederick felt that Bourbaki was not disputing his advance, but had gone clear away, he wheeled round in force to the assistance of the Grand Duke. Towards the end of the first week of January, he seems to have joined him. On the 10th the two combined German armies, numbering about 150,000, came into collision with Chanzy's army of about 230,000 near Le Mans. The battle went against the French, who however showed a bold front. On the 11th the fight was continued, Chanzy with his young troops struggling nobly against their seasoned opponents. The two following days, the 12th and 13th, still found the French disputing gallantly the advance of their enemies. But the end was now come. Chanzy's troops could no longer face the terrible and repeated pounding of their opponents, and the close of the fighting on the 13th, found them dispirited and demoralised. Le Mans with its entrenchments, and an immense store of provisions and munitions of war, was abandoned to the enemy; 22,000 prisoners also fell into their hands. The remainder of the French army seems to have retreated, broken in spirit, towards the west of Brittany, where, for the present, the Germans have not followed them. And so ended the resistance of the gallant Chanzy, without doubt the ablest of the French generals—the only one of them in our humble opinion who has done deeds in this war that will live in history. Out of raw troops, fresh from the workshop and the

plough, badly officered, insufficiently armed and clothed, and we believe also ill fed, he has in the six weeks of his command drawn as much fighting as would have well tried the quality of an old and well disciplined army, had they had to go through the same service in as many months. Such a result could not have been secured by an ordinary or by a second-rate man, and we think that, though too late for present service, and for her present straits, France has at last found a general.

While Chanzy was making this gallant stand in the west, his brother general, Bourbaki, at the head of the other wing of the Army of the Loire, was approaching Dijon. He did not, however, catch Moltke napping. The wonderful old man seems to divine every movement of the French strategists. When he found that Bourbaki had left a military vacuum, so to speak, in front of Prince Frederick, he seems to have given warning to General Werder, commanding the German forces in the south-east, and to have at the same time hurried forward to his support powerful reinforcements under General Manteuffel, formerly commanding in the North. Werder abandoned Dijon, and fell back after several engagements towards Belfort, near which, at Montbelliard, he took up a strong position. Here he was attacked from the 15th to the 17th of January by vastly superior numbers under Bourbaki, but he successfully repulsed his assailants, as also did the army besieging Belfort, which was about the same time attacked in its investing trenches. In the meantime Moltke's combinations were being rapidly executed. Manteuffel, probably commanding many of the new levies from Germany, was rapidly approaching, and

Bourbaki found himself compelled to desist from the offensive, and look to his own safety. In this, like the other ex-Imperial generals, he seems to have been unsuccessful, for the late telegrams by the mail inform us that, finding his retreat to the south and east of France cut off, he, on the 1st of February, entered Switzerland, and surrendered himself and his army of 80,000 men to the Swiss authorities. Truly may this be called the "war of surrenders."

We have but brief space to deal with the movements in the North of France, where Faidherbe, a capable general, commanded the French. On the 2nd and 3rd of January he fought General Goeben, who had succeeded Manteuffel, at Baupaume, south of Arras, and gained, or nearly gained a victory. The truth seems to be that it was a drawn battle. Faidherbe, who was attempting to march south on Paris, was checked in his advance, and so the fruit of the contest fell to the Germans. On the 19th he again encountered the enemy near St. Quentin, his movement on this occasion having apparently been concerted with the military authorities in Paris, who at the same time were making their last and greatest sortie. At St. Quentin, Faidherbe sustained a defeat, being driven back on Cambrai and ultimately obliged to seek shelter under the fortifications of Lille, thus for the time virtually abandoning all opposition in the field to the invaders north of the Seine.

While these desperate contests were being waged in the provinces, Paris was slowly but surely being reduced to the last extremity. After the sortie of the 30th of November there was but little overt movement on either side,

what has been done by Generals Chanzy, De Paladine, Faidherbe, and Trochu, almost deprived of regular troops, and destitute of many of the advantages that a complete and continuous organisation gives to an army in the field, we cannot help coming to the conclusion that the system of administration which so rapidly found such men, and brought them to the front, must be, when compared with the Imperial administration before the war, as light is to darkness.

Besides the surrender of Paris, which is of course the crowning disaster that has befallen France, there have been several cities and fortresses captured by the Prussians which we have not yet recorded, and which in order to preserve the completeness of the war record we shall now mention. Rouen was occupied on the 6th, Dieppe on the 9th, Phalsbourg on the 12th, and Montmedy on the 14th of December, and previously Thionville had surrendered on the 26th of November. The possession of Thionville, Phalsbourg, and Montmedy, help to strengthen and complete the German line of communication with the Rhine, and the fall of Mézières and of Longwy in January, almost make this perfect as regards the northern line. In the gap or valley between the southern extremity of the Vosges, and the Jura mountains, on the borders of Switzerland, the strong fortress of Belfort defends the entrance to France in that direction. The Germans invested it early in November, and since then its capture on the one hand, and its relief on the other, have been the chief efforts of the contending armies in that quarter. It is the key to central and southern France on the side of Germany, and undoubtedly a

frontier fortress of the first importance; but we think there can be no doubt that Bourbaki, or those who ordered his advance, overestimated its importance when his army was detached from that of General Chanzy, for the purpose of relieving it. The movement left Chanzy unable to cope with the enemy in his front, and he had consequently to succumb, while it was made too late to save Belfort, which the late telegrams received by the mail inform us, was surrendered early in February. Within the area of the war, which comprises about one-fourth of France, the Germans have therefore at last stamped out all opposition. No stronghold or town within that area, except the small fort of Bitsche in the Vosges, now holds out against the Germans, and it is only on the outer rim of it, at Lille, Havre, and a few other towns in the north, and in West Brittany outside the limit of the German movements, that the French now hold sway north of the Loire. If then, peace does not follow the armistice which was agreed to in the end of January, the Germans will possess a most formidable offensive position, and with the mass of troops that will be at their disposal, French resistance will, we think, be hopeless. Though it is not yet clear that the German terms will be accepted by the French Provisional Government, it is sincerely to be hoped that they will be so, and the resignation of Gambetta will no doubt render this more probable. We may therefore with great hope—if not with certainty—look for news by the next mail of peace being established, and of the most wonderful war in history being brought to an end.

XIV.

To the delight of Europe, and indeed of the civilised world, the armistice has ended in peace. The elections for the National Assembly resulted in the return of a large majority of quasi-conservative members, disposed to moderate views, and to make peace with Germany, if it were at all possible. At the first meeting at Bordeaux, M. Thiers was elected head of the Executive, and to him and his colleagues fell the task of arranging the terms of peace with the German representatives. To afford time, the armistice had to be prolonged, and some uneasiness was felt lest, after all, the negotiations should fall through. The German military authorities in the meantime took every precaution to begin another campaign with the utmost vigor, should such an extreme measure be necessary. The forts surrounding Paris were strongly garrisoned, and their armaments, as well as those of the besieging batteries that were most suitably placed, were turned on the city, while the bulk of the rest of the besieging forces were marched to the extreme limits of the Prussian occupation in the South and West, ready to overwhelm all resistance on the part of the French should the war be renewed. These preparations were made known to the French Ministers, and probably helped them in no small degree to come to a conclusion, and to decide in favor of a peace on the best terms they could get. These were agreed to at Versailles by M. Thiers and M. Jules Favre, on the 25th of February, and though hard, were not quite so hard as some previous apparently

authorised statements had led the public to expect. They were—1. The cession of German Lorraine, including Metz and Thionville. 2. The whole of Alsace—Belfort, and a small strip of country in that neighborhood excepted. And 3. The payment of an indemnity of two hundred millions sterling within three years. Till the indemnity is paid, the Germans will retain Belfort and Champagne; but the latter province will gradually be withdrawn from, as the payment of the indemnity proceeds. The loss of Alsace seems to have been regarded by the French representatives as a settled question, but that of German Lorraine, and especially of Metz, seems to have been resisted to the utmost; M. Thiers, it is said, appealing urgently to the British Government to interfere, and to remonstrate with the German authorities against such a demand. As might have been expected, nothing was gained either by delay or remonstrance. The cession of Metz was a German *sine qua non*, and as it was garrisoned by German troops, and the Germans had had no allies in the war, they were in a position to insist on their own terms. Belfort they gave up, but as regards Metz they seem to have acted on the French declaration of September. "Not an inch of its territory—not a stone of its fortress." And so the gate to Paris is left in German hands, and humiliated France will have to begin anew, and painfully to build up a line of fortresses between this threatening German outpost and the capital; for, as has been truly said, otherwise a German victory on the frontier, means the investment of the capital within ten days; Metz being, as the crow flies, less than 180 miles from Paris.

These terms, with the exception of the indemnity, are, we think, severe, but just. It is all very well for British journalists and British public speakers to declaim against the so-called brutality of the Germans in their taking advantage of a prostrate foe. "Happy England" knows not what invasion means, and knowing nothing, even by tradition, of its horrors, it thinks the precautions of often-devastated Germany unnecessarily harsh and degrading to France. But we need hardly say that on this point, the German statesmen are likely to be better judges than the loud-speaking, or strong writing portion of the British public. They know what their country has for centuries endured from France, and there can be no doubt that the best line of defence against French inroads has for a long time back deeply engaged the attention of the best strategists of Germany. It is said by the British anti-Germanic party, that though Germany might with some reason demand the line of the Vosges for defensive purposes, her retention of Metz, Thionville, and German Lorraine must be for offence. The best answer to this charge is the well-known rule of strategy, that the value of a line of defence is doubled if it is also well suited for offence. When the rulers of France know that not only is the frontier of Germany difficult to attack on the side of France, but that the frontier of France is also difficult to defend on the side of Germany, they will not in future feel inclined to declare war against Germany "with a light heart." The Germans are thoroughly justified in their retention of Metz, if they retain it not to aid them in wantonly attacking France, but only as

a weapon of offence in the event of France attacking Germany. And we need hardly say that all the accusations to the contrary are as yet baseless, and not very creditable to the country that so loudly utters them. If Germany should assume the spirit of aggression that we trust has been at last crushed out of France, and should in the future wantonly invade that country, as that country formerly invaded and devastated Germany, then we shall admit that all the severe strictures and denunciations that can be levelled against German aggressiveness will be well deserved; but at present they seem to us to be altogether unnecessary and unjust, if not also exceedingly silly. One would imagine on reading these anti-German diatribes that France had always been a peaceful, contented country, which had never annoyed its neighbors, and had hardly ever fired a shot except in self-defence; and that her British advocates belonged to a country that had never vexed the seas or foreign shores by a hostile squadron. That the French had never under the pretence of friendship seized the fortresses of unoffending Spain, and the British under the plea of self-defence had never in time of peace bombarded Copenhagen and seized the Danish fleet. That, in fact, a British Daphnis had simply come to the rescue of a distressed French Phillis.

The aims of the German statesmen are evident. In the first place, they have endeavored to make it plain to the meanest French understanding, that war is a game which has two sides, and that if France chooses to play it, she may also suffer invasion and all its horrors, as well as her neighbors, who have hitherto been the chief victims. And in the second, in

case France may not be an apt pupil in such a lesson as this, the German Ministers have decided on so strengthening their own frontier, and so weakening the French one, that if in the future France should again invade Germany, she will do so at a terrible disadvantage, and be herself likely to suffer three times more injury than she can inflict on her neighbor.

The necessity of thus teaching France a lesson has long been evident to the statesmen of Europe. But the difficulty that always presented itself was, what nation or nations would undertake the task? The power and the ambition of France, it was universally felt, were dangerous to Europe, but how was she to be restrained? Who would venture to bell the cat? This was the difficulty of difficulties, that only got settled once or twice in a century. It was a great European question in the latter part of the 17th century; it was a still greater one in the beginning of the 18th century; and in the beginning of the present century it was the question of questions—till enraged and outraged Europe at last rose, and disposed of it for a generation or two, by twice seizing the French capital, and placing an army of occupation on French territory for several years. At that time a great man who knew France well thus wrote of it:—

"It is besides on many accounts desirable, as well for their own happiness as for that of the world, that the people of France, if they do not already feel that Europe is too strong for them, should be made sensible of it; and that whatever may be the extent at any time of their momentary and partial success against any one, or any number of individual powers in Europe, *the day of retribution must come.*"*

* Wellington Despatches, Gurwood's Selection, p. 900.

Less than ten years ago, another great man, who also knows the French character well, let fall some weighty words of warning against the besetting sin of France. Discoursing in his own peculiarly powerful style of the French wars and inroads into Germany of the middle of the last century, he thus supposes France to speak, and be answered:—

"Have not we gained Fontenoy, Roucoux, Lauffeld, and strong places innumerable (mostly in a state of dry-rot)? Did men ever fight as we Frenchmen; combining it with theatrical entertainments, too! Sublime France, First Nation of the Universe, will try another flight *(essor)*, were she breathed a little!

"Yes, a new *essor* ere long, and perhaps surprise herself and mankind! The losses of men, money and resource under this mad empty Enterprise of Belleisle's, were enormous, palpable to France and all mortals: but perhaps these were trifling to the replacement of them by such *gloire* as there had been. A *gloire* of plunging into War on no cause at all; and with an issue consisting only of foul gases of extreme levity. Messieurs are of confessed promptitude to fight; and their talent for it, in some kinds, is very great indeed. But this treating of battle and slaughter, of death, judgment and eternity, as light playhouse matters; this of rising into such transcendency of valour, as to snap your fingers in the face of the Almighty Maker; this, Messieurs, give me leave to say so, is a thing that will conduct you and your *Première Nation* to the Devil, if you do not alter it. Inevitable, I tell you! Your road lies that way, then? Good morning, Messieurs; let me still hope, Not!"†

When these weighty and prophetic words were published, the Third Napoleon was still in his pride of place, and France was as it were basking in the sunshine. Pleased with herself, and proud of her ruler, she was again in the eyes of the world she fondly thought—as well as ever in her own—the First Nation of the Universe. To give to her then these words

† Carlyle's "Frederick the Great," vol. IV., pp. 279-80.

[illegible] however wise—against the [illegible] [illegible] war, was merely a scriptural [illegible] years. Only fire and terrible [illegible] could teach her the lesson that [illegible] [illegible] Let us hope that in [illegible] she has at last learned it, [illegible] forgotten.

XV.

The progress of the war has brought out in striking relief the fickleness—almost the comparative worthlessness—of the public opinion of the people of one country towards that of another, when one of them is engaged in a great war. When the contest began in July last, the public opinion of Britain was strongly in favor of Germany, and so far as it was necessary for the Germans to reciprocate such good feeling at such a time, we believe they did so. In six weeks the Germans were completely victorious, had captured the Emperor of the French, with one of his principal armies, and had cooped up the bulk of the remainder of the regular army of France in a fortress, from which it was unable to escape. But the French people, and the Government that had [illegible] power, were still as audacious and as [illegible] as though the struggle had been an [illegible] case. When terms of peace came to be [illegible] the French envoy offered to pay a [illegible] for the expenses of the war, [illegible] that on no account would [illegible] the surrender "of a stone of [illegible] an inch of her territory." [illegible] refused to entertain such [illegible] war went on with such result

as we all now know, and which even then was not so difficult to foresee. The war had been wantonly begun by the French with the avowed intention of humiliating Prussia; and it is certain that if France had been successful, she would have annexed the left bank of the Rhine to the Belgian frontier; while it is also highly probable that she would have interfered to an outrageous extent with the internal government of Germany. Yet when the throw of the dice went against her, she refused to pay the stakes. For her, a successful war, meant a large accession of German territory, in addition to what she had acquired by former wars of aggression; but for Germany a successful war simply meant the receipt of so many millions sterling. The loss of German lives could be repaid by French money, but the loss of French lives must be repaid by the cession of German land, and of German people. This, in plain terms, was the proposition boldly set forth by the new French Government, and because the German Minister would not accept it, he was denounced in the bitterest terms for his unscrupulous rapacity and ambition. The French people of course may be excused for taking such a partial view of the proposals for peace; but strange to say, the French terms, absurdly one-sided as they seem, met with the warmest support in Britain. Among the working-classes, or those of them who are inclined to republicanism, the French terms were favored, simply because the Germans were led by a King, while the French had just had their Emperor captured by the enemy, and were then, as one of the most significant results of such a loss, in the full blaze of a few weeks

republicanism. The higher circles of British opinion were influenced by different motives. Germany was triumphant, and France was humbled, and there was now a splendid opportunity for the German leaders to display their magnanimity, and thus to inaugurate a new and nobler era of international relations. Germany, these transcendentalists loudly said, should accept an indemnity, but not an inch of territory—Strasbourg perhaps excepted—and be content with the demolition of the French fortresses near the German frontier. If any part of the French territory should be annexed, they argued, Germany would establish on her border a new Venetia, or a new Poland; she would have disaffected and rebellious subjects, and the peace of Europe would, in future, be in danger of being constantly disturbed. These were the views put forth by many of the leading British journals, and urged by some writers to such an extreme, as, in the name of future peace and concord, to threaten active intervention on the part of Great Britain, if they were not agreed to by Germany.

These views seem to us to be unreasonable. As regards that of the republican party, as it professes to base itself not on reason, but on sentiment, it is unnecessary to discuss it. We will only say, that if the republican party is glad and thankful for the recent establishment of a republic in France, it is thankful for very small, and probably for very short-lived mercies. The other views we have just cited profess to deal with the question from a rational point of view. The German spirit of fair play and of magnanimity is appealed to, and it seems to be taken for granted, that if the

Germans do not respond in the affirmative, it can only be because they are actuated by motives of ambition or of aggression. But the reply open to the Germans to make, seems to us a strong one. They can, and no doubt will say:—"We have been disunited and weak for three centuries. We have been so, mainly because our country was the birthplace of the principles of the Reformation, and the theatre where the two great contending parties fought out their great fight. From that great struggle the whole world has benefited, and civilisation has received new life, and an infinitely higher development. But while our country was undergoing the travail of this great deliverance, her weakness was taken advantage of by her western neighbor, who consolidated his strength, and made use of it to still further weaken us. Some of our richest outlying dependencies he seized and incorporated; and not content with these, he also seized many purely German cities and bishoprics, and two of our fairest and most fertile provinces. For generation after generation he invaded our country and laid it waste. At last we rose, and in 1814–15, with the assistance of our allies carried the war into his own gates. We then demanded back one of our provinces—the one which still retained most of its German feeling. But our allies—Britain and Russia—objected. While we had been undergoing the process of dismemberment, they had been largely increasing their territories—one in Europe and Asia, and the other, all over the world. Now, when we with their assistance had triumphed over the great disturber of the peace of Europe, and our national despoiler was at our mercy, we naturally looked for our reward. We

asked for no conquest of foreign territory—for no seizure of a new continent, or fortresses or ports commanding great seas. We did not even ask for all that had once been our own, but only for a part—for a part still warm with our own national life. We wanted Alsace, because it was still fresh with German life and German feeling, and because it gave us a strong and defensible frontier against the attacks of our inveterate enemy. But our allies—especially you British, objected. No! you said; do not reclaim Alsace. If you do, you will humiliate France, and render the continuation of the Bourbon Government, which we have restored, impossible. The peace of Europe will be broken again, and you must not expose us once more to such a terrible calamity. We were then comparatively weak; our rulers gave way, and Alsace was left with France. You know what has happened since. The Bourbons have been ejected from France, and a Bonaparte has been placed at its head. The cry of the Rhine for a frontier has been raised, and has long been a sort of national rallying cry of the new Empire. Two great wars were entered upon by the Napoleonists. First Russia—with your assistance—was humbled. Then, with the assistance of Sardinia, Austria. Our turn was the next—the avowed object being the conquest of what remained of our territory on the left bank of the Rhine, and the conformation of our internal government in accordance with Napoleonic ideas. We knew before the struggle began that it would be a bloody one—that the loss of life would be terrible; and being a peaceful people, indisposed for strife, we did everything we reasonably could to avoid war. We conceded everything we could without

humiliating ourselves—even doing a little of that. But all was of no avail. After four years of preparation, openly avowed, war was declared against us, the chief Minister of our enemy doing so, he said, "with a light heart." We closed in deadly strife, and our foe went down—down hopelessly. We had no allies. The struggle was all our own, and the terms of peace are therefore fairly in our own hands. We say *now* we shall, and must have back our German territory, so far at least as the safety of our frontiers demand. You say the people of Alsace are now thoroughly French, and that if we annex them they will always be ripe for rebellion—that the annexation of an unwilling province is contrary to modern ideas of national action. To this we reply that if the annexation of an unwilling province be so, the holding of one by superior force is but little better, and that we intend holding Alsace by exactly the same title and for the same reason that you hold Ireland, and have little doubt that we shall pacify the Alsatians and make them contented with our rule quite as soon as you shall have got rid of Fenianism or other forms of Irish disaffection. Metz is thoroughly and purely French you say. May we ask you what is Gibraltar? Is that fortress, avowedly held merely for the protection of British trade and for the extension of British influence, as necessary to the defence of Britain as Metz is to that of Germany? Is New Zealand to be looked on merely as an outpost of the United Kingdom, held only for defensive purposes? What of Malta, Hong Kong, India? As to Alsace being irrevocably French, we do not agree with you. The eighth Prussian Army Corps (General Goeben's) has not been the least dis-

tinguished portion of the army that has humbled the pride of France—and we certainly have not heard of its displaying at any time during the war French proclivities or anti-German feeling. Yet this corps is wholly recruited from a province—Rhenish Prussia—that for nearly a score of years was incorporated with France, and which gave to the French army one of its proudest names, Marshal Ney. We reclaimed that province and its people to Germany, and we have no doubt that we shall ere long as thoroughly reclaim Alsace and German Lorraine. Why should we not? We have greater reason to hope for success now than then. Then Germany was a disunited, disorganised mass, with a national government—if government it could be called—which was the laughing-stock of Europe. We had no national centre, and little hope of one; for our two great powers seemed each too strong to be overcome by the other. France on the other hand was compact, and had just ended a brilliant series of military exploits that had made her for ever famous. She had a sparkling and fascinating literature and an attractive capital. Yet we held our own in Rhenish Prussia, and the people there are at present as German as those who dwell on the Lower Elbe. Why shall it not be the same in Alsace? It is true that it has been very much longer in the possession of France; but it must be remembered that the great event that, as it were, fused these Rhenish provinces into France, was not their long occupation by France, but the great Revolution and the events that followed it; and to the fire of this, Rhenish Prussia was subjected, as well as Alsace. Germany is now thoroughly united, and the great and glorious events that

have ushered in her unity must exercise a powerful attraction on all those who have still any trace of German origin and German feeling. In Alsace these are still to be found, and not so sparingly as is generally supposed; and, when the next war between France and Germany passes over, and it is found, as we have no doubt it will be, that our hold of these conquests is not to be relaxed, and that we are capable of defending and of thoroughly protecting the remotest portions of our provinces against any attack, Alsace we believe will then quickly become as German as Westphalia or Rhenish Prussia."

Such, we take it, will be the reply that intelligent Germans will make to the reproaches of those British journalists who complain so loudly of the terms of peace.

XVI.

When we began these papers, one part of the program we laid down for ourselves was "how this war between France and Prussia, and its result either way, will affect the rest of Europe, and more particularly the British Empire." The promise here implied on our part has never yet been fulfilled, and we shall now proceed to do so.

When the war began, probably four-fifths of that portion of the British public who think of such matters at all were under the firm impression that France would be the victor, though perhaps after a struggle more or less severe. So long as this opinion lasted, there can be no doubt that very great anxiety was felt in the United Kingdom, based on the

belief that if France were victorious, she would make such claims, or assume an attitude so aggressive, as to force upon us a war sooner or later. But when Prussia became triumphant, to an extent never contemplated by the most sanguine of her friends, there seemed to be little anxiety felt by the British Government or by the British people. This change in public feeling is significant, and in it will be found the key to the question with which we have now to deal.

Had France been the victor there can, we think, be no doubt that the danger of aggression on her part would have been great, in proportion to the extent and thoroughness of her triumph. If her victory had in any way been decisive, so as to permit her to dictate to some extent at least the terms of peace, she would without doubt have insisted on the cession of all German territory lying on the left bank of the Rhine, and on the completion of her arrangement with the King of Holland as to the purchase of Luxembourg. This frontier being secured, the annexation of Belgium would almost inevitably follow, sooner or later. If aware that the British Government would be prepared to fight for Belgium, France might probably pause before annexing it; but the pause would only be one of expediency—a mere waiting for some favorable opportunity when Britain might be engaged in some foreign war that would neutralise her strength, or be weakened by some internal trouble, such as a rebellion in India, or an insurrection in Ireland. Then France victorious over Prussia, and in possession of the left bank of the Rhine, from Switzerland to the valley of the lower Meuse, would inevitably, we think, have seized Belgium,

and thus have completed what she deems to be her natural frontier.

Then almost certainly would have begun a bloody time for Europe. France thus victorious, would never rest till she had humbled the pride of what the bellicose portion of the nation term her ancient and hereditary enemy, England. To strike down British power and British influence, would then become a passion with a large portion of the French people—for after such a victory as we have supposed, the peace party in France would be almost extinct, and the war party would be in overwhelming strength. Anglo-phobia would run through France like an epidemic, and she would strain her naval resources for years to enable her to throw an army across the Channel; which being done, the rest—so thinks the nation in its heart—would be easy. But if France, satisfied with her acquisition of Belgium and her triumph upon the Continent, should unexpectedly be forbearing in her policy towards Britain, it would still be almost impossible that peace between the two countries could be long preserved. By the seizure of Belgium and the Rhenish provinces of Prussia, the good feeling towards France that for the last fifteen or twenty years has been so rapidly growing amongst the people of the United Kingdom, would have been destroyed, and a feeling of soreness and of bitterness would have taken its place. France would be looked on as incurably aggressive, and opportunities would be sought to curb her pride and to stop her encroachments on the rest of Europe. But if France were in possession of all the territory lying to the west of the Rhine from the North Sea to Switzerland, to restrain her would probably be

of Germany, and the military genius of Moltke has so deftly wielded its consolidated strength, as to lay France in the dust; and it now remains for us to consider what effect this great change is likely to have on the equilibrium of Europe, and more especially of the British Empire.

XVII.

The collapse of France and the rise of Prussia to be the leading military power on the continent seems to be regarded by many thoughtful men in the mother country as a serious calamity, and one which is likely to lead to a great disturbance of the peace of Europe. We do not share in such forebodings, but, on the contrary, are of opinion that the war which has just closed triumphantly for Germany will also be a great gain to the United Kingdom as well as to the other neutral powers of Europe, and ultimately to the French people themselves.

Let us look at the question in its general aspect, The great dangers that have long threatened the smaller kingdoms of Europe, and have excited the uneasiness even of so powerful and apparently so impregnable a country as Britain, are the vainglorious aggressiveness of France, and the inordinate ambition of Russia. So long as Germany was disunited and weak, there can be no doubt that this danger was a serious one, and in the event of a good understanding being come to by these two great powers as to the division of the spoil, a danger, imminent and of the first magnitude. It was as we have already pointed

out, a probability that these two great powers might, under favorable circumstances, be enabled, for a time at least, virtually to control Europe, and the greater portion of Asia. That danger is now largely, if not entirely, removed. The consolidation of Germany under the leadership of Prussia, and the fall of France, have completely changed the European situation. Europe, in fact, has changed its centre of gravity, which is not now at Paris but at Berlin. This great change involves so many others that we here can only indicate them, or a portion of them. In the first place, Germany, from her being the leading military power of the continent, and from her strategical position in the centre of Europe, commands the European situation. It is not too much to say that neither Russia nor France singly can now enter upon any great aggressive enterprise without the consent of Prussia; and that even in combination these two great powers are unable to seriously injure Prussia, if the latter obtain the assistance either of Austria or of Great Britain. Prussia, or rather Germany, thus holds a commanding position in Europe—a position as regards real strength unsurpassed since the days of Charlemagne. But Prussia is not, in our opinion, an aggressive power, despite all that has been said against her, except in so far as aggression is necessary to unite Germany, and therefore we look upon her recent aggrandisement as an immense gain to Europe. It is evidently the belief of a great many British journalists that Prussia is just as aggressive as France or Russia, and that as regards territorial ambition the Prussians are as unscrupulous as the French or the Russians. There is only one test to which this question

can fairly be brought, and it is that of history; and, judged by this test, we think we can show that of all the great powers now in Europe, Prussia in her aggressiveness is one of the most moderate.

Those who fear Prussian ambition point out that two centuries ago, Prussia was but a small principality of two or three thousand square miles, and that now she has annexed nearly all Germany. Can there be required, they say, a more convincing proof of Prussian ambition and Prussian aggressiveness? To this we reply, that with one exception,—her Polish acquisitions,—Prussia in her growth cannot fairly be accused of ambition or aggressiveness. Her growth has been the growth of German unity—her rulers showed that they knew how to govern, and this fact becoming apparent to the German people, her growth has been more owing to their patriotism than to anything else. Indeed, there can be little doubt, we think, that the desire of the people of Germany, during the last half century especially, to aggregate themselves round Prussia, has been to a considerable extent frustrated by the indisposition of the Prussian royal house to interfere with the personal rights of the other German potentates; and that in this way the want of aggressiveness on the part of the House of Hohenzollern has hindered the development of German nationality. Spain consolidated herself four centuries ago. France was compelled to follow suit to prevent herself from being overpowered by her then great rival. Probably the process of consolidation of these two great powers was denounced as the result of ambition and of wanton aggressiveness by

the contemporary monkish annalists of the neighboring nations, or whoever then played the part that is now played by the enlightened publicists of British journalism. To come nearer home, the now compact realm of England was about a thousand years ago undergoing the process of unification which Germany has only lately gone through, and was then converted from a knot of small pugnacious principalities into a powerful kingdom. The religious differences arising from the Reformation split asunder what had been, more or less, united Germany, and for a century and a half left her the prey of her powerful western neighbor. But in process of time the bitterness of religious feuds died away, and the German people once more began to feel the necessity of union. They cannot be justly accused of rashness or rough aggressiveness in their attempts. It is only yesterday that their national assembly was the butt of the wits of Europe for its slowness and its helpless ponderosity. The truth is that the Germans are conservative to a fault, and, as history proves, almost to their own ruin as a great race. The Reich was continued for a couple of centuries after it was proved to be useless as a national government against the ambition of France. It finally fell, and the German people with it, by the aggressiveness of Napoleon. Yet, when the German people had once again recovered their freedom, their conservatism or that of their leaders so far prevailed as to establish the Bund—a constitution almost as rudimentary and as useless as the old Reich. So long as France, after 1815, remained under the comparatively peaceful Bourbons, the Germans believed they were in no great danger of

attack; and consequently, notwithstanding the evident defects of the Bund as a form of national union, it was, with a short break in '48, continued; although the extension of the Zollverein and of railways, and the progress of education had made the more intelligent of the people and the more able of their rulers, ripe for a form of government more unified and compact, and, above all, more capable of wielding with a vigorous hand the power of Germany against attack. The re-establishment of Napoleonism in France, and the cry that soon began to arise in that country after the inauguration of the second empire for the frontier of the Rhine, quickened the German national feeling, and impressed upon the more patriotic of the German leaders—such as the Duke of Saxe Coburg Gotha—the absolute necessity that existed for a strong national government. What was to be done? A republic in those times was premature and would have led to chaos, and probably to the dismemberment of Germany. The Bund was practically effete, and Austria had for centuries been tried and found wanting. There alone remained Prussia capable of becoming the vigorous head of Germany, and of being to her what the Government of Castile had been to Spain, and that of France to the various principalities now incorporated with that powerful State. The work of unification done in bygone times by the people of these countries is not looked upon as unwise or unnecessary in these days, even by writers of the calibre of the monkish annalists of the olden time. Nay, more, the consolidation of Italy under the direction of Piedmont—the Prussia of Italy—which took

place—not centuries—but a few years ago, received the unqualified approbation of the majority of the same class of journalists who are now denouncing Prussia because she is doing for Germany the same service that Piedmont did for Italy.

If then, the consolidation of a numerous race, speaking one language, and occupying contiguous provinces, into one compact and powerful State be accepted by the verdict of history as wise and beneficial in the case of the English, French, Spanish, and Italian speaking peoples, it is surely unreasonable and unfair to object to the Germans following in the same course, and forming for themselves what sad experience has proved to be absolutely necessary to their existence—a central government, wielding the power of United Germany. The only difference to be observed in the process of the unification of Germany, as compared with that of England, France, and Spain, is, that in the first place, it has been on the whole completed, or almost completed, more peaceably, and with greater agreement on the part of the absorbed provinces; and in the second, that it has to a large extent taken place under our own eyes. Because the perhaps necessarily rough process of the fusion of a great race is exhibited before us, is it to be condemned and denounced as the exhibition of a rude, insolent, and aggressive spirit, merely because we see the tumult and turmoil, and bloodshed that almost inevitably accompany such great national movements, and do not see the beneficent results that history has proved to attend upon them when they are mellowed by time? It is perhaps necessary to remind such censors that

no great movement of a nation can take place without involving more or less of human misery. The reform even of a minor law generally involves the ruin of many citizens. What then, may we not look for when one of the greatest races in the world is changing the very basis of its government? In such great national movements as these the sacrifice of human life seems to be as inevitable, as in the ordinary movements of man is the unconscious destruction of lower animal life. The fact that it is only in these days, a race so gifted and so numerous as the Germans, is accomplishing its national unity, is of itself a proof that the charges now levelled against it are not warranted by history. Had the Germans, as a race, been the aggressive, rapacious, and insolent people, which they are now denounced as being, it is not likely that an object so vital to them as national unity would have been delayed till these days. The postponement of the event was no doubt at one time owing to religious differences; but it must, we think, be admitted that during the present century the innate conservatism of the race, and its indisposition to violent and extreme measures have prevented it from obtaining that unity, which it has now, partly by the rapacity and ambition of its western neighbor, so thoroughly and successfully secured.

Much has been made by British writers of the two Danish wars, and the conclusion has been repeatedly drawn from these contests, that if a powerful country like United Germany should wage war against so tiny an antagonist as Denmark, she must be imbued with an aggressive spirit of the worst description. We are afraid that in this matter the often laudable

British sentiment of "backin' the little un" has misled the public judgment. As we pointed out in one of the first of these papers, it is generally forgotten that Denmark in the first war depended on the assistance of Russia, then the greatest military power in Europe; and in the second, on France and Great Britain. In Germany, it was a pretty universal opinion that their brethren in Holstein and South Schleswig were grievously oppressed by the Danes, who, relying on their powerful allies, were endeavoring, as had been successfully done by France in the west, to de-Germanise these northern provinces of the Fatherland. To prevent this process from being completed by Denmark, the Germans were willing to brave a war with France and Denmark, or even with these two countries and Britain combined; and if this be the case, which we believe it to be, it is clear that one of the chief grounds of British antagonism to Germany is ill-founded and unjust.

Believing, then, that the charge now so frequently urged against Prussia—or Germany rather, for the spirit of Prussia proper will necessarily in future be greatly modified by that of the other German States—that she is likely to be in the future a great disturber of the peace of Europe, is not warranted, we now come to deal with the question of the probable attitude of Prussia towards the neighboring States. The best guide in such a matter is to ascertain how far the legitimate aspirations of the German people towards unity, and the preservation of the national dignity, have been attained by the recent events. If these have been thoroughly secured—if Germany has, in other words, now thoroughly completed the

task, so happily finished centuries ago in England, Spain, and France; and if there is no fear of the national dignity being ruffled or insulted by the acts of any neighboring nation —then we may now with some confidence look forward to the inauguration of a long period of European peace; for we hold it to be one of the grand results of the war just ended, that Germany now holds the position of the arbiter of the European Continent.

Is then Germany satisfied, and if satisfied, is she likely to be left in unruffled possession of her new honors and her new position? Both these questions require to be carefully considered before we can come to anything like a safe conclusion as to the probable course of events in Europe. We will deal with the last question first. There are only four powers in Europe at all likely or able to give effect in an overt way to any feeling of dissatisfaction with the recent rise of Prussia. These are Britain, Russia, Austria, and France. The first may be summarily dismissed. Britain has no reason to be dissatisfied, as we have already shown, with the rise of *Prussia; but,* on the contrary, in our opinion, *will gain immensely* by the change; and, as nothing but dire necessity would again lead a British Government into a war on the continent, it may be assumed as a certainty that the horizon on this side is bright and unclouded. On the side of Russia also, Prussia has not much to fear, if only the force of events will enable her to leave that power alone. The Muscovite Court has every reason to conciliate its powerful western neighbor. On that side alone can Russia be approached in great force, and be attacked in a vital and vulner-

able point; and this vulnerable point, Poland, can be reached by no other power in Europe so easily as by Prussia. The Eastern question also is a matter of less moment to Prussia than to Austria or Great Britain; and this is the knotty point on which Russia and the rest of Europe are likely ere long to differ. With Prussia, then, the Court of St. Petersburg is likely to be disposed to be friendly; but if it wishes to be so certain alterations must be made in its domestic policy. That, for many years back, has been intensely and fanatically national. What is termed the Muscovite or old Russian party has been endeavoring to grind to pieces every form of national life but that of the pure Russ. Besides the Poles, the Tartars, and the Finns, who have all more or less suffered from this fanaticism, the not inconsiderable German population in the provinces of Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland have also been subjected to the yoke, and their cries of anguish and despair have been not unheard in Germany. Before 1866, when the Fatherland was divided, Russia, of course, had nothing to fear from such treatment of her German subjects, as her adroit statesmen knew only too well how to play off one of the great German powers against the other; and since Sadowa she still preserved her immunity, as the great struggle with France loomed darkly over the Rhenish frontier. But now Germany stands erect and immovable in the centre of Europe like a cone of steel—almost irresistible in attack, all but impregnable in defence. If her sons utter a wail amid the northern snows, it will not now be the painful duty of her statesmen to close the ears of the nation, lest its sympathy

their position. With the outline of the present frontier, it is apparent that Russia would possess a great advantage, if a war arose in connection with the grievances of the Russian German provinces. These are all but enclosed in her territory, and West Prussia is not in a much more favorable position. In the event of a war then it is not unlikely that the German Cabinet, if successful, would be disposed to reconsider the Polish question from a totally new stand-point. A portion of territory—Prussian Poland—that was deemed necessary to Prussia when Prussia was small and surrounded by powerful neighbors, is of little consequence to United Germany. With France humbled, there is no power but Russia that is likely to be formidable to Germany, and as against Russia, the obvious defence of Germany is the re-constitution of Poland into a semi-independent kingdom, under the protection of Germany. To secure this, were the danger from Russia to become serious, it is quite probable that both Prussia and Austria might be disposed to cede the whole or the greater part of their Polish provinces, and to form with these, and such parts of Russian Poland as could be obtained and were favorable, a new kingdom or state that would act as a barrier between the civilisation of Western Europe and the rude race that holds sway in the East. Were this scheme carried out, the German provinces of Russia would probably be also detached from that kingdom, and be either incorporated with Poland, or be regarded as dependencies of the Germanic Empire. Such a radical change of Eastern Europe is not, of course, to be looked on as a very probable

event; but if ever a strong antagonism springs up between the German and Russian races—a very probable event indeed—and if a desperate war should follow, Germany, if victorious —which we have no doubt she would be—would in all probability seriously discuss, and perhaps carry into effect a scheme somewhat similar to this. If she did, there can be no doubt, she would effectually cripple Russia, and for ever dispel the threatening cloud that has so long hung over the eastern horizon of Europe.

XVIII.

The relations between Prussia and Austria are likely for some time to come, to be of a more complicated kind, and to require more delicate and dexterous management than those between Prussia and any of the other great powers of Europe. Both are German States, with, if not antagonistic, at least conflicting interests. Then Sadowa lies between them, and the great career which Prussia, flushed with success, has now entered upon, was for centuries, with even higher hopes, that of Austria. When we consider all this, it must be owned that though there are strong reasons why Austria should be friendly to Prussia, there are also good grounds in the eyes of many for hatred, envy, and all uncharitableness.

The outward bearing of Austria to Prussia during the last two or three years, has, all things considered, been exceedingly courteous and friendly; yet it has been openly asserted that when the war began in July last Austria was almost tempted to throw in her lot with

France. It will probably be some time before the public generally is made aware of the real position of the Austrian Cabinet at that important crisis, but there can be no doubt, we think, that, early in the war, matters had assumed a most serious aspect. Besides the startling letter of a Vienna correspondent of the *Times*, published, we think, in the latter part of September, and in which the apparently well-informed writer stated that the Austrian Government had barely escaped from an open declaration in favor of France, we find it was lately openly stated in a public meeting, by an Austrian politician, apparently of some note, that last autumn, Austria was "on the brink of war" in favor of France. The real position of affairs was probably this. The cool-headed and far-seeing members of the Cabinet and of the Court were strongly in favor of non-intervention, while another section was equally strong in favor of a war for the purpose of revenging Sadowa, and, by the aid of France, recovering for Austria her former position in Germany. These two parties were probably equally strong, but the advocates of peace had the advantage of the position. The country was at peace, and they wished it to remain so, while their opponents on the other hand were anxious to begin a terrible war which might prove the ruin of the monarchy. This, from all we can glean, was in all likelihood the true position of affairs, and if it were so, the issue rested with the Emperor, who hesitated, fearful of the result. Had he been able to make up his mind, the peace party would have been overwhelmed; but time was with them. Every encounter between the hostile armies in August told in favor of neutrality, till the terrible disaster of

Sedan came like a thunder-clap, and completely silenced the Vienna advocates of intervention in favor of France.

But if Austria was so nearly being committed to France when the late war began, it is clear that unless Austria makes ample atonement, the relations between that country and Prussia must necessarily for some years yet to come be of anything but a cordial character. The Prussian Cabinet is no doubt thoroughly well informed of the real position of affairs at Vienna in July and August last, and if there was then even the possibility of Austria intervening in favor of France, when that power had made a wanton attack on Germany, Prussian forbearance and good feeling must then have been, and still must be, sorely tried. The members of the Prussian Cabinet will feel inclined to say that "if Austria was disposed to join the common enemy when the Fatherland was engaged in a struggle almost of life and death, will it not be wise and even necessary for us now to cripple her, so that for the future she shall be incapable of mischief? Is the new life of Germany to be endangered by the rancorous envy of one of her own sons? Are Germans still to fight Germans at the bidding and for the interest of the enemies of Germany? If there is a danger of such a calamity: if there is even a possibility of it, owing to the thoughtless selfishness of the House of Austria—for we acquit the people of Austrian Germany of such a criminal desire—why should we not now, once and for ever, put an end to it? Our forbearance towards the House of Austria has been ill requited; and further forbearance will not only be folly, but a crime to the Father-

land. Let us now, when we have humbled France, boldly tell the German people of Austria that their separation from the Fatherland is a mistake which ought to be remedied, that it is a serious danger to new Germany, and that they ought to join the new confederation, and so make the Germanic union complete, and Germany the greatest power in the world—able to withstand any possible attack that might be made against her, even by combined Europe."

Such, there can be little doubt, are the ideas that are now latent in the minds of many of the German statesmen, and public men; for to them, weighing thoughtfully and anxiously the probable future of their country, there must ever recur this momentous question—"What if Austria leaps upon our back when France comes again into the arena and demands revenge? In the war just ended, we provided against such an event by an alliance with Russia; but the course of events render the continuance of such an alliance improbable." From such considerations as these we think there can be no doubt that the future attitude of Austria to new Germany is a matter of the gravest consequence to the Cabinet of Berlin, and that here is to be found the key to the future action of Germany. It is easy to see, and as easy to say, that the true policy of Austria is to accept the present situation, and to enter into a cordial alliance offensive and defensive with Germany. Such a policy is evidently the wisest for Austria. It would guarantee to her the continuance under her rule of her German provinces; for there can be no doubt we think that Bismarck would be only too glad to purchase even the neutrality—and still more so to secure the support—of

Austria, in the event of an attack on Germany by France or Russia—one or both, by granting to Austria such a guarantee. In doing so, he would only be extending his policy and placing Austrian Germany in the same position as Bavaria,—with this difference, that he would probably permit Austria, in consideration of her higher claims, to command her own troops in the field. We think that such an arrangement would meet with the support of the people of Austrian Germany; but we doubt whether the Austrian royal house and its followers would be disposed to accept it. They may permit feelings of jealousy and of revenge to influence them, and be disposed to reject all approach to cordiality between Austria and the rest of Germany, in the hope that events may yet favor them, and enable them to make better terms for the dynasty. Much, if not all, will probably depend on the advisers of the Emperor. If these are sagacious and prudent, they will endeavor to come to some cordial understanding with the Cabinet of Berlin; the basis of the alliance being that Germany will assist Austria, should Russia attempt to make encroachments in the Danubian provinces—the only quarter whence Austria has to fear danger; and, in return, Austria will assist Germany if she is subjected to attack by France or Russia. We look upon it as all but certain, that the Cabinet of Berlin will use all its efforts to secure an alliance of this nature, and probably the astute chancellor is even now bending his energies in this direction, trying after the capture of Paris to secure the neutrality or the support of Austria for the next struggle with France, as after Sadowa he secured that of Bavaria and the other South German States for the present war.

On the side of France, Germany has to meet another great war. That we take to be one of the strongest probabilities of the future. The blow to French pride by the late war has been too terrible, and the weakening of their frontiers by the cession of Alsace and Metz has been too great, to permit the French people to sit down and unreservedly accept the situation. We think that it would be much wiser for them to do so; and bidding good-bye to those warlike ideas and aspirations which have for such a length of time been a curse both to themselves and to the rest of Europe, for the future, to cultivate alone the arts of peace. But such a course, though in every sense a wise one, is, we admit, one which it is most unlikely the French people will follow. Their overweening vanity, and their unbounded confidence in their military prowess, are, we think, certain to lead them to try the issue of another war with Germany, for the purpose of recovering their lost province, and of restoring their shattered prestige. It is sad to have to take such a view of the future, but such a war we deem to be merely a question of time. If France had wise leaders, and were she inclined to defer to their guidance, such a war of revenge might be avoided; but we certainly do not now see the leaders; and even if they existed, we much question if on this point the people would accept their leadership. The idea seems to be deeply ingrained in the national character that France is the leading country in the world, and that her people are the most brilliant of races, to whom all things are possible, and whom no other race can withstand. The late terrible disasters have already been distorted by the national

vanity, and are regarded as the results of the treason of their generals and statesmen, and not of the superiority of the German armies, and military organisation. Such a people can only be taught by bitter experience, and as the late war is apparently insufficient to do so, they will try the hazard of another. *When*, it is difficult to say, but unless an opportunity should occur through Germany being involved in a war with Russia, it is most improbable, we think, that France will be ready for another war with Germany in less than ten years. The drain upon the population and the devastation of the country caused by the late war, will be unfelt in three or four years, but the finances will be seriously embarrassed for a much longer time, and their re-establishment, and the reorganisation of the army on the Prussian or some similar model, will not be properly effected till near the close of the present decade. Then the peace of Europe will not be worth six months' purchase. Much of course will depend on the character of the ruler of France for the time being, be he Emperor, King, President, or Prime Minister. A wise and prudent man in any one of these positions might restrain the national impetuosity for a time—but we think only for a time—and sooner or later we regard the collision with Germany as inevitable.

Should the result of such a war prove another great defeat to France, her career as a great military nation would be ended. Those national qualities that lead to such unbounded self-confidence and glorification, would then tell the other way. The spirit of the French people would be destroyed: they would look upon the Germans as their masters in war, and would

refuse to try conclusions with them again. The direction of the national vanity would perforce take another direction, and the people would either settle down vigorously to industrial and artistic pursuits, when France would become a kind of combination of Belgium and Italy; or internal divisions would arise, the government would become unsettled, and good government impossible, and for a time at least France would become merely a superior Spain —a great country that had lost its career, and dissatisfied with itself, would waste its strength in civil conflict.

There still remain to be considered in their relation to the new German Empire, the minor States that surround it, and are not now affiliated to it—Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and perhaps we may include the two Scandinavian kingdoms, Sweden and Norway. Denmark and Holland, we are told, are almost certain soon to be swallowed up by Prussia. It may prove to be so, but if such a result should occur, we are strongly of opinion that it will either be with their own consent, as in the case of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden; or because they will take the part of the enemies of Prussia, and go to war with her, as did Saxony and Hanover. Should Denmark and Holland join France when France next attacks Germany, there can be little doubt, we think, that if Germany is successful, she will annex these two countries as a matter of precaution. Otherwise, despite all that is said about Prussian ambition, we are decidedly of opinion they will be left peaceably alone. Belgium is more likely to receive the protection of Germany than to be attacked by it —the wolf to the Belgian lamb being not

Germany but France. Switzerland, so long as she preserves her integrity, will, we think, be in the same position to Germany as Belgium. Sweden seems to be afraid of Prussia, and probably Norway shares the same feeling; but as Belgium has to fear France, so have the Scandinavian kingdoms to fear Russia. Instead of united Germany proving a source of terror to these surrounding minor States, we think she will prove by-and-by to be, if they permit her, the mastiff—perchance surly, but faithful and strong—that will protect them from the French wolf on the one side, and the Russian bear on the other.

From this survey it will be seen that we regard the policy of Austria as being that on which the immediate future of the Germanic Empire must for some time hinge. If Austria should throw in her lot closely and faithfully with her northern brethren, she will preserve her own integrity, render the new empire impregnable to attack, and enable it to check Russian encroachment in the East; for it is a mistake to suppose that Prussia is altogether indifferent to Russian aggression in that quarter. Her indifference hitherto has been merely comparative, not positive. Previous to the late war she sought the support of Russia, because only through such an alliance could she be rendered safe against such a terrible danger as the coalition against her of France and Austria. Such a coalition might have endangered the very existence of Prussia, and in view of such a peril, it is obvious that the importance of the Eastern question would weigh as nothing in the minds of the Prussian statesmen. But the situation is now entirely changed. Prussia, as the leading power on the

Continent, cannot regard with equanimity the seizure by Russia of Constantinople or the Danubian provinces. She would regard such an aggrandisement as dangerous to herself as well as to the rest of Europe, and if Austria were in cordial alliance with her, would, we think, actively resent such aggression on the part of Russia. The alliance of Austria with Prussia is therefore a matter of the highest importance, not only to Prussia, but to Britain. With Austria as an ally, Prussia will be not only independent of Russia, but able, if required, to withstand both her and France in combination; and there will then exist in the heart of Europe a great allied and peaceful people, who will be able to restrain the ambitious designs of these two powers. But the alliance of Austria must first be firmly secured, and with this in all probability Bismarck is busily engaged, even now. For until he has not only removed all danger from the side of Austria, but made her a friend of the new Empire, he must continue to keep in alliance with, or at all events, take care not to break with Russia, however great might be the complaints from the oppressed German population in Courland and Livonia, or however aggressive Muscovite action might be against Turkey.

But should Bismarck's approaches towards amity with Austria be altogether repelled, the Prussian alliance with Russia will be continued, much we think to the disadvantage, not only of Germany, but of Europe. And relying on Russian support, Germany when brought face to face again with France in the next war, will in all probability give to Austria the alternative that in 1866 she gave to Hanover, saying to her—"Either join me as a German State

in defending Germany, or take the consequences." To Austria the result in such a case would probably be dismemberment, and the annexation of German Austria, or the chief portion of it, to Prussia.

XIX.

We have failed greatly in our aim, if we have not made it clear to the attentive reader, that the result of this war is something altogether higher than the mere establishment of the present superiority of the Prussian army over the French army. It means that the great German race has at last asserted its position in the world as one of the leading powers —that in future German literature will have to observers and thinkers a new interest; and that, generally, within the bounds of all German speaking lands, the inhabitants will now feel a deeper pride in their nationality, and will be as little disposed to sink it in that of France or of any other country, as Englishmen are. Probably, if the secret thoughts of the majority of the German dwellers on the left bank of the Rhine could have been ascertained during the period between 1815 and 1866, it would have been found that they believed they or their descendants would sooner or later become French—so high then was the influence and the power of France—so low the influence and the power of Germany. But there will now be no wavering of the German faith in the German future; all true Germans will now look to Berlin as their political centre, as faithfully as a true Mahometan in his devotions turns to Mecca.

This change, though mainly political, will also largely influence literary, and, though in a less degree, social affairs. Paris will be deprived of much of its importance as being the great centre of European power, its place in this respect being usurped by Berlin; and the curious enquirers of politics — the class of political detectives who, since 1830 have been in the habit of closely scanning the thoughts and feelings of the lower classes of Paris—will now find it more profitable to transfer their observations to Berlin. As a force worthy of attention in European politics, the working-classes of Paris will be supplanted by those of Berlin; and as men of science carefully watch and note the slightest movements of a new crater, so will observant statesmen in the various European centres have now to carefully observe the tendencies of the fierce, rough artisans of Moabit—the Berlin Faubourg St. Antoine. German mobs are not so explosive as those of France, but in these democratic days, even German mobs move, and that of Berlin it will be specially necessary for all keen-witted politicians to watch with close attention. When Berlin becomes a city with a population of a million and a quarter, or a million and a half, as it probably will before the end of this decade, it will become a new power in Germany, and one which even the strong-headed, imperious Junker party will be compelled to recognise. It is anticipated by some observers that the Junker party will be rendered so powerful by the victories of this war, that they will not only override the liberties of their own countrymen, as they have hitherto been too much disposed to do; but that they will become still more of a

military *caste* than they have yet been, and in order to increase the importance of their order, will lead the nation into a series of aggressive wars. This is, we think, but a partial view to take of the future internal position of Germany. A closer enquiry will show, we think, that one great cause of the power of the Junker party has been the paucity of great cities, and of great manufacturing centres. In this respect Germany is now in the same position as Britain was in the first quarter of this century, when the Tories—our Junkers—were all powerful. But the progress of trade and of manufactures in Germany has been impeded, not by the want of enterprise or industry on the part of the Germans—for in the latter quality they excel all nations in Europe, and in the former, only are excelled by ourselves—but mainly by the want of international communication, and of national security. The Zollverein and the railway system have largely secured the former, which will now be thoroughly completed; and the recent triumph over France, and the establishment of the new Empire will as effectually establish the latter. In the middle ages, when Germany was free from foreign inroads, her free cities were the most flourishing marts, and the greatest centres of population in Europe. It is highly probable, Germany being now so powerful, and the security of her provinces being assured, that much of the former prosperity will return; that Berlin will by-and-by become the most populous city on the Continent, and that other German cities will become great centres of trade, and as populous as Leeds or Birmingham, or perhaps even as Glasgow and Manchester, in our own country. Such a change will ulti-

mately restrain Junkerism, as effectually as a similar change in Britain has destroyed the old war-seeking Toryism. But this pacific tendency, be it observed, will be— not lessened—but increased and hastened, proportionately as Germany becomes powerful, and is able to develope her trade and her manufactures. In other words, paradoxical as it may seem, the more strongly Germany developes her military strength, and thus increases her immunity from foreign attack, the more strongly will she also develope her trade and manufactures, and thus increase the peaceful elements within her.

In this way do we anticipate from the triumph of Germany, and from its now assured position of security from foreign aggression, a future policy, not of war but of peace, that will grow with its growth, and in good time, cause war on the Continent to be as rare, and to be looked on with as much horror as civil war would now be in Britain.

What is likely to be the duration of this new great military power? Is it to be as evanescent as that of the first French Empire, or as durable as has been the naval supremacy of Britain. All the probabilities seem to us to point to the latter conclusion. There is now under the flag of the new Germanic Empire a homogeneous population of as nearly as possible forty millions; and this prolific recruiting ground is more likely to be increased than diminished; for in all probability some of the minor neighboring nations, of semi-German descent, and the German States of Austria will sooner or later be affiliated to the new Empire. The German race also is hardy, strongly built, brave and frugal—all fine military qualities; it is patient, highly amenable to discipline,

easily led when worthily led, and fertile in military ability and genius. With all these qualities and advantages it has another of the very highest importance. It possesses a governmental organisation, unsurpassed in Europe for efficiency. Even the members of its royal house seem to understand the virtue of thrift, as thoroughly as a member of the Society of Friends, or a careful Scot. Nothing seems to be wasted, nothing wanting. So long as the Prussian Government is conducted with such prudence and such efficiency, we see no power in Europe that can wrest from it its present high position. Great power of course may ultimately bring with it indolence, luxury, and inefficiency, as it has so often brought before under similar circumstances. But the Prussians—king and people—are essentially a northern race, and northern races, even when powerful, do not surrender themselves to luxury and sloth so readily as the races bred in the warm enervating south. We think, then that all the probabilities point to a long duration of Prussian supremacy on the European continent. Doubtless that supremacy will by-and-by be assailed—certainly by France, and probably also by Russia, possibly ultimately by both; but we see no great reason to doubt that the high national qualities which have raised Prussia to her present pre-eminence will enable her successfully and easily to withstand such assaults. In the Seven Years War, Prussia, with a population of about three millions, and with only a moderate assistance from Britain, successfully withstood the combined attacks of Austria, France, Russia, and Sweden. At present Prussia is certainly as ably led—both in war and politics—as she

was under Frederick the Great. But her leaders now command forty millions instead of three. Has the discriminating reader ever conjectured for himself the possible potency that lies there?

THE END.

APPENDIX.

SOME STATISTICS OF THE LATE WAR.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS.

1870.

July 15. War declared by France against Germany.

23. Empress of the French appointed Regent.

24. The Prussians blow up the railway bridge on the Rhine opposite Strasburg.

A skirmish at Grisweler.—French repulsed with loss of 10 men.

28. The Emperor and Prince Imperial leave Paris for Metz.

A small skirmish at Niederbronn.

31. The King of Prussia leaves Berlin.

Aug. 2. The French under General Frossard take Saarbrück.

4. French defeat at Weissenburg. Prisoners: 30 officers and 1,000 men.

6. French defeats at Woerth and Spicheren.

9. Resignation of the Ollivier Ministry, and General Montauban appointed Premier.

10. Commencement of the siege of Strasburg.

12. Capture of Fort Lichtenberg. Prisoners: 30 officers and 280 men.

Occupation of Nancy by four Uhlans.

14. Battle of Courcelles.

15. The French Fleet blockade the northern ports of Germany.

16. Battle of Mars La Tour.

17. General Trochu appointed Governor of Paris.

18. Defeat of French at Gravelotte.

19. The Bombardment of Strasburg begins.

23. Metz invested.

26. Capture of Fort Vitry. Prisoners: 17 officers and 850 men.

1870.

Aug. 29. The Crown Prince of Saxony defeats Marshal MacMahon at Beaumont.

30. Further defeat of MacMahon.

31. Unsuccessful attempt of Marshal Bazaine to escape from Metz.

A severe engagement near Douzy.—The French driven into Sedan.

Sep. 1. Defeat of Marshal MacMahon at Sedan.

2. Capitulation of Sedan, surrender of Napoleon III. Prisoners: The Emperor, 2,365 officers, and 98,450 men.

3. Flight of the Empress and the Prince Imperial from Paris.

4. Revolution in Paris. A Provisional Government appointed.

8. The Empress arrives at Hastings.

9. Capitulation of Laon. The magazine blown up by the French.

17. The French Government and the Corps Diplomatique remove to Tours.

19. Investment of Paris.

20. M. Favre's interview with Count Bismarck at Ferrières.

23. Surrender of Toul. Prisoners: 109 officers and 2,240 men.

24. Another ineffectual sortie from Metz.

27. Capitulation of Strasburg (48 days' siege). Prisoners: 450 officers and 17,000 men.

30. Repulse of a sortie from Paris.

Oct. 5. German Headquarters at Versailles.

7. M. Gambetta leaves Paris in a balloon.

10. Defeat of the French at Arthenay.

11. Occupation of Orleans.

12. General Aurelles de Paladine appointed to the command of the army of the Loire.

16. Surrender of Soissons. Prisoners: 4,000. Garibaldi assumes the command of the Vosges Army.

18. Capitulation of Châteaudun.

24. Capitulation of Schelestadt. Prisoners: 2,400 men. General de Kératry goes to Brittany to form an army.

27. Capitulation of Metz (70 days' siege). Prisoners: 6,000 officers and 167,000 men.

28. M. Thiers goes to Paris to negotiate an Armistice.

29. Dijon entered by the Germans.

1870.

Oct. 31. Disturbances in Paris. The Radicals attempt to seize the Hôtel de Ville.

Nov. 3. A plebiscitum in Paris—confidence in the Government declared by 557,976 against 62,638 votes.

Investment of Belfort.

6. The Armistice negotiations abruptly broken off. M. Bismarck refuses to permit the re-victualling of Paris.

8. Capitulation of Verdun. Prisoners: 1,500 men.

9. Aurelles de Paladine defeats von der Tann at Coulmiers, and retakes Orleans.

10. Capitulation of New Breisach. Prisoners: 100 officers and 4,900 men.

24. Capitulation of Thionville. Prisoners: 4,000 men.

26. The Garibaldians defeated near Dijon.

27. Capitulation of La Fère. Prisoners: 2,000 men.

Manteuffel defeats the French Army of the North near Amiens.

28. Amiens occupied by General von Göben.

Aurelles de Paladine defeated by Prince Frederick Charles at Beaune-le-Rolande.

29. Great sortie from Paris. The French take Brie and Champigny.

Dec. 2. The Parisian Army forced to retreat.

3. Another defeat of the Army of the Loire.

4. The Germans re-enter Orleans.

Occupation of Rouen.

8. Defeat of General Chanzy at Beaugency.

9. Occupation of Dieppe.

11. The French Government removes to Bordeaux.

12. After four days' hard fighting, Chanzy retreats to Blois.

Capitulation of Phalsburg. Prisoners: 52 officers and 1,839 men.

13. Blois occupied by the Germans.

14. Capitulation of Montmedy. Prisoners: 3,000 men.

16. Dieppe, Fêcamp, and Havre, blockaded by the French fleet.

General Chanzy defeated at Vendôme.

19. Von Werder gains a victory at Nuits in the south-east.

the pursuit and capture by General von Werder. The French have taken very few prisoners throughout the war.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN FORCES.

At the commencement of the war the official return of the French troops sent to the frontier was 250,000, to which Germany opposed a force of 350,000. At Woerth, Marshal MacMahon had only 50,000 men against the Crown Prince with 130,000. Of these 10,000 Frenchmen and 7000 Germans were killed or wounded. Strasburg, with a garrison of more than 17,000, was besieged by a force exceeding 60,000. Metz, which contained 173,000 men, surrendered to a force of about 200,000. In the battles of Sedan the French numbered about 150,000, and the Germans 240,000. Paris contained about 500,000 troops (National, Mobile, and Line), while the whole number of the besiegers only amounted to about 250,000 men. The Army of the Loire, under General Aurelles de Paladines, was reckoned at 180,000 men, but his opponent, Prince Frederick Charles, defeated him with only 90,000. The Army of the North, under General Faidherbe, was 60,000, and was routed by General Manteuffel with only half that number. Von Werder had only 75,000 men round Belfort against Bourbaki's army of 120,000 and the besieged garrison of 8000.

THE TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE GERMANS.

At the time of the conclusion of the armistice of the 28th January more than one-third of France was occupied by the enemy. The line of demarcation during the suspension of hostilities commenced at Pont l'Evêque, in the Department of Calvados, and proceeded southwards in an irregular line to the most southern part of Indre et Loire. Hence it skirted the south of the Departments of the Loir et Cher, the Loiret, and the Yonne. At the Department of the Côte d'Or it became less defined, and was mainly left to the positions actually occupied by the contending armies. The Pas de Calais and the Côtes du Nord, however, situated at the north-east of France, remained in the hands of the French, as well as the town of Havre. This arrangement left no less than twenty-nine of the eighty-eight Departments of France in the occupation of the Prussians.

THE TERRITORIAL CESSION TO GERMANY.

The territory demanded by Germany in the terms of peace is most important from a military point of view, and would effectually prevent a French invasion of Germany, as well as render it comparatively easy for the Germans to overrun France in case of another war. The new frontier-line begins at Cattenom, near Longwy, on the borders of the Duchy of Luxemburg, and takes a southern course, having Thionville, Metz, Château Salins, on the east (all of which now therefore belong to Germany), and Verdun, Toul, Nancy, and Luneville on the west. After cutting a corner off the Department of the Vosges the line then coincides with the western boundary of the Department of the Haut Rhin as far as the canton of Belfort, which it leaves to France by striking off to the canton of Delle, between which town and Joncherey it terminates on the Swiss frontier. Germany is thus advanced about a hundred miles nearer Paris, and comes into possession of a long line of forts invaluable for defensive purposes. The principal forts are Metz La Pucelle, Thionville, Strasburg, Schelestadt, Bitsche, Marsal, New Breisach, Phalsburg, and Hagenau, while amongst the towns are Colmar, Mulhausen, Guebwiller, Molsheim, Saverne, Château Salins, Sarreguemines, and Forbach. Thus the whole Department of the Bas Rhin, the greater portions of the Moselle, the Meurthe, and the Haut Rhin, and a small corner of the Vosges, are comprised in the concession, which may be more briefly described as the whole of Alsace (minus Belfort), and about a fifth of Lorraine. The accurate definition of the new frontier is to be entrusted to an International Commission. The ceded territory, which is about 6200 square miles in area, contains 2,000,000 inhabitants, who are, as a rule, steady and hard working, and will prove a great loss to France. As, however, they are to have three years to choose their nationality, and as they are devotedly attached to France, it is probable that the greater part will remove eastward, and that though the territory will change hands, the majority of the population will remain faithful to France.*

* The foregoing is taken from *The Graphic* of the 11th of March, 1871, with the exception of some additions which we found it necessary to make to the "Table of Events."

Printed at "The Ballarat Star" Office, Sturt Street.

NOTE.

THE accompanying "Plan of Paris and its Fortifications" represents the line of the investing armies, and the positions seized or held by them in the end of September or beginning of October, so far as could be ascertained by careful examination of the journals of that time. Several of these positions were shortly afterwards abandoned by the Germans, and were subsequently occupied by the French, and strengthened by them. On the peninsula to the north of Fort Valerien, the positions of Gennevilliers, Courbevoie, and Nanterre, marked as German, were then abandoned, as also that of Villejuif, to the south of the city. On the east, the hill of Avron was also strongly fortified by the besieged. The lines of the besiegers, it must also be remembered, were greatly strengthened after the fall of Metz.

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